Hardwick v. Price

• Decision Date: 16 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 42246,42246,1
• Citation: 114 Ga.App. 817,152 S.E.2d 905
• Parties: Robert L. HARDWICK v. Suzanne PRICE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 905

152 S.E.2d 905

114 Ga.App. 817

Robert L. HARDWICK v. Suzanne PRICE.

No. 42246.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Dec. 16, 1966.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 9, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It was not error to refuse to exclude medical testimony, admitted conditionally, to the effect that the plaintiff's injury 'could' or 'might' have been caused by the accident in question where the properly admitted evidence subsequently introduced tended to substantiate the medical testimony.

2. Plaintiff's counsel's closing argument to the jury, suggesting as the arbitrary hourly worth of the plaintiff's pain and suffering, 'the price of a measley bottle of Coca-Cola,' was not an invasion of the jury's province of estimating such damages by the impartial jurors' own enlightened consciences.

3. Failure to charge in the exact language requested, where the charge substantially covered the same principle, is no longer a ground for a new trial under Code Ann. § 70-207, as re-enacted.

4. The amount of the verdict was authorized by the evidence.

5. The general grounds are abandoned.

Suzanne Price brought an action against Robert L. Hardwick for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's alleged negligence in colliding with the automobile in which the plaintiff was passenger. The trial of the case resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $7,500. The defendant's amended motion for a new trial was overruled and the appeal is from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Gambrell, Harlan, Russell & Moye, Edward W. Killorin, David A. Handley, Atlanta, for appellant.

J. R. Cullens, Cartersville, for appellee.

FELTON, Chief Judge.

1. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved to exclude the medical testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had a 'retroverted uterus,' which 'could' or 'might' have been caused by the accident in question, which evidence had been admitted by the court subject to subsequent evidence to establish its relevancy.

Evidence which, in connection with other evidence, tends, however slightly, to prove, explain, or illustrate a fact, even though it is not sufficient, standing alone, to sustain a finding of such fact, is relevant, has probative value and is admissible as against objection as to its relevancy and probative value; doubt as to the latter should be resolved in favor of admission and against exclusion, sufficiency not being a test or condition of admissibility. Anno. 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1118; Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall, 207 Ga. 314(1), 61 S.E.2d 469; Fuller v. State, 196 Ga. 237(2), 26 S.E.2d 281; Livingston v. Barnett, 193 Ga. 640(3, a), 19 S.E.2d 385; Nugent v. Watkins, 129 Ga. 382(2), 58 S.E. 888; Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705(7), 45 S.E. 630, 98 Am.St.Rep. 145; Shelnutt v. Phillips, 113 Ga.App. 321(1), 147 S.E.2d 803; Melaver v. Garis, 110 Ga.App. 267, 268, 138 S.E.2d 435; Williams v. Young, 105 Ga.App. 391(1), 124 S.E.2d 795; Curtis v. State, 102 Ga.App. 790, 795, 118 S.E.2d 264; Yellow Cab Co. v. McCullers, 98 Ga.App. 601, 609(7), 106 S.E.2d 535; Thomas v. State, 95 Ga.App. 699(9), 99 S.E.2d 242; Garner v. State, 83 Ga.App. 178(3), 63 S.E.2d 225; Continental Trust Co. v. Bank of Harrison, 36 Ga.App. 149, 150(5), 136 S.E. 319.

Evidence was introduced to the following effect: That plaintiff occupied a vehicle which, while traveling at approximately 15 miles per hour, collided with the defendant's vehicle with an impact sufficient to damage substantially the right front end of plaintiff's vehicle and throw the plaintiff forward and sideways against the interior of her vehicle, causing bruises of her arm, shoulder and side; that she was, at the time of the collision, approximately 4 weeks pregnant; that she felt an immediate 'slight stinging sensation' in some undisclosed portion of her body; that she experienced pain in the lower portion of her 'stomach' and regular 'spotting' or bleeding, beginning about 2 weeks after the collision annd continuing for 3 to 4 weeks; and that the plaintiff had had normal sexual relations with her husband prior to the collision, but that, following the 'stinging sensation' she experienced during the collision, she began to experience such extreme pain during intercourse that she lost the ability and desire to have sexual relations, which was the primary cause, in her opinion of her eventual separation and divorce. Dr. Worthy testified that, as of the time of his examination of the plaintiff, which was three years after the collision and the day before the trial, the plaintiff had a retroverted uterus, which resulted in a very tender pelvis and that dispareunia, or painful intercourse, is a common consequence of a retroverted uterus.

The foregoing evidence was sufficient-in connection with Dr. Worthy's testimony as to his opinion that the described condition could have been caused by the collision-to justify the submission of the case to the jury. Therefore, although the complained-of testimony alone would not have been admissible for lack of relevancy and probative value, it became admissible when supplemented by the subsequent evidence of the plaintiff's onset of the described symptoms immediately following the collision. See 135 A.L.R. 516, 532; 2 A.L.R.3d 384, 387; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga.App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507; Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Moody, 100 Ga.App. 690, 112 S.E.2d 202. The court did not err in its judgment refusing to exclude the subject testimony.

2. The court did not err in allowing plaintiff's counsel, over defendant's objection, to make the following closing argument to the jury with respect to the measure of damages for pain and suffering: 'I am going to conclude now and I want to say this to you, and listen to me closely; would it be fair to say that it is worth a dime an hour, the price of a measley bottle of Coca-Cola, for this child, would it be worth that to go through what she has gone through, from now to the end of her allotted time on this earth that God Almighty gives us? At ten cents an hour that is $2.40 a day, there are 365 days in a year * * *'

Although a witness may not express his opinion as to the monetary value of damages for pain and suffering, it is not improper for counsel to argue to the jury the per diem, monthly or yearly value of the plaintiff's...