Harman v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. SD 33414,SD 33414 |
Citation | 461 S.W.3d 876 |
Parties | Steve Harman, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., Defendant–Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Attorney for Appellant: Thomas G. Morrissey, The Morrissey Law Firm, P.C., Springfield, Missouri
Attorneys for Respondent: Lee M. Baty, Karen L. Lloyd, of Baty, Holm, Numrich & Otto, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri
Steve Harman appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Manheim Remarketing, Inc. (“Manheim”), holding that Harman's civil action against Manheim for his injuries from a fall on Manheim's premises was barred by The Workers' Compensation Law, see sections 287.010–.811. Harman claims that Manheim was not entitled to summary judgment because section 287.280.1,1 gives him the right to bring a civil action against Manheim if Manheim failed to insure its full workers' compensation liability, as required by that section, and there are no uncontroverted facts in the summary judgment record supporting that Manheim was so insured. We agree, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Thereafter, Manheim filed a motion for summary judgment asserting as its legal basis that Harman's “negligence claim against Manheim fails as a matter of law as Manheim is the statutory employer4 of [Harman] ... [t]herefore, [Harman's] exclusive remedy against Manheim is through the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act.” In support of its motion, Manheim alleged seven statements of uncontroverted facts related to it that were all later admitted by Harman. These uncontroverted facts are:
In his response, Harman conceded that “he was a statutory employee of Manheim at the time of his fall.” Harman asserted that, nevertheless, because he could “elect to sue Manheim to recover damages for personal injury if Manheim failed to comply with R.S.Mo. § 287.280 by failing to secure workers' compensation insurance that covered Steve Harman[,]” Manheim's motion for summary judgment must be denied due to Manheim's failure to plead and prove that it complied with the insurance requirements of section 287.280.1.
In its reply, Manheim admitted it “was not an insured under Securitas' Workers' Compensation Insurance Policy[,]” that Harman made a workers' compensation claim only against Securitas, and that the Stipulation for Compromise Settlement of that claim lists only Securitas as the employer. Although Manheim did not dispute that it was required under section 287.280.1 to carry workers' compensation insurance, it reasoned that “[n]othing in [section 287.280.1] requires a statutory employer to prove that it provided worker's compensation insurance to be allowed immunity in a civil action pursuant to” section 287.120, in that “[s]ection 287.280 simply states that all employers must carry worker's compensation insurance.”
The trial court granted Manheim's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Manheim accordingly. Harman timely appeals that judgment.
In a single point relied on, Harman asserts that “[t]he trial court erred in granting Manheim's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon [Manheim's] affirmative defense of exclusive remedy” pursuant to section 287.120, “because every employer subject to Chapter 287 must purchase insurance[,]” as provided in section 287.280.1, “in order to receive the benefit of the exclusive remedy shield under” section 287.120,5 and Manheim produced no uncontroverted fact “that it carried Workers' Compensation Insurance required by R.S.Mo. § 287.280.”
Standard of Review
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–A m. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). “The key to summary judgment is the undisputed right to judgment as a matter of law, not simply the absence of a fact question.” Id. at 380.
Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted).
The burden is on the summary judgment movant to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law “flowing from facts about which there is no genuine dispute.” Id. at 378. “The non-movant never needs to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law; the non-movant need only show that there is a genuine dispute as to the facts underlying the movant's right to judgment.” Id. at 382–82.
In reviewing the propriety of the grant of the motion for summary judgment, this court first determines whether the movant is a claimant or a defending party. Id. at 380. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 380. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 380. Here, Harman sought recovery for personal injury against Manheim. Manheim answered and asserted affirmative defenses but did not file a counterclaim or cross-claim. As to Manheim's motion for summary judgment, therefore, Manheim is a defending party and Harman is a claimant.
When the party moving for summary judgment is a defending party, as is the case here, the movant's right to summary judgment can be established by showing one of the following:
(1) facts that negate any one of the claimant's elements facts, (2) that the non-movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, and will not be able to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimant's elements, or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support the movant's properly-pleaded affirmative defense. 6
Id. at 381. Manheim's motion, based upon its workers' compensation exclusive remedy affirmative defense barring this civil action, falls within the third category.7
“A defendant has the burden to prove all affirmative defenses.” Warren v. Paragon Techs. Group, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Mo. banc 1997). A defendant may establish a right to summary judgment by showing that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts required to support its affirmative defense. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp ., 854 S.W.2d at 381. The next consideration, therefore, in this court's determination regarding the propriety of the grant of summary judgment here, is “whether the uncontroverted material facts established [Manheim's] right to judgment as a matter of law.”
Wood v. Copeland, 450 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Mo.App.2014). We determine they do not.
“The exclusivity provision of Chapter 287 is found in Section 287.120.” Amesquita v. Gilster–Mary Lee Corp., 408 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Mo.App.2013). Section 287.120 provides, in pertinent part:
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