Harley H. Hoppe & Associates Inc. v. King County
| Decision Date | 23 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 64819–5–I,65810–7–I.,s. 64819–5–I |
| Citation | 162 Wash.App. 40,255 P.3d 819 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HARLEY H. HOPPE & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Washington corporation, Appellant and Cross Respondent,v.KING COUNTY, a political subdivision of the state of Washington; and Scott Noble, King County Assessor, Respondent and Cross Appellant.Amy Hoppe, and individual, Appellant and Cross Respondent,v.King County, a political subdivision of the state of Washington; and Lloyd Hara, King County Assessor, Respondent and Cross Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cameron Gordon Comfort, Atty. General's Ofc./Revenue Division, Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for WA State Dept. of Revenue.Jeffrey Iver Tilden, Pamela Jo DeVet, Gordon Tilden Thomas & Cordell LLP, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.Michael Joseph Sinsky, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.APPELWICK, J.
[162 Wash.App. 45] ¶ 1 Hoppe sought to compel the King County Assessor to disclose the Department of Revenue's tax ratio audits under the Public Records Act, chapter 42.56 RCW. The County refused on the grounds that disclosure was prohibited by the Public Records Act and by Washington's property tax statutes. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. Hoppe appeals. The County cross appeals arguing that both of these cases should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. Because the issues raised by these cases are likely to recur and because a determination is desirable to provide future guidance to the Department of Revenue, the County, and the public, we reach the merits of the consolidated cases. The trial court correctly concluded that the requested documents were exempt from disclosure. We affirm.
¶ 2 Under RCW 84.48.080(1), the Washington State Department of Revenue (DOR) uses a “ratio audit” to assess real and personal property value in each of Washington's 39 counties, and compares each county's valuation against a total valuation of property in the state. These ratio audits are used to equalize property taxes yearly, and are also used to calculate each county's state school levy. In late 2007, Harley H. Hoppe & Associates, Inc. (Hoppe), requested documents from the King County Department of Assessments (County) under the Public Records Act, chapter 42.56 RCW, believing that certain corporate taxpayers had received preferential tax treatment. The County responded to these requests, though Hoppe did not find the particular information it sought in the responses or disclosed documents. On February 29, 2008, Hoppe made a public records request for the 2006 state ratio audits for personal property.1 Its request stated that the information sought was not confidential, and that client names and account numbers could be redacted.
[162 Wash.App. 47] ¶ 3 The requested ratio audit is drawn from a random cross-section of private companies that were required to participate in the process. WAC 458–53–130(2). It contains detailed lists of assets, described by specific item, acquisition year, original cost, and depreciated value. The County notified the DOR and the audited corporate taxpayers of the request. The DOR responded that disclosure of the material was prohibited by statute, and that redaction would not sufficiently safeguard the taxpayers' identities. The individual taxpayers also objected, noting that the information was private and confidential, and that disclosure would place them at a competitive disadvantage. The County relayed this to Hoppe, indicating that in the absence of taxpayer permission, and in light of relevant statutes that exempt disclosure, the County was prohibited from disclosing the information. On June 23, 2008, Hoppe filed suit against the County ( Hoppe I), seeking to compel production of the ratio audit. Hoppe and the County filed cross motions for summary judgment. On July 20, 2009 the trial court in a letter ruling denied Hoppe's motion and granted the County's.
¶ 4 Independent of Hoppe's public records claim, the County had filed a counterclaim in Hoppe I, seeking to vacate a 1991 injunction pertaining to unrelated actions of a prior County Assessor. The trial court denied the County's motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and on November 30, 2009 the parties eventually entered a stipulated order dismissing the counterclaim entirely. At that point, there were no further claims remaining in Hoppe I.
¶ 5 On December 2, 2009 Hoppe timely filed its initial notice of appeal. But, that appeal mistakenly sought review from this court “of the Stipulated Order of Dismissal, entered on November 23, 2009, and matters concluded thereby, in particular the Order on Summary Judgment dated November 13, 2009.” Hoppe had already prevailed in that counterclaim and apparently meant to appeal from the July 20, 2009 summary judgment order that had earlier dismissed its public disclosure claim. But, Hoppe did not designate or attach that July 20, 2009 order. On December 23, 2009, the Court of Appeals moved sua sponte to determine the reviewability of Hoppe's designated orders. Hoppe, likely recognizing the error, moved to voluntarily withdraw its appeal, and this court granted the request, dismissing the appeal on January 7, 2010.
