Harold E. Meadows Jr. v. Meadows

• Decision Date: 11 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. SD 30426.,SD 30426.
• Citation: 330 S.W.3d 798
• Parties: Harold E. MEADOWS Jr., Appellant,v.Janet L. MEADOWS, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

330 S.W.3d 798

Harold E. MEADOWS Jr., Appellant,

v.Janet L. MEADOWS, Respondent.

No. SD 30426.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

Jan. 11, 2011.

Harold E. Meadows, Jr., Bonne Terre, pro se.No brief filed for Respondent.ROBERT S. BARNEY, Judge.

Harold E. Meadows, Jr. (“Husband”) appeals the “Judgment and Decree of Annulment of a Marriage” entered by the trial court in favor of Janet L. Meadows (“Wife”).¹ Husband, who was incarcerated at the time of the marriage and throughout this appeal, appears before this Court pro se and asserts four points of trial court error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, Blair v. Blair, 147 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Mo.App.2004), the record reveals that while Husband was serving a life sentence in prison without the possibility of parole he met Wife, who was a social worker for the State of Missouri, and they were married inside the correctional institution on September 22, 2006. During their marriage, Husband told Wife that he had applied for clemency from the governor of Missouri; however, Wife believed no such request was ever made. According to Wife, “about a year after they were wed she stopped visiting [Husband] because of his false statements to her.”

On January 26, 2009, Husband filed his “Petition for Dissolution of Marriage” and Wife countered with her “Counter–Petition for Annulment or Alternatively for Dissolution of Marriage.” On July 23, 2009, Husband filed a “Petition for a Writ of H[a]beas Corpus Ad Testificandum Duces Tecum” in which he requested he be allowed to attend the hearing on these petitions which was to be held on September 8, 2009. On September 8, 2009, the matter was called for trial. The trial court denied Husband's request for a writ of habeas corpus at that time, noted his “fail[ure] to appear,” and “denie[d] all relief requested by [Husband]” in his petition for dissolution. In support of her petition for annulment, Wife testified she had had no contact with Husband outside of the correctional facility, that she had no “conjugal visits” with Husband, and that the marriage was never consummated. She related that prior to her marriage to Husband he had “convinced [her] that he was going to be released ... in approximately a year and a half to two years.” He told her that he “was going to be sending information to the governor asking for clemency and he had been saving money to have the ex-governor ... do that for him.” She related this never occurred although it was part of the inducement which led her to marry him. Wife maintained that “because of the fact that [her] marriage was never consummated and because [she was] induced by his misleading promises about getting clemency ...,” her marriage should be annulled. Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court found against Husband and determined the parties' marriage “was induced by fraud and was never consummated and therefore an annulment is just and proper.” Accordingly, the trial court entered its decree annulling the parties' marriage, setting “aside any and all possessions that [each] party may possess real, personal, and tangible or intangible, to be each parties separate property hereafter.” This appeal by Husband followed.

In this court-tried case, appellate review is governed by Rule 84.13(d) ² and the principles set out in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Blair, 147 S.W.3d at 885. Accordingly, “ ‘[t]he judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law.’ ” Blair, 147 S.W.3d at 885 (quoting Eckhoff v. Eckhoff, 71 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Mo.App.2002)). “In making these determinations, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” Id.

Husband's first and third points relied on are based on the trial court's denial of his request for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum duces tecum. It is through this process that he, as a prisoner, sought to personally appear at his dissolution of marriage hearing. We review these points seriatim. In his first point relied on, Husband asserts the trial court abused its discretion in waiting until the day of his hearing to deny his application for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, thereby denying him the right to “full and fair access to court.” In his third point relied on, Husband asserts trial court error in “not allowing” him to appear at trial because he was denied the right to cross-examine Wife, as guaranteed by section 491.070.

