Hare v. Potter

• Decision Date: 12 February 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 02-CV-7373.
• Citation: 549 F.Supp.2d 698
• Parties: Jamie G. HARE v. John POTTER, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

549 F.Supp.2d 698

Jamie G. HARE v. John POTTER, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service.

Civil Action No. 02-CV-7373.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

February 12, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jordan Yeager, Boockvar & Yeager, Bethlehem, PA, for Jamie G. Hare.

Karen Lee Tomlinson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for John Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TIMOTHY R. RICE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jamie Hare seeks attorney's fees and costs after a jury found she was the victim of a retaliatory hostile work environment. The jury, however, awarded no compensatory damages and I denied her back pay request. Hare v. Potter, 549 F.Supp.2d 688, 691, 2007 WL 4275508, at *1 (2007). Hare is no longer employed by United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"); but I granted her equitable relief consisting of supplemental management training and a requirement that the Postal Service post notices of the verdict in certain regional offices. See id. Although the Postal Service maintains Hare is precluded from recovering fees and costs, I grant Hare's motion because the verdict establishes she is a "prevailing party" and a fee award furthers the purpose of Title VII.

I. Background

In 2002, Hare brought an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2003), against the Post Service, seeking damages and equitable relief. Complaint at 8-10, HARE v. POTTER, No. 02-07373, 2002 WL 34341654 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2002) The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for the Postal Service and remanded as to three claims. Hare v. Potter, 220 Fed.Appx. 120 (3d Cir.2007). After the parties agreed to drop the gender retaliation claim, the jury returned a split verdict on the remaining two claims: ruling for the Postal Service on the retaliation due to exclusion from career advancement claim, and ruling for Hare on the retaliatory hostile work environment claim.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hare, the verdict winner, see Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1097 n. 6 (3d Cir.1995), the retaliatory hostile work environment was based on evidence that Hare was a highly regarded postmaster on the promotion track until she filed complaints of sexual harassment and retaliation. Hare frequently had been selected for assignments as acting-post office operations manager and acting officer-in-eharge for various post offices, received superior evaluations, and was part of the Postal Service's succession plan. In 2000, Hare filed a complaint of sexual harassment by a postal inspector and a complaint of retaliation against certain members of the Postal Service management. After these complaints, her career plummeted. Although she was promoted to another postmaster position in 2002, she received little assistance from management in performing her new job, and received less favorable evaluations. While Hare was on sick leave, her replacement was told to leave the work for Hare's return, which resulted in additional work for her and lapsed deadlines. Hare never again received additional prestigious assignments in upper management, as she had before filing her harassment complaint.

Hare also endured numerous audits at her new office, ranging from one-day audits to audits that lasted for many months, each of which impacted the ability of her post office to function and her ability to perform her job. For example, while she was on leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, her postage stamp inventory was sealed and she could not obtain postage stamps upon her return until an audit was conducted. In addition, her former supervisor became aware of various operational issues at Hare's post office. The operational issues were referred to the Inspection Service, not to Hare or Hare's supervisors, which was normal procedure, and the Inspection Service did not conduct an investigation until approximately a year later. The inspection found no misconduct on the part of Hare or her employees. Amid the stress of handling such recurring issues, Hare resigned and ended what had been a promising career.

II. Discussion

"[I]n the absence of legislation providing otherwise, parties bear their own attorney's fees and costs." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 415, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)). Congress provided limited exceptions to this rule under selected statutes, including Title VII, which applies here. Id. at 415-16, 98 S.Ct. 694; accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Congress authorized fee-shifting for prevailing Title VII plaintiffs "to encourage individuals injured by . . . discrimination to seek judicial relief." Newman v. Piggie Park Enter, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968); accord Albemarle Paper.Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (applying Piggie Park to Title VII cases). A Title VII plaintiff is the "chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate `a policy that Congress considered the highest priority'" Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 418-19, 98 S.Ct. 694 (quoting Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402, 88 S.Ct. 964). "If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneyL's] fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402, 88 S.Ct. 964.

Under Title VII, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Plaintiffs must establish they are a prevailing party, and that the requested fee is reasonable. Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir.1996); see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,116-17,113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (O'Connor, J. concurring); Buss v. Quigg, 2002 WL 31262060, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 9, 2002) (Schiller, J.).

Only a plaintiff who is a "prevailing party" can be awarded attorney's fees. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109, 113 S.Ct. 566.¹ The Supreme Court has broadly construed the term `prevailing parties.' See Truesolell v. Phila, Hons. Autk, 290 F.3d 159, 163 (2002) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). "[P]laintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some benefits the parties sought in bringing the suit." Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933). To qualify as a "prevailing party", the plaintiff "must obtain an enforceable judgment" or comparable relief against the defendant. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 566 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987); Maker v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,129,100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980)). A pronouncement the defendant violated federal law "unaccompanied by an enforceable judgment on the merits, does not render the plaintiff a prevailing party. Of itself, `the moral satisfaction [that] results from any favorable statement of law" cannot bestow prevailing party status." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 762, 107 S.Ct. 2672) (alterations in original).

Hare's status as a prevailing party is a close question. "[A] plaintiff `prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 566. Although a plaintiff who received only a judgment is not a prevailing party, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), a plaintiff awarded nominal damages is a prevailing plaintiff, Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112,113 S.Ct. 566 (plaintiff prevailing party when awarded nominal damages). Similarly, a plaintiff awarded equitable relief may be a prevailing party. See Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F.3d 541, 544 (3d Cir.1994) (plaintiff prevails if received injunctive relief or recovered damages) overruled on other' grounds by Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 602, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001); Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 677, 678 (9th Cir.1997) (prevailing party even though no damages or reinstatement where equitable relief included ordering the defendant to cease and desist notification of prospective employers of its employees or former employees' protected activity, remove a negative reference from the plaintiffs personnel file, provide EEO training, and post the EEOC notice); but see Barnes v. Broward County Sheriffs Office, 190 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (applicant not a prevailing party because the plaintiff could not receive benefit from the injunction prohibiting use of challenged test). Once the "litigation materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, `the degree of the plaintiffs overall success goes to the reasonableness of the fee award,'" not whether the plaintiff is a prevailing party. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 452,103 S.Ct. 1933).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found Fair Housing Act² plaintiffs prevailing parties where the plaintiffs, an individual and the Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc., received no monetary or equitable relief. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 423-24, 430 (3d Cir.2000). After a jury found the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act but did not award damages, the trial court did not submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, entered judgment in favor of the defendant, and directed the parties to bear...