Harmon v. City of Arlington

• Decision Date: 12 August 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-00696-O
• Citation: 478 F.Supp.3d 561
• Parties: Terrence HARMON et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

478 F.Supp.3d 561

Terrence HARMON et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-00696-O

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division.

Signed August 12, 2020

Stacy Sylvester Lee Merritt, Sr., Merritt Law Firm LLC, Daryl K. Washington, Washington Law Firm PC, Dallas, TX, John J. Coyle, McEldrew Young, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Robert H. Fugate, Cynthia Withers, Nastasha N. Anderson, City of Arlington, City Attorney's Office, Arlington, TX, for Defendant City of Arlington Texas.

James T. Jeffrey, Jr., Law Offices of Jim Jeffrey, Arlington, TX, for Defendant Bau Tran.

ORDER

Reed O'Connor, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant City of Arlington's Motion and Brief to Dismiss (ECF No. 29), filed December 9, 2019; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant City of Arlington's Motion and Brief to Dismiss (ECF No. 30); Defendant City of Arlington's Reply opposing Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31); Defendant Bau Tran's Motion and Brief to Dismiss (ECF No. 32), filed January 8, 2020; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Bau Tran's Motion and Brief to Dismiss (ECF No. 35); and Defendant Bau Tran's Reply opposing Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36).

Having considered the motions, briefings, and applicable law, for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Defendant City of Arlington's motion should be and is hereby GRANTED , and that Defendant Bau Tran's motion should be and is hereby GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND¹

On September 1, 2018 Arlington Police Officer Julie Herlihy ("Herlihy") stopped Plaintiffs O'Shae Terry ("Terry") and Terrence Harmon ("Harmon") due to an expired registration on Terry's vehicle. Am. Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 26. After retrieving Harmon and Terry's identification and verifying their identities, Herlihy continued to detain because she suspected that they possessed marijuana in their vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20. A second Officer, Defendant Bau Tran ("Tran"), soon arrived on the scene to assist. Id. at ¶ 21. Tran approached the vehicle on the passenger side and requested that the men lower the windows and shut off the vehicle's engine, to which the men complied. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22. Tran remained by the passenger side of the vehicle while Herlihy temporarily returned to her cruiser. Id. at ¶ 28.

Soon after, Terry began rolling up the windows and grabbing for the keys.² The video record shows that Tran responded by climbing onto the side of the car, placing his right arm in the passenger window to prevent it from rolling up, and shouting several warnings. Terry then engaged the vehicle's ignition and accelerated the vehicle forward. Tran responded by removing his right arm from the window, grabbing his pistol from its holster, and firing several shots across Harmon, striking Terry four times. Am. Compl. ¶ 33, ECF No. 26. The video then shows Tran falling off the vehicle and rolling several times, as the vehicle careens away out of control and off the street.

Harmon eventually stopped the vehicle by grabbing the steering wheel and using his hands to remove Terry's foot from the gas pedal. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 37, ECF No. 26. Harmon exited the vehicle and removed Terry, who was bleeding profusely, from the driver side in an attempt to render aid. Id. at ¶ 38. Officers soon arrived, placing Harmon under arrest and transferring Terry to Medical City Arlington Hospital, where he later died. Id. at ¶¶ 39, 40.

Administratrix Woods claims relief on Terry's behalf under 42 U.S.C § 1983, asserting first that Tran violated Terry's Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during the arrest, and second that the City of Arlington is liable under a theory of municipal liability. Am. Compl. ¶ 128, 136. Administratrix Woods also brings state law claims on behalf of Terry and against Tran for assault and battery as well as punitive and exemplary damages. Id. at ¶ 139, 143.

Harmon independently claims relief under 42 U.S.C § 1983, asserting first that Tran violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force during the arrest, and second that the City of Arlington is liable under a theory of municipal liability. Am. Compl. ¶ 147, 154. Harmon also brings state law claims against Tran for assault as well as punitive and exemplary damages. Id. at ¶ 157, 161.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff's pleading to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier , 509 F.3d at 675. The Court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] [C]ourt should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Generally, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius , 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id. This doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

Courts generally apply the two-pronged analysis established in Saucier v. Katz in determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity for an alleged constitutional violation. 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The first prong of the Saucier analysis asks whether the facts alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the record sets out or establishes no violation, no further inquiry is necessary. Id.

On the other hand, if a plaintiff sufficiently pleads or establishes the violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, a court then asks whether the right was clearly established at the time of the government official's alleged misconduct. Id. If there are sufficient allegations or evidence to support the violation of a constitutional right, the court asks whether, nevertheless, qualified immunity is appropriate because defendant's actions were objectively reasonable "in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., L.L.C. v. Tunica County, Miss. , 543 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has clarified that it is no longer mandatory for courts to consider the two prongs set in Saucier in order but noted that it may be beneficial to do so. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. Under Pearson , courts are now "permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Qualified Immunity

1. The Violation of a Constitutional Right

It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to use excessive or unreasonable force in the context of an arrest. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish: ‘(1) injury (2) which...