In our review of Point I, we note with regard to prisoner access to the courts, that the Supreme Court of Missouri in Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 846 (Mo. banc 1996), observed that there is “a constitutional right of access to the courts.” “However, this right of access is not a right to perfect access; constitutionally sufficient access can be afforded by means other than personal appearance.” State of Washington ex rel Lewis v. Collis, 963 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Mo.App.1998). “The right of access does not automatically encompass a right to be present in person at trial.” Id. It is settled law that “ ‘absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, prisoners must be afforded meaningful access to the courts and an opportunity to be heard.’ ” Beckwith v. Giles, 32 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Mo.App.2000) (quoting State ex rel. Kittrell v. Carr, 878 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Mo.App.1994)) (emphasis omitted); see also Call, 925 S.W.2d at 846. With that being said, “it is also equally well[-]established that a prisoner has no absolute right to appear personally in a civil proceeding.” Beckwith, 32 S.W.3d at 663 (emphasis omitted); see Muza v. Missouri Dept. of Soc. Servs., 769 S.W.2d 168, 176 (Mo.App.1989). This is even true in the situation where the prisoner is requesting to appear “personally in a dissolution proceeding in which he is the plaintiff.” Kittrell, 878 S.W.2d at 862; see also In re Marriage of Burnside, 777 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Mo.App.1989). Furthermore, without specific authority granted by rules, statutes, or case law, a prisoner is not “entitled, as a matter of right, to the appointment of counsel.” Lewis, 963 S.W.2d at 705. Generally, “[p]arty litigants to civil proceedings have no constitutional or statutory right to the appointment of counsel.” Id. In the instant litigation, none of the issues presented involve the possible loss of Husband's liberty requiring the appointment of counsel, particularly in the case of an indigent litigant. See Fitzpatrick v. Hoehn, 746 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Mo.App.1988). “Moreover, it is well-established that constitutionally sufficient access can be afforded by means other than the live presence at trial of the person in question.” Call, 925 S.W.2d at 846. Therefore, when examining whether a prisoner has a “constitutional right to appear personally in a civil matter ... [we look to] whether there are any reasonable alternative means by which the prisoner may be heard and thus obtain meaningful access to the court.” Beckwith, 32 S.W.3d at 663; see Kittrell, 878 S.W.2d at 863.

The legislature has provided a variety of alternatives for securing prisoner's rights to access to the courts. In Missouri, prisoners can testify by conventional deposition or by videotaped deposition or by closed circuit television, and in some instances, upon a prisoner's request, a trial judge may, in his or her discretion, conduct a bench trial within the prison in cases where the prisoner is a party. Only where there are no reasonable alternatives to access the court and a substantial and irreparable prejudice will result from the failure to attend the proceedings may personal attendance be required as a matter of due process.

Beckwith, 32 S.W.3d at 663 (internal citations omitted); see § 544.275.

In 1995, the General Assembly amended [section 491.230.2] to permit an inmate who is a party to a civil proceeding to attend a trial when the trial court determined that the inmate would be ‘substantially and irreparably prejudiced by his failure to attend a trial on the merits in the civil proceeding.’

State v. Scott, 933 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Mo.App.1996) (quoting § 491.230.2). “By its enactment of [section] 491.230.2, the legislature has indicated in the strongest possible terms that prisoners should not be permitted to leave the prison to appear in civil cases.” Id. “Moreover, due process is not implicated in the absence of a showing that alternative means are inadequate to secure meaningful access to the courts.” Id.

“The granting of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to appear in a civil proceeding lies within the discretion of the trial court, which should ‘require strict proof of the materiality of the testimony and the necessity of the attendance of the prisoner as a witness.’ ” Beckwith, 32 S.W.3d at 663 (quoting Laws v. O'Brien, 718 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo.App.1986)); see § 491.230.2(2).³ “Such proof would then be balanced against the [S]tate's interest in economy, convenience and security.” Kittrell, 878 S.W.2d at 862.

Here, it was Husband's burden to demonstrate he was denied meaningful access to the courts or that he was “ ‘substantially and irreparably prejudiced by his failure to attend’ ” his hearing. State v. Christian, 182 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Mo.App.2005) (quoting § 491.230.2(2)). The record shows Husband first filed his petition on January 26, 2009. Even as a pro se litigant, “[h]e is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney.” Lewis, 963 S.W.2d at 705; Mills v. Mills, 939 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Mo.App.1997). The hearing in this matter took place on September 8, 2009.⁴ Husband merely set out in his writ request that “the presence of [Husband] with his legal documentation be produced at this scheduled hearing.” The...