State v. J.M.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 64699–1–I.,64699–1–I.
• Citation: 255 P.3d 828,162 Wash.App. 27,269 Ed. Law Rep. 306
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent,v.J.M., Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

162 Wash.App. 27

255 P.3d 828

269 Ed. Law Rep. 306

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.J.M., Appellant.

No. 64699–1–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

May 23, 2011.

Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.William Leonard Doyle, King County Prosecutors' Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.SPEARMAN, J.

[162 Wash.App. 29] ¶ 1 We are asked to decide the constitutionality of a school resource officer's warrantless post-arrest search of a high school student's locked backpack on school grounds, where the search, which revealed an air pistol, was conducted after the officer saw the student holding suspected marijuana. A trial court found J.M., a juvenile, guilty of carrying a dangerous weapon at school and possessing less than 40 grams of marijuana. He appeals his dangerous weapon conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that the school resource officer (SRO) was a “ school official” conducting a school search and therefore needed only reasonable grounds to search rather than probable cause. He argues, moreover, that even if the SRO was a school official, his search was not supported by reasonable grounds. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the reasonable grounds standard applied to the SRO's search and that the search was supported by reasonable grounds. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 On February 4, 2009, Bellevue police officer Michael Fry was on duty as an SRO at Robinswood High School in Bellevue, Washington.¹ He had worked as an SRO for approximately 12 years, assisting with discipline matters and exercising arrest powers. His primary duties were to maintain a safe, secure, and orderly learning environment, and he rarely handled nonschool-related calls while on duty as an SRO. That day, while checking one of the school's restrooms, Fry saw J.M., a student, standing at a sink, holding what appeared to be a baggie of marijuana and a medicine vial. Next to J.M. was a blue backpack. As Fry approached J.M., he smelled a strong odor that he recognized as that of marijuana. Fry seized the suspected marijuana, vial, and backpack and took J.M. to the dean of students, Phyllis Roderick. Roderick sat at her desk while Fry and J.M. sat facing her with J.M.'s backpack between them. Fry explained to Roderick what he had observed. He then informed J.M. that he was under arrest and called for another officer to come to the school to assist him. Fry sought to search J.M.'s backpack, which had a padlock running through the pull tabs on the zipper to the main compartment. Despite the lock, Fry was able to unzip the compartment wide enough to get his hand inside and withdraw a few items. He asked J.M. for the key to the lock, but J.M. said he had left it at home. Fry was suspicious as to why J.M. would bring a locked backpack to school and not have a key. Fry handcuffed and searched J.M., finding keys in his jacket. He used one key to open the backpack and discovered an air pistol inside. Officer David Finney arrived shortly thereafter. Fry read J.M. his Miranda² rights, and J.M. indicated he did not wish to answer any questions. Finney took J.M. to the precinct for booking.

¶ 3 J.M. was charged with one count of carrying a dangerous weapon at school and one count of possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana. J.M. filed a motion to suppress the air pistol, arguing that the search of his backpack violated his constitutional privacy rights. The court commissioner denied the motion, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law. J.M. agreed to an adjudication on stipulated facts, and the trial court found him guilty as charged. J.M. challenged the commissioner's suppression ruling in a motion for revision. The superior court judge denied the motion and imposed a standard range disposition.³ J.M. appeals his dangerous weapon conviction, claiming that the trial court's denial of his suppression motion was reversible error.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4 J.M. argues that Fry was not a “school official” conducting a school search and therefore his search had to be supported by probable cause rather than reasonable grounds. He also argues that the search was not permissible under the reasonable grounds standard. We disagree with both arguments and affirm.

¶ 5 J.M. does not challenge any findings of fact, but instead bases his appeal on issues of law and the superior court's application of the law to the facts in his case. We review issues of law, as well as a trial court's application of the law to the facts, de novo. State v. Dow, 168 Wash.2d 243, 248–249, 227 P.3d 1278 (2010) (citing State v. Law, 110 Wash.App. 36, 39, 38 P.3d 374 (2002)).

¶ 6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Government agents must therefore have a search warrant issued upon probable cause unless some other condition justifies a warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). See also State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 79, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). One exception to the warrant requirement, under both the federal and state constitutions, is a search conducted in a school setting by school authorities. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985); State v. Brooks, 43 Wash.App. 560, 563–64, 718 P.2d 837 (1986).

¶ 7 Under the “school search” exception, school officials may search a student's belongings without a warrant if, under all the circumstances, the search is reasonable. State v. Slattery, 56 Wash.App. 820, 823–24, 787 P.2d 932 (1990). A search is reasonable if it is justified at its inception and the scope of the search is reasonably related to the reasons justifying it. Id. The constitutionality of Officer Fry's search of J.M.'s backpack depends in part on whether the school search exception to the warrant requirement applies.⁴

¶ 8 J.M. argues that the school search exception does not apply because Fry was not a “school official” at the time of the search. He cites State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977), arguing that under that case, Fry's duties showed that he was not a school official but rather a “police officer acting within police authority.” ⁵ He contends that Fry was mainly responsible for maintaining a “safe learning environment,” and preventing and discovering crime at Robinswood. He points out that Fry's duties as an SRO did not preempt his law enforcement duties and that Fry was available to assist other police officers with matters unrelated to the school even during his shift as an SRO. Moreover, he contends that Fry was paid by the Bellevue Police Department, not by the Bellevue School District.

¶ 9 The State urges us to reject any distinction between a non-law enforcement security officer and a police officer on assignment to a school as an SRO, arguing that “the fulfillment of the school's duty to protect students from danger should not depend on whether the school district or the city employs the SRO.” The State further argues that requiring probable cause would unduly interfere with a school's ability to maintain swift and informal disciplinary procedures.

¶ 10 We hold that under the facts of this case, Fry was acting as a school official and the reasonable grounds standard applied. As the parties acknowledge, Washington courts have not decided whether SROs are school officials for purposes of conducting student searches, but we find guidance in decisions from other jurisdictions.

¶ 11 The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill.2d 195, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996), held that the search of a student by a “liaison officer,” a police officer employed by the police department and assigned full-time to an alternate high school, was governed by the reasonable suspicion standard rather than probable cause. Id. at 207–08, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310. The court noted that post- T.L.O. decisions from various jurisdictions that involved police officers in school settings could generally be separated into three categories: “(1) those where school officials initiate a search where police involvement is minimal, (2) those involving school police or liaison officers acting on their own authority, and (3) those where outside police officers initiate a search.” Id. at 206, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310. It noted that in cases involving the first or second category, most courts have applied the reasonable suspicion standard, while in cases involving the third category, most courts have required probable cause. Id. at 206–07, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310. The court held that the reasonable suspicion standard applied where the case was “best characterized as involving a liaison police officer conducting a search on his own initiative and authority, in furtherance of the school's attempt to maintain a proper educational environment.” Id. at 208, 214 Ill.Dec. 456, 661 N.E.2d 310.

¶ 12 Similarly, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ( overruled on other grounds, Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind.2009)), rejected the argument that the school search standard did not apply to the search of a high school student's book bag because the police officer who conducted it was not a school official:

While Officer Grooms is a trained police officer, he was acting in his capacity as security officer for the [Indianapolis Public School] schools. Grooms is employed by the [Indianapolis Public School Police Department] and as such, his conduct regarding student searches on school premises is governed by the test announced in [ T.L.O.].

Id. at 795.

¶ 13 We hold that, like the officers in Dilworth and S.A., Officer Fry was acting as a school official when he searched J.M.'s backpack. He was on duty as an SRO and acting under his authority as an SRO when he personally...