Williams v. Young

• Decision Date: 22 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 39159,39159,3
• Citation: 124 S.E.2d 795,105 Ga.App. 391
• Parties: Herbert WILLIAMS v. C. C. YOUNG
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 795

124 S.E.2d 795

105 Ga.App. 391

Herbert WILLIAMS v. C. C. YOUNG.

No. 39159.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Jan. 22, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1962.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Every fact or circumstance which tends to throw light upon the issue being tried is proper evidence for the jury's consideration. In this case, evidence that three years prior to the time she was injured the plaintiff's wife was capable of rendering certain described services and of doing certain kinds of work, was admissible as a circumstance from which the jury could infer the physical condition of the plaintiff's wife immediately prior to the injuries and evaluate the plaintiff's loss of services resulting therefrom, where there was no evidence that her physical condition had changed between that time and the time she received the injuries.

2. The 5th, 6th, 7th and 15th grounds of the motion for a new trial, complaining of portions of the charge, and alleging error therein on various grounds do not show harmful or reversible error.

3. Documentary evidence which was merely cumulative of oral testimony as to the amount of certain expenses incurred by the plaintiff for dental services to his wife was properly admitted over the objection that these bills were not shown to have been incurred as the result of the injury sustained by her in the collision in question.

4. The instructions given the jury with respect to the method to be used by it in computing the plaintiff's damages on account of future diminution in his earning capacity were not such as to lead them to reach a mathematical figure based solely on his loss of earnings for life and without regard to the fact that in his declining years there might be a decrease in his capacity to labor at his calling and in his ability to earn money, irrespective of the injuries received by him, and the failure of the court to charge and instruct the jury as to this latter principle, in the absence of a timely written request therefor, was not harmful or reversible error.

5. The instruction with respect to the use of the mortality tables and the computation of damages for permanent diminution in the plaintiff's earning capacity was authorized by the evidence and it was not harmfully erroneous.

6. The terms 'injury' and 'damage' are synonymous terms. Accordingly, an instruction to the jury that the negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury or damage claimed before a recovery therefor would be allowed, is not an incorrect abstract principle of law as against the contention that the instruction should have been that the negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury and damage claimed.

7. The verdict was neither excessive nor unauthorized by the evidence.

C. C. Young brought suit against Herbert Williams, individually, and T. H. Jefferson, Herbert Williams and Alton Williams, a partnership doing business as 600 Cab Company. Prior to suit, the partnership and all individuals named therein were stricken as parties defendant, and the case proceeded solely against Herbert Williams individually. The injury and damage sued for were alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff as the result of an automobile collision between his automobile and that of the defendant Williams, which occurred in the City of Cartersville on December 8, 1957, at approximately 5:35 o'clock, P. M. It was alleged that at that time the plaintiff was driving his automobile in a northerly direction on South Tennessee Street, his automobile proceeding along the right-hand side of said street in its proper lane of travel; that at the intersection on South Tennessee Street with Leake and Gilmer Streets Gilmer Street intersects with Tennessee Street from the northwest and that the vehicle being driven by Williams approached the intersection from the north, or northwest, on Gilmer Street and to the left of the plaintiff; that the traffic light, at the time and place, was green for plaintiff, and that as plaintiff proceeded through the intersection Williams' vehicle entered the intersection from plaintiff's left on Gilmer Street, crossed the south-bound, or west, lane of Tennessee Street, cut across the center line of Tennessee Street and into the east or north-bound lane of said street immediately in front of plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff alleged that when he saw defendant's vehicle approaching he applied his brakes and cut his vehicle to the right to avoid a collision, but that the defendant's vehicle came across the center line directly in front of the plaintiff and crashed into his automobile, damaging the right front end and inflicting personal injuries on the plaintiff and his wife, who was riding in the car with him. Plaintiff further alleged that he received a severe blow to his chest, suffered excruciating pain therefrom, and a knot developed internally; that he remained sore and has continued to suffer and will continue to suffer therefrom for the rest of his life; that in addition thereto, he received blows about his head, arms, shoulders, abdomen and chest area, for which hospital treatment was necessary. He alleged further that his wife was thrown violently against the instrument panel and windshield of the car, her knees, forehead and head striking the instrument panel and windshield, and that she noticed immediately pain in her groins, back, legs, lower abdomen and head; that she suffered a severe sprain to her back area, a ruptured intervertebral disc between the fifth lumbar and first sacral vertebra; that her injuries required immediate hospitalization but that she was subsequently taken home, and on February 1, 1958, she entered the Floyd County Hospital where she remained for 17 days; that upon returning home, she was confined to her bed for a period of three weeks, and that thereafter and until the present time she has had to remain in bed an average of two hours a day on account of her injuries and will be compelled to do this for an indefinite period of time; that as the result of her injuries she is handicapped in her household and other activities, must take medicine therefor and still suffers pain, discomfort and nervousness. Plaintiff sued for loss of his wife's services in the performance of her household duties, loss of her companionship and consortium in general, for hospital, medical, nursing and drug expenses incurred by him on behalf of himself and his wife as the result of their personal injuries, for his own pain and suffering, for the actual loss of time from his work, and for past, present and future diminution of his capacity to work, labor and earn money, and for damage to his automobile. In his answer, the defendant merely denied the allegations of the petition. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $17,750.28. Defendant made a motion for a new trial on the usual general grounds, which he later amended by the addition of 19 special grounds, numbered 4 through 22, inclusive. The trial court overruled that motion and the exception here is to that judgment.