¶ 6 Hoppe then returned to superior court, requesting a reentry of judgment in favor of the County on the already dismissed claim from Hoppe I. The County opposed this, stating that judgment had already been entered back on July 20, 2009, and that there was no basis in the civil rules for reentering a judgment that had already been entered. The trial court granted Hoppe's request and reentered judgment in favor of the County. Hoppe then filed a second notice of appeal in Hoppe I on January 27, 2010. The County cross appealed, challenging the trial court's reentry of judgment.
¶ 7 On February 2, 2010, Amy Hoppe, an employee of Harley H. Hoppe & Associates, submitted a nearly identical public records request for DOR ratio audits of personal property. This request was for audits from 2007 and 2008, whereas Hoppe I involved a request for audits from 2006. On April 2, 2010, Amy Hoppe filed a lawsuit against the County ( Hoppe II). After the request, a similar exchange unfolded. The County notified the DOR of the request and the DOR again advised the County that such information was confidential and exempt from disclosure without permission from the taxpayer. The County again declined to disclose the audit information for those taxpayers that did not consent.
¶ 8 Her request ultimately gave rise to Hoppe II, a case with nearly identical facts to Hoppe I. The attorney and the legal arguments were nearly identical to those in Hoppe I. Both parties again moved for summary judgment. The trial court reached the same conclusion that it had reached a year earlier in Hoppe I, denying Amy Hoppe's motion and granting summary judgment in favor of the County.
[162 Wash.App. 49] ¶ 9 Amy Hoppe filed a notice of appeal in Hoppe II on July 27, 2010, and Hoppe moved this court to consolidate the two appeals. This court granted Hoppe's consolidation request on August 17, 2010.
¶ 10 Before reaching the merits of Hoppe's appeal, we begin by addressing the arguments raised by the County on cross appeal that these consolidated cases should be dismissed on procedural grounds. The County first argues that the trial court erred by reentering judgment in favor of the County on January 21, 2010. It argues if the trial court had not reentered judgment the time for Hoppe to appeal would have begun running much earlier, and the appeal from Hoppe I would be untimely. Second, the County argues that Hoppe II should be barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
¶ 11 The County contends that the July 20, 2009 order by the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the County resolved the claim at issue in Hoppe I and constituted a final, dispositive judgment. RAP 5.2 provides 30 days for a party to file a notice of appeal, following a final, appealable judgment. The County concedes that the 30–day clock for filing an appeal should not have begun running on July 20, 2009 in this case, because of the then still pending counterclaim. But, once that counterclaim was resolved by stipulation on November 30, 2009 the 30–day clock should have begun running. It was the only remaining claim in the case, and its resolution made the earlier July 20, 2009 order granting summary judgment a final, appealable one.
¶ 12 Hoppe's initial notice of appeal in Hoppe I was timely filed on December 2, 2009, less than 30 days from November 30, 2009. But, Hoppe's appeal mistakenly focused on the County's counterclaim, rather than on the July 20, 2009 summary judgment order in favor of the County. Instead of seeking to amend the appeal in that timely notice of appeal, Hoppe withdrew its appeal altogether and then returned to the trial court seeking reentry of judgment. The County argues that there was no basis in the civil rules for the trial court to reenter judgment in favor of the County, when the claim at issue had already been conclusively resolved by the July 20, 2009 judgment.
¶ 13 Hoppe correctly argues that the trial court's initial ruling in the County's favor on summary judgment did not constitute a final appealable order when it was issued, due to the pending unresolved issue in the counterclaim. But, Hoppe goes on to suggest that the summary judgment order did not become appealable, simply because a stipulated order resolved the counterclaim. Hoppe's assertion is unfounded. “In ordinary usage, a ‘final judgment’ is ‘[a] court's last action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy....’ ” Wachovia SBA Lending, Inc., v. Kraft, 165 Wash.2d 481, 492, 200 P.3d 683 (2009) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 859 (8th ed. 2004)) (alterations in original). The July 20, 2009 summary judgment conclusively determined Hoppe's...
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