Harlingen Irrigation Dist. Cameron Cty. No. 1 v. Caprock Comm.

Decision Date31 May 2001
Docket NumberNo. 13-99-396-CV,13-99-396-CV
Citation49 S.W.3d 520
Parties(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001) HARLINGEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT CAMERON COUNTY NO. 1, Appellant, v. CAPROCK COMMUNICATIONS CORP., Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

On appeal from the 357th District Court of Cameron County, Texas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Hinojosa, Yanez, and Chavez1

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Yanez

This lawsuit arose from a conflict between the Harlingen Irrigation District Cameron County No.1 (HID) and Caprock Communications Corporation (Caprock) over the placement of fiber-optic cable installed by Caprock over and along property belonging to HID. The trial court issued a judgment in favor of Caprock, from which HID now appeals. We affirm.

Background

In 1998, Caprock obtained permits from the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDoT) to install an underground fiber-optic cable along several state roads in Cameron County, Texas. The proposed route of the cable traveled along the state road rights-of-way, crossing over property and easements owned by HID.2 When HID became aware of Caprock's plans, it contacted the contractor installing the fiber-optic cable for Caprock to discuss measures that HID wanted Caprock to institute to minimize the impact the fiber-optic cable would have on HID's operations. HID also wanted to charge Caprock a fee of fifty dollars per linear foot of cable laid on property in which HID held an interest, the fee being for a fifteen-year term. Caprock argued that it had the right, under the Texas Utilities Code,3 to install a fiber-optic cable along a roadway, even where that roadway crossed property and easements owned by HID.

After initial discussions, a dispute developed between Caprock and HID concerning the requirements HID sought, with the fee being a major point of contention. On October 14, 1998, Caprock filed an application for a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, and injunction, to prevent HID from interfering with Caprock's access to the roadway. The court issued a temporary restraining order. On October 30, 1998, Caprock amended its petition to add a claim for declaratory relief, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.4 HID filed its original answer on November 3, 1998. On November 24, 1998, following a hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction against HID.

A trial on the merits of Caprock's petition was held on February 1, 1999, before the bench. Following the trial, the court issued a judgment for Caprock, holding that Caprock is a telephone corporation and, under section 181.082 of the utilities code, Caprock has the right to install, operate, and maintain fiber optic cable along, on, or across public roads, public streets, or public waters that cross HID's pipelines, canals, irrigation ditches, or lands.5 The court also held that HID was not allowed to impose a fee on Caprock.

HID challenges the trial court's judgment with seven issues.

The State's Ownership of the Roadway Easement

In its first issue, HID challenges the trial court's ruling as it applies to three parcels of land located along state Farm-to-Market Highway (FM) 507 (parcels one through three). These parcels are three places where the state roadway crosses canals and a drain owned by HID. HID argues that Caprock's cable is laid outside of the forty-foot-wide roadway easement owned by the state, and section 181.082 of the Texas Utilities Code does not permit telephone corporations to lay cable on property which has not been acquired by the state for use as a public street or road. Caprock argues that the roadway easement is actually eighty feet wide.

The original forty-foot road easement was acquired in 1920, prior to HID acquiring the land upon which it has built its canals and drains.6 At some point the state acquired an additional twenty-foot-wide strip on each side of the existing road easement from land-owners on both sides of the roadway, thus creating an eighty-foot-wide roadway. Caprock's cable is laid outside the forty-foot easement; however, it is within the boundaries of the eighty-foot easement.

HID argues that the FM 507 roadway is only forty feet wide where it crosses HID's drain and canal, although the roadway is eighty-feet wide along the rest of its length. Thus, according to HID, the Caprock fiber-optic line is laid outside of the road easement where the easement crosses the HID property. HID contends that there is no evidence that the state, when it acquired the additional land, also acquired additional land over HID's canals and drain.

The "No Evidence" Standard of Review

The standards for reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in a trial to the court are the same as those applied when reviewing a trial to a jury. Humphrey v. Camelot Retirement Cmty., 893 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). A "no evidence" standard of review is applied when the party not bearing the burden of proof challenges a finding of fact by arguing that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding. Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied)(citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)). If any evidence of probative value supports the finding, we must uphold the trier of fact's finding. Id. When reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, indulging every reasonable inference in that party's favor. Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, 964 S.W.2d 276, 286 (Tex. 1998); Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas, 999 S.W.2d 846, 853 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).

In the case now before this Court, the trial court found that Caprock placed its cable in accordance with permits from TxDoT, which allowed Caprock to place its lines within the state's road rights-of-way. Essentially, the trial court found that the lines laid by Caprock, including those installed over parcels one through three, were within the state's road rights-of-way, which would only be correct if the state's right-of-way easement was eighty feet wide where it crosses HID's property.

The Evidence

The deposition of Jack Brown, a civil engineer from Harlingen, Texas who has done engineering work for HID, was admitted in evidence.7 Brown stated that HID recognized the original forty-foot roadway easement but did not recognize the additional twenty feet added on each side of the easement. In his deposition, Brown testified that he could find no deed granting the state the additional property, although it is possible that a joint-use agreement could have been made between HID and the state, without the agreement being documented.8 Brown also stated that the rights-of-way for farm-to-market roads are typically acquired by Cameron County and then transferred to the state, which constructs and maintains the road.

Brown explained that Cameron County had occasionally needed to acquire rights-of-way over an irrigation district's property. On those occasions, the County would generally arrange to bear the cost of any expense caused by the roadway; however the County would not pay HID "in cash" for the crossing. The agreements that allowed for the County to acquire the road right-of-way would not be recorded in the deed records, but rather would be contained in the minutes of the meetings of the county commissioner's court and HID's board. Brown stated that there was a public road for the entire length of the route of Caprock's fiber optic cable. Brown testified that TxDoT maps show FM 507 as having a right-of-way of eighty feet over parcels one, two, and three. Attached to Brown's deposition are deeds and maps, also admitted in evidence without objection, indicating that, where the roadway was bordered by private property, Cameron County acquired an easement to the extra twenty-foot strip from the private land owners in 1950. There is no document in the record of the conveyance of an easement from HID for the additional twenty feet.

The deposition of Arnold Cortez, TxDoT's area engineer, was also admitted in evidence. Cortez stated in his deposition that TxDoT's map for FM 507 shows the right-of-way as being eighty feet wide. Cortez also stated that Cameron County would have acquired the property to increase the width of the roadway, and the state took control of FM 570 in the late 1940s or early 1950s. The TxDoT maps showing the eighty-foot right-of-way were admitted in evidence. The permits granted to Caprock by TXDOT state that the right-of-way is eighty feet wide. Cortez testified in his deposition, that the state maintains both the road and the right-of-way, mowing, picking up litter, issuing permits for utilities, and making sure all obstructions are kept cleared. Cortez also testified that HID has never challenged the state's use of the property.

Considering the evidence before the trial court in the light most favorable to Caprock as the prevailing party, we find there is some evidence to support the trial court's finding that Caprock's cable is laid within the state's roadway. Brown stated that rights-of-way were often acquired by the county from irrigation districts with informal agreements. The state claims an eighty-foot right-of-way, which it has controlled and maintained since the early 1950s. The trial court could have reasonably inferred that the county acquired easements from HID in 1950 to widen the right-of-way, with an informal agreement that was not recorded, and the easements were then conveyed to the state, which has used and maintained the right-of-way from that time. There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding, in regards to parcels one, two, and three, that Caprock's cable is laid along the public road. Issue number one is overruled.

Attendant Uses of Public Roads

HID's second...

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