Harnage v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 31 August 2017
• Docket Number: HHDCV145037637
• Parties: James A. Harnage v. Peter J. Murphy et al
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

James A. Harnage v. Peter J. Murphy et al

No. HHDCV145037637

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

August 31, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Nina F. Elgo, J.

The plaintiff, James A. Harnage, an inmate at MacDougall Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall), has filed this action seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief with respect to certain practices and policies in effect at the Department of Correction (department). His twelve-count complaint names twenty-seven individuals employed by the department as defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Counts one, two and seven concern strip search procedures utilized by the department. Counts four and eleven pertain to the use of privacy sheets and window coverings inside the plaintiff's cell, while count three concerns the use of restrictive housing in a section of MacDougall known as the " Q-Pod." Counts six and ten contain allegations of retaliatory conduct, while counts eight and nine allege interference with the plaintiff's access to the courts and the inmate administrative remedy system (system). Lastly count twelve alleges a violation of the right to privacy in attorney-client communications.

The plaintiff's complaint does not allege a violation of any federal or state statute, but rather alleges various constitutional violations.^[1] Counts one, two, five, and seven allege violations of the plaintiff's right " to be free from unreasonable searches." ^[2] Counts four and eleven allege violations of the plaintiff's " right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches." Count three alleges a violation of the plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protection as well as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Count six alleges a violation of the plaintiff's " right to freedom of speech, right of access to the courts, and right to a redress of his grievances." Count eight alleges a violation of the plaintiff's " right of access to the courts and right to a redress of grievances." Count nine alleges a violation of the plaintiff's " right of access to the courts, right of redress of grievances, and right to freedom of speech, " while also asserting a " liberty interest" in the proper administration of administrative directives promulgated by the department and a " right to equal application" of the system. Count ten alleges a violation of the plaintiff's " right to redress of grievances, right of access to the courts right to freedom of speech and liberty interest in the proper administration of the [system], as well as the equal application thereof." Count twelve alleges a violation of the plaintiff's " right to privacy in his legal calls to privileged individuals."

Although the plaintiff has not expressly invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ^[3] it is well established that a claim for damages for an alleged violation of a federal constitutional right can only be made pursuant to a federal statute such as § 1983, which provides a procedure for redress for the deprivation of federal rights established elsewhere. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (" [t]he purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails"); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (" [t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law"). For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the court, like the defendants, presumes that the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims are brought pursuant to § 1983. See Stocking v. Austin, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-50170376-S, (June 2, 2016) .

The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In that motion, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim in multiple respects. They further assert that the doctrines of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and statutory immunity bar the plaintiff's claims. In response, the plaintiff has filed an objection primarily addressing the issue of whether his complaint failed to properly state certain claims. That objection does not address sovereign immunity and statutory immunity in any manner, and briefly argues that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the allegations of count three of his complaint.

DISCUSSION

" [A] motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) insufficiency of process; and (4) insufficiency of service of process." Practice Book § 10-30. " Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).

" When a [trial] court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . . . A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 750-51, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Furthermore, our appellate courts have recognized that the doctrines of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and statutory immunity implicate subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, are proper bases on which to grant a motion to dismiss. Id., 747 (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction " on the basis of the doctrines of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity and statutory immunity"); see also Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).

I Failure to State a Claim

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the defendants, in their memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss repeatedly assert that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim in certain counts of the complaint. The defendants, however, have not provided any authority indicating that the Superior Court is permitted to dismiss the action on that basis. This court is cognizant of the fact that, in federal court, such claims may be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.^[4] Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has recognized " the general and unassailable proposition . . . that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation in their own courts." Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). The Connecticut Supreme Court likewise has indicated that " state procedural requirements . . . generally apply to [federal] claims brought in state court." (Citation omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 147, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). For that reason, the judges of our Superior Court repeatedly have declined to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of a federal claim raised in state court. As one observed, " [t]he defendants' citations to federal cases allowing for motions to dismiss conclusory federal claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inapposite. In state court, the Connecticut Practice Book is applicable, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Lobaton v. Erfe, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-15-5014975-S, (April 24, 2017) (Vacchelli, J.); see also Lotto v. Hamden Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-05-4010436 (February 21, 2006) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 713, ) (Silbert, J.) (motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure properly treated as a motion to strike under Connecticut rules of practice); Sullivan v. Analysis & Technology, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV554076, (November 21, 2000) (Hurley, J.) (same).

Our Appellate Court similarly has explained that while " [u]nder Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to state a claim is a valid ground for dismissal. Under Connecticut practice, however, it is not. A motion to dismiss . . . is available only to raise the question whether, on the face of the record, the court lacks jurisdiction . . . A motion to strike is the proper...