Harhay v. Town of Ellington Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date21 March 2003
Docket NumberDocket No. 01-9173.
Citation323 F.3d 206
PartiesAnne E. HARHAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF ELLINGTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, Richard E. Packman, Maurice W. Blanchette, William R. Harford, Gary J. Blanchette, Cynthia A. Heidari, Donald Weekes, Kenneth J. Brennan, Susan J. Luginbuhl, John O'Shaugnessy, Wendy J. Ciparelli, and Richard Currey, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Michael J. Rose, Howd & Ludorf, Hartford, CT (John J. Radshaw, III and Thomas R. Gerarde, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.

Noah H. Starkey, Noah H. Starkey, Esq., Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: STRAUB, SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,* Judge.

GOLDBERG, Judge.

Plaintiff Anne E. Harhay brought an action against defendants Town of Ellington Board of Education (the "Board"), Superintendent Richard E. Packman, and the individual members of the Board (the "Board members") in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.). The action arises from the Board's refusal to accept the resignation of another teacher and rehire Harhay to fill the resulting vacancy. Harhay alleged a violation of her right to due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action, and defendants' legislative and qualified immunity as to plaintiff's due process claim. The district court denied the motion with respect to legislative and qualified immunity on August 28, 2001. Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed by the district court; her breach of contract claim remains pending against all defendants.

On appeal, we consider the following two legal issues: (1) whether the actions of the Board members allegedly denying plaintiff an opportunity to be reappointed were legislative in nature so as to qualify for legislative immunity; and (2) whether Packman and the Board members are entitled to freedom from suit for acts undertaken in their official capacity under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the district court's denial of the Board members' legislative immunity, but reverse in part the district court's denial of Packman and the Board members' qualified immunity. This case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Packman and the Board members on plaintiff's due process claim.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Anne E. Harhay was employed as an elementary school art teacher by the Board from September 1981 through March 1994. Throughout this time, Harhay's employment was governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the Board and her labor union, the Ellington Education Association. As part of a budgetary cutback, the Board voted on March 16, 1994 to terminate plaintiff's employment effective the following day, March 17, 1994. Plaintiff initiated arbitration by filing a grievance that was eventually rejected by the Connecticut Appellate Court.

At the time Harhay's employment was terminated, she was a tenured teacher under the authority of Connecticut General Statute § 10-151. As a tenured teacher, plaintiff could only be dismissed because of the elimination of her position if there was no other position for which she was qualified. There was no such vacancy on the date of her termination. As provided for in the CBA governing her contract, Harhay exercised her right to reappointment, which entailed being placed on a "reappointment list" for up to three years upon the date of her termination. While on the reappointment list, Harhay was entitled to be appointed to any position that became vacant for which she was qualified. Her name remained on the list for the maximum three years, until March 17, 1997.

On September 25, 1996, Norton Berkowitz, an Ellington art teacher, notified Packman in writing of his intent to retire effective February 1, 1997. The Board deemed Berkowitz's mid-year retirement a breach of contract, and tabled his request at a meeting on November 13, 1996, and several times thereafter. At the request of the State of Connecticut Teachers' Retirement Board, the Board and Packman completed a retirement form on January 3, 1997. It is not apparent from the record whether this form was ever submitted to the Retirement Board or otherwise was officially filed. Berkowitz ceased teaching in the Ellington public school system on February 1, 1997. His request was eventually approved by the Board, but with the effective date of his retirement designated as July 1, 1997.

In two separate letters dated November 21, 1996 and December 3, 1996, Harhay notified Packman of her desire to be appointed to the position being vacated by Berkowitz. On December 3, 1996, Packman informed Harhay by letter that the Board did not consider Berkowitz's early retirement valid and that therefore there was no vacancy. A "long-term substitute" teacher was hired to replace Berkowitz on February 1, 1997. Plaintiff remained on the reappointment list until March 17, 1997, but was never rehired to fill the vacancy.

Harhay filed two separate grievances, a Level II grievance and a Level III grievance, pursuant to the CBA. Through her union, she contested the Board's decision not to reappoint her to fill the vacancy resulting from Berkowitz's departure. In response to each grievance, Packman and the Board members responded by contending that no vacancy existed for an art teacher and therefore the Board was not obligated to reappoint her. Following the Board's denials of Harhay's grievances at two initial levels, only the union could seek arbitration under the terms of the CBA, which it did by filing a Level IV grievance on March 3, 1997. The union withdrew its demand for arbitration on March 18, 1997.

On January 29, 2000, Harhay filed suit in Connecticut State Court, claiming that the Board's refusal to allow Berkowitz to retire as of February 1, 1997 was part of a deliberate and concerted effort by the Board and the individual Board members to deny Harhay her right to be appointed to the vacant position left by Berkowitz. The action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action, plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and defendants' legislative and qualified immunity. On August 28, 2001, the district court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court found that plaintiff's allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on that count. The court ruled that plaintiff had not failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as set forth in the CBA, and denied summary judgment for breach of contract. The court found the Board members' conduct regarding Harhay's employment to be administrative in nature, and therefore ruled that absolute legislative immunity for the Board members did not apply. Lastly, the court decided that Packman and the Board members were not entitled to qualified immunity on Harhay's Section 1983 claim. In arriving at this conclusion, the court found that Harhay had a contractual right to be appointed to any vacancy for which she is qualified. Addressing the issue of qualified immunity, the court stated that a tenured public employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in his or her job of which he or she cannot be deprived without due process, but did not explicitly hold that plaintiff's contractual right to reappointment constituted a property interest under the Due Process Clause. Defendants have taken an interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision denying summary judgment on the basis of defendants' legislative and qualified immunity.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that their actions with respect to plaintiff's employment status are protected by the doctrines of legislative immunity and qualified immunity. We consider these claims individually.

This court has jurisdiction to consider the district court's denial of a claim of absolute and qualified immunity as an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to the extent that it turns on a matter of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("An appellate court reviewing the denial of ... immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law...." Id. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806.). We review de novo the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 2000).

I. Legislative Immunity

Legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities. This Circuit has previously held that absolute legislative immunity for Section 1983 actions extends to local legislators. See e.g., Carlos v. Santos, 123 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir.1997). We consider whether the purported actions of the Board members are protected by the doctrine of legislative immunity.

The test for determining whether an act is legislative "turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it." Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998). Under this functional test, immunity depends on the nature of the act itself, not the identity of the actor performing it. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).

The first step in our inquiry is whether the...

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