Hargis v. Department of Human Resources, S00A0162.
Decision Date | 14 July 2000 |
Docket Number | No. S00A0162.,S00A0162. |
Citation | 272 Ga. 617,533 S.E.2d 712 |
Parties | HARGIS v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Christopher A. Townley, Thomas F. Lindsay, Rossville, for appellant.
Womack & Rhyne, John T. Siess, Lafayette, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katherine S. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. HINES, Justice.
The Department of Human Resources ("DHR") filed suit to establish William Hargis's paternity of a minor. Hargis answered on May 20, 1997, demanding a jury trial. On July 1, 1997, an amendment to OCGA § 19-7-40 became effective which extinguished the right to a jury trial in a paternity suit. Trial was set on the non-jury calender and Hargis filed a motion for jury trial, which was denied. This Court granted Hargis's application for interlocutory review to consider the trial court's ruling that he did not have a right to a jury trial.
Hargis contends that applying amended OCGA § 19-7-40 to him unconstitutionally deprives him of the right to trial by jury. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI; Kelley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 269 Ga. 384, 384-385(1), 498 S.E.2d 741 (1998). It is without question that Hargis had a right to a jury trial when he filed his demand. See former OCGA § 19-7-40(a) & (b). Thus, the question is whether the amendment to the statute, effective July 1, 1997, may be given retroactive application in light of Georgia's constitutional ban on retroactive laws. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X; Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 105(1), 317 S.E.2d 189 (1984). "Although legislation which involves mere procedural or evidentiary changes may operate retrospectively, legislation which affects substantive rights may operate prospectively only." Enger v. Erwin, 245 Ga. 753, 267 S.E.2d 25 (1980). Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55(3), 365 S.E.2d 273 (1988).
The right to a jury trial is a substantive one. See Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367(4), 434 S.E.2d 484 (1993); Bell v. Cronic, 248 Ga. 457, 459, 283 S.E.2d 476 (1981). See also McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 49-51(2), 273 S.E.2d 847 (1981) ( ). Accordingly, a statute providing that a civil defendant may demand a jury trial provides that defendant with a substantive right, and a statute removing that right cannot be given retroactive application. That right vested in Hargis upon his demand for a jury trial. See Paul v. Keene, 272 Ga. 357, 529 S.E.2d 135 (2000); Trulove v. Trulove, 233 Ga. 896, 213 S.E.2d 868 (1975); Walker v. Bivins, 57 Ga. 322, 325-326(2) (1876). Therefore, the 1997 amendment to OCGA § 19-7-40 was unconstitutionally applied to him.1
DHR argues that the legislature intended that the amendment to OCGA § 19-7-40 be applied retrospectively because other sections of Ga. L.1997, pp. 1613-1679 were specified to be effective January 1, 1998, and to "apply to all proceedings initiated on or after that date." Ga. L.1997, p. 1679, § 36. But the bill is silent as to retrospective or prospective application of the section at issue, other than to state that it, and most other sections, "become effective on July 1, 1997." Ga. L.1997, p. 1679, § 36. This silence is not language that "imperatively requires" retroactive application under the rules of statutory interpretation. See Coastal Ga. Reg. Dev. Center v. Higdon, 263 Ga. 827, 830(2), 439 S.E.2d 902 (1994); Polito, supra at (2), 365 S.E.2d 273. Further, even if it did show an intent for such application, the legislature may not enact a statute to apply retrospectively in violation of our constitutional provision barring retroactive laws. See Canton Textile Mills, supra; Enger, supra.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur.
1. It is not necessary to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Fowler Properties, Inc. v. Dowland
... ... constitutional provision barring retroactive laws." Hargis v. Dept. of [282 Ga. 79] ... Human Resources, 272 Ga ... ...
-
Burdett v. State
...which affects substantive rights may operate prospectively only." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hargis v. Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 617, 533 S.E.2d 712 (2000). Our courts have long recognized that OCGA § 17-7-171 affords an individual a statutory right to a fair trial — a righ......
-
In Re: Barbara R. Barker
...or evidentiary" which may act retroactively or "affects substantive rights" which may operate prospectively only. Hargis v. Dept. of Human Res., 272 Ga. 617 (2000). "Substantive law is that law which creates rights, duties and obligations. Procedural law is that law which proscribes the met......
-
Blaylock v. Blaylock, No. S03A0824.
...as an equitable portion of the marital assets. "The right to a jury trial is a substantive one. [Cits.]" Hargis v. Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 617, 618, 533 S.E.2d 712 (2000). Absent waiver, OCGA § 19-5-1(a) requires that a trial court submit a divorce case to a jury when an issuable ......
-
Trial Practice and Procedure - Kate S. Cook, Alan J. Hamilton, and John C. Morrison Iii
...197 (2007). 89. O.C.G.A. Sec. 9-11-68 (2006). 90. Fowler, 282 Ga. at 79-80, 646 S.E.2d at 200 (citing Hargis v. Dep't of Human Res., 272 Ga. 617, 618, 533 S.E.2d 712, 713 (2000)). 91. O.C.G.A. Sec. 9-11-68(b)(1) (2006). 92. Fowler, 282 Ga. at 77, 646 S.E.2d at 199. O.C.G.A. Sec. 9-11-68 bec......