J. R. Cullens, Cartersville, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. A. Ingram, Henry A. Keever, Cartersville, for defendant in error.

CARLISLE, Presiding Judge (after stating the foregoing facts).

1. Grounds 4 and 11 of the motion for a new trial complain because the trial court permitted a witness for the plaintiff to testify that Mrs. Yong, prior to the injuries in question, washed and ironed, kept house, did all of the mopping, went to the field, picked cotton and chopped cotton, and in doing all of these chores, never made any complaints concerning pain in her body; that she also worked at a chenille bedspread factory, but that after their son, Phillip, was born (a little less than three years prior to the date of the injuries) she quit working at the spread factory, the objection being that such testimony did not reflect her condition and ability to render services to the plaintiff at the time of the collision and was irrelevant and immaterial, since such testimony related to her activities in 1954, more than three years before the date of her injuries. Every fact, or circumstance, which tends to throw light upon the issue being tried is proper evidence for the jury's consideration. Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Marshall, 207 Ga. 314(1), 61 S.E.2d 469. The rule in this State is that, where the relevancy of evidence is in doubt, it will be admitted for the jury's consideration and the jury permitted, under proper instruction, to give to the evidence just such weight and probative value as it sees fit. Brown v. Wilson, 55 Ga.App. 262, 263(1), 189 S.E. 860. 'Evidence which is only indirectly relevant to the issue on trial, but which tends somewhat to illustrate it and to aid the jury in arriving at the truth of the matter should be admitted. Walker & Chapman v. Mitchell, 41 Ga. 102.' Talbotton R. Co. v. Gibson, 106 Ga. 229, 236 (32 S.E. 151). And see Continental Trust Co. v. Bank of Harrison, 36 Ga.App. 149, 150(5), 136 S.E. 319. The evidence objected to as complained of in these grounds of the motion, when considered in its context with the other evidence, was such as to authorize the jury to infer the physical condition and nature of the services that Mrs. Young was able to render to the plaintiff immediately prior to the injuries inflicted upon her in the collision in question. It being of this nature, it was properly admitted. Walker v. Roberts, 20 Ga. 15. It is not likely that the jury understood that such evidence was admitted for the purpose of showing directly the condition of Mrs. Young immediately prior to the injuries but there was no evidence that her condition had changed in any material respect from the time testified about by the witness as here complained of. That the loss of ability of the wife to perform such services constitutes a part of the husband's damages in a case of this nature is hardly open...