Harland v. State
| Decision Date | 04 October 1977 |
| Citation | 73 Cal.App.3d 894,141 Cal.Rptr. 215 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Dawn HARLAND, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant. Lisa HARRINGTON, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant. Susan CASHMAN, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant. Kirsten STEWART, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant. Viggo KONGSHOW, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE of California, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 38958. |
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Bergman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard M. Sperry, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, Harry S. Fenton, Chief Counsel, John P. Horgan, Kenneth G. Nellis, Paul B. Lahaderne, Robert R. Buell, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.
E. Robert Wallach, David B. Baum, San Francisco, William B. Boone, Santa Rosa, for plaintiffs and respondents.
The State of California has appealed from a judgment for damages in the aggregate sum of $3,052,000 caused by an automobile accident on the Benicia-Martinez Bridge. The judgment is based on jury verdicts finding the state responsible for the wrongful deaths of two victims of the accident and for personal injuries suffered by six other victims. The jury assessed damages against the state on two independent theories: negligence in permitting the driver of the other vehicle to be driving while away from his place of residence at the California Veterans Home at Yountville, and maintenance of the Benicia-Martinez Bridge in a dangerous condition. We affirm the judgment.
At about 4:30 in the afternoon on Sunday, October 26, 1970, respondents were riding in a 1967 Chevrolet pickup with a camper shell. Respondents were then 11 to 13 years of age and were part of a group of Girl Scouts returning to their homes in the San Jose-Santa Clara area from an outing in the Napa Valley. The pickup was being driven by Carl L. Harrington, father of two of the girls.
While proceeding south across the Benicia-Martinez Bridge, the Harrington camper was struck head-on by a 1965 Ford stationwagon driven by Author Edgmon, who had been returning to his place of residence at the California Veterans Home in Yountville. Edgmon's automobile had struck the guardrail on the bridge at the right margin of the northbound lanes and was propelled across the center median strip and into the southbound side of the highway; there it collided with the Harrington vehicle, which was entirely on its own side of the highway. Both vehicles caught fire, and were burning wildly when highway patrol officers arrived. Author Edgmon and Mr. and Mrs. Harrington all died in the flaming crash. In addition to sustaining cuts and broken bones, the young girls were severely burned.
Appellant contends that the staff at the Veterans Home did not have a duty to prevent Author Edgmon from driving his automobile. Absent a special relationship, there is ordinarily no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435-437, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334; Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 48-49, 123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36; Wright v. Arcade School Dist. (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 277, 40 Cal.Rptr 812; Rest.2d, Torts (1965) § 315.) 1 It is respondents' contention that a special relationship existed in this case between the State of California and Author Edgmon giving rise to a duty of care on the part of employees at the Veterans Home. (See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 435-437, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334; Poncher v. Brackett (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 769, 772-773; Rest.2d, Torts (1965) § 319.) 2 Respondents point out that at all times during which Author Edgmon resided at the Veterans Home he was subject to a rule (adopted by the commandant of the home under authority of Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 12, § 502) that no resident could leave or remain away from the premises without a written pass. Edgmon kept an automobile on the Home premises which he sometimes drove on weekends to Stanislaus County, where his wife resided. Edgmon was returning from such a trip, with a written pass, when the accident occurred.
There was evidence that a special relationship did exist between the responsible authorities at the California Veterans Home and Edgmon. The state provides hospitalization or domiciliary care at the Home for necessitous veterans. Edgmon was incapable of sustaining himself outside the Home due to his physical and mental disabilities. Residents of the Home are subject to some control by the staff, as evidenced by published regulations (see Mil. & Vet.Code, §§ 1023, 1044; Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 12, §§ 502-508) and as reflected in the contractual agreement signed by entering veterans as a condition of admission. Any resident of the Home who left without permission was subject to discipline including discharge from the Home. A resident could obtain permission to park his vehicle on the Home premises; Author Edgmon was given such permission.
Members of the staff had on prior occasions prevented residents from driving "(i)f there is a question about an old stroke and a possibility of seizure or a blackout or hypertension over certain ages, . . ." However, at the time of the events in question, there was apparently no procedure in effect for determining whether residents remained capable of driving; there was no communication between the medical and administrative staffs on this matter, and passes were issued as a clerical matter unless the resident's history card showed some restriction.
Author Edgmon was admitted to the California Veterans Home on January 29, 1968, having come from the federal Veterans Administration Hospital in Palo Alto. He remained at Yountville from 1968 until he died, except for a period of four and a half months from April until mid-August of 1969 when he was returned to the Palo Alto V. A. Hospital. His medical history showed that he had suffered a head injury in 1942, probably causing meningeal adhesions to the brain. He had a long history of headaches of an incapacitating intensity, and suffered frequently from dizziness, nausea, what he described as "blackouts," blurred vision and diplopia or double vision.
Edgmon was regularly administered four drugs at the Home: (1) Dilatin, an anticonvulsant drug primarily used in the treatment of epilepsy; (2) Darvon, a mild analgesic structurally related to the narcotic analgesic, Methadone; (3) Prolixin, used in the management of schizophrenia and manifestations of psychotic disorders; and (4) Taractan, also used for control of schizophrenic manifestations. All four drugs are central nervous system depressants. When taken singly, these drugs have a sedative effect and can impair motor functions. Three of the four drugs regularly administered to Edgmon had specific indications of potential danger in operating motor vehicles. The fourth drug, Dilatin, has even more effect on the central nervous system.
There was thus evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that employees of the Veterans Home had notice or knowledge of facts suggesting that Edgmon's driving presented a risk of harm to himself and others. But the risk was not one that could be guarded against by warning potential victims (cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334). There was uncontradicted evidence supporting an inference that a physician at the Home had warned Edgmon that he should not drive when he was under medication. Edgmon was not under guardianship, and it could not be maintained that by becoming a resident at the Home he had surrendered his civil rights and his responsibility for his own conduct. There is no statute or regulation purporting to authorize the commandant of the Home to order a resident veteran not to drive a car. Apparently the only authoritative procedure available to prevent a veteran from driving his car would be expulsion from the Home for violation of such an order. No lawful basis has been shown for the exercise of such paternalistic powers over a citizen, in the absence of an adjudication of incompetency. Even if such power existed, its exercise would be a discretionary act for which the state has not subjected itself to tort liability. (Gov.Code, § 818.4; Papelian v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 958, 135 N.E.2d 665.) We conclude that the judgment cannot be sustained on respondents' theory that the state should have prevented Edgmon from driving an automobile.
Appellant contends that there is no substantial evidence that a dangerous condition of the Benicia-Martinez Bridge was a proximate cause of Edgmon's collision with the Harrington camper.
A reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. (Bakity v. County of Riverside (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 24, 28, 90 Cal.Rptr. 541.) The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are matters for the trier of fact and not for the appellate court. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183.) "The test is not whether there is a substantial conflict in evidence but whether there is substantial evidence in favor of the respondent." (McKinley v. Buchanan (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 608, 611-612, 1 Cal.Rptr. 573, 575; Crogan v. Metz (1956) 47 Cal.2d 398, 404, 303 P.2d 1029.)
Under the Tort Claims Act of 1963 (Gov.Code, §§ 830-840.6), a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the elements required by section 835 of the Government Code in order to establish liability of a...
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