Harfred Auto Imports, Inc. v. Yaxley

• Citation: 343 So.2d 79
• Decision Date: 03 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. BB--146,BB--146
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Parties: HARFRED AUTO IMPORTS, INC., a Florida Corporation and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, an Insurance Corporation, Appellants, v. Richard YAXLEY, Sr., et al., Appellees.

Page 79

343 So.2d 79

8 A.L.R.4th 259

HARFRED AUTO IMPORTS, INC., a Florida Corporation and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, an Insurance Corporation, Appellants, v. Richard YAXLEY, Sr., et al., Appellees.

No. BB--146.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 3, 1977.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1977.

Richard T. Jones of Jones & Langdon, R. Franklin Ritch, of Ritch & Graves, Gainesville, for appellants.

James S. Quincey, Gainesville, William M. Howell and Robert L. Cowles, of Howell, Howell, Liles & Braddock, Jacksonville, Louisa Smith, of Adam, Montgomery, Lytal, Reiter, Denney & Searcy, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

McCORD, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment against appellants (defendants) Harfred Auto Imports, Inc., (hereafter called Harfred) and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (hereafter called Hartford) and appellees (defendants) James Paul Crown, individually and as partner d/b/a Crown-Owen Fleet Service (hereafter called Crown-Owen) and Security Insurance Company (hereafter called Security) and in favor of appellees (plaintiffs) Richard Yaxley, Sr., and Dorothy Yaxley, his wife. Appellants (Harfred and its insurance carrier, Hartford) contend they are not liable for damages to the Yaxleys which resulted from a collision between the Yaxleys' automobile and an automobile owned by appellant Harfred and driven by a partner of appellee Crown-Owen, because at the time of the accident, Crown-Owen, as an independent contractor, had the automobile in its possession and control to make repairs upon it. We agree and reverse.

Harfred is an automobile dealer in new and used cars. The car involved in this accident was taken by Harfred in trade and was inoperable, it having been towed to its place of business. Crown-Owen serviced automobiles for both automobile dealerships and general businesses. Harfred had the car towed to Crown-Owen's place of business to get it running so it could be shown on the used car lot. After putting the engine in running condition, Mr. Crown drove the car on the public thoroughfares to road test it and to take his partner, Mr. Owen, to another place of business to repair a vehicle there. While on this joint mission, Crown approached a stop sign and applied the brakes, but they did not hold and the car slid through the stop sign coming to rest in a lane of traffic in which the Yaxleys were traveling. The Taxley vehicle struck the Harfred vehicle being driven by Crown, and Mrs. Yaxley sustained injuries. The record does not show that either Harfred or Crown-Owen had knowledge of the defective brakes.

Prior to trial, the court entered summary final judgment in favor of appellants Harfred and Hartford, but thereafter entered an order quashing the judgment because it found that the two cases relied upon were not controlling--Patrick v. Faircloth Buick Company, 185 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2 DCA 1966), and Fry v. Robinson Printers, Inc., 155 So.2d 645 (Fla. 2 DCA 1963). These two cases are exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, involving accidents on the premises of an alleged independent contractor. The trial court considered that the accident in the case sub judice did not fall within the ambit of the two cases because it occurred on the public highways.

Subsequently, on trial of the case, the court denied appellant's motions for directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiffs' case and again at the end of the defendants' case. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in quashing the summary final judgment previously entered in their favor; in refusing to grant appellants' motions for directed verdict and in refusing to give appellants' requested Standard Jury Instruction 3.3(b) regarding an independent contractor. Appellants also contend the trial court erred in dismissing their cross-claim against Crown-Owen, but that point is moot in view of the ruling which we here make. The central determinative question on this appeal is whether or not appellants are liable to the Yaxleys under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. It is our ruling that they are not.

In Southern Cotton Oil Company v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), the Supreme Court originally applied the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles. There, the doctrine was grounded upon respondeat superior--the master servant relationship. In Southern the negligent driver of the automobile was the employee of the owner. Subsequently, the doctrine has been extended to cover situations which go beyond the master-servant relationship. In Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla.1958), the Supreme Court said:

'Consistently we have announced that this rule of liability rests on an application of the principle of respondeat superior. In other words, as a matter of law the relationship of principal and agent is raised out of the factual situation. When one permits another to operate his automobile under his license, he becomes as a matter of law the principal and the driver becomes his agent for (that) purpose.'

The Supreme Court of Florida has not ruled on the applicability of the independent contractor exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in the situation here presented.

In Fry, supra, the District Court of Appeal, ...