Hargis v. Florida Real Estate Commission
Decision Date | 23 April 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 5629,5629 |
Citation | 174 So.2d 419 |
Parties | James O HARGIS, Jr., Petitioner, v. The FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION and Earle L. Mann, Respondents. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles E. Davis, of Fishback, Davis, Dominick & Troutman, Orlando, for petitioner.
Stanley A. Reese, Winter Park, for respondents.
This petition for certiorari seeks review of an order of the respondent Real Estate Commission suspending petitioner's broker registration. The order adjudged petitioner guilty of violating Florida Statute 475.25 (1)(a), F.S.A., with respect to six counts of a fifteen-count information. The order found petitioner guilyy of misrepresentation, concealment and dishonest dealings with persons in a confidential relationship with him and suspended his registration to run concurrently on each of the six counts.
Three hearings were held by the Commission--two two before the examiner on the merits of the case and one before the Commission upon petitioner's exceptions to the findings of the examiner and his recommended order of suspension. For purposes of this petition it is not necessary to set out the findings of the examiner in detail nor the facts surrounding the professional misconduct of which petitioner stood accused.
One question posed by petitioner is decisive of all three points he raises; i. e., did the calling of the petitioner to testify as an adverse witness in the administrative hearing which resulted adversely to his privileges under his broker's license violate his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to be a witness against himself?
The occurrences of which petitioner complains took place during the first hearin held before the examiner. Prior to the taking of any testimony all of the witnesses, including petitioner, were duly sworn. Several witnesses testified and then the petitioner was called by the attorney for the Commission as an adverse witness and the following took place:
Petitioner's Attorney: 'Now on this subject of calling the defendant as a witness, I am not acquainted with your procedures but I think the Constitution condemns such a thing and we do object to it.'
The Examiner: 'The objection will be over-ruled.'
Petitioner's Attorney: 'Is it the Court's ruling that Mr. Hargis is required to answer questions at this time?'
The Examiner: 'Without any further statement from you other than the fact you feel that it violates the constitution, is that your objection?'
Petitioner's Attorney: 'Yes.'
The Examiner: 'I am going to rule that Mr. Reese can ask (emphasis supplied) Mr. Hargis the questions he wishes relative to this information filed agaisnt him * * *.'
Petitioner's Attorney:
The petitioner was then questioned relative to various transactions involved in the information against him. None of the questions asked of him was challenged on the ground of tending to incriminate the petitioner.
It is not necessary to delive any further into the proceedings to settle the question presented here. We find the calling of the petitioner in this administrative hearing as an adverse witness and a ruling by the examiner that he may be asked questions relative to the information filed against him does not per se violate his right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself within the meaning of Sec. 12, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., which provides:
'No person shall be * * * compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 1
In the case of the criminally accused this is further spelled out by the provisions of Florida Statute 918.09, F.S.A.:
'In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own behalf * * * but no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to testify.'
The above makes it clear that had this petitioner stood 'criminally accused' or had this been a 'criminal' case the mere permitting of petitioner to be called as an adverse witness would have been violative of petit...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Spiegel
...Cal.3d 676, 103 Cal.Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968 (1972); State ex. rel. Arnold v. Revels, 100 So.2d 51 (Fla.1957); Hargis v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 174 So.2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); In re Zisook, 88 Ill.2d 321, 58 Ill.Dec. 786, 430 N.E.2d 1037 (1981); Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney-Respo......
-
Wiley v. Shanahan
...claim of self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis. 3 Two recent cases support our conclusions. In Hargis v. Florida Real Estate Comm. (Fla.App.) 174 So.2d 419, a real estate broker was called to testify before an administrative commission for the purpose of determining whether his......
-
McDaniel v. State
...that she was being compelled to testify against herself and no reversible error has been shown in this regard. Hargis v. Fla. Real Estate Commission, Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 419. The record shows that appellant was represented by counsel of her own choice at the hearing and consulted with h......
-
SCHLIEN v. SCHLIEN, 97-1489.
...party who voluntarily gives testimony in their own behalf waives the privilege against self-incrimination. Hargis v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 174 So.2d 419, 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172 (Fla.1993). If a party were permitted to present their statements to the tr......