Harold v. Bagley
| Decision Date | 12 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-0501 (NLH) (AMD) |
| Parties | ABE HAROLD, III, Plaintiff, v. POLICE OFFICER DANIEL BAGLEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Abe Harold, III 950275B Plaintiff Pro se
James R. Birchmeier, Esq. Birchmeier & Powell, LLC Attorneys for Cumberland County Jail [1]
Plaintiff Abe Harold, a prisoner presently confined in Southern State Correctional Facility, moves to amend his complaint. See ECF No. 12. The Court will grant the motion to amend and review the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons stated below, the amended complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend for a second time.
Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on January 11, 2021. ECF No. 1. The Court administratively terminated the complaint as Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis application. ECF no. 3. Plaintiff later submitted an in forma pauperis application, ECF No. 4, which the Court granted upon reopening the matter, ECF No. 5.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Daniel Bagley, a Bridgeton police officer, “failed to do arrest procedures and filed a complaint warrant maliciously.” ECF No. 1 at 5. He states Defendant Bagley “generated a complaint warrant with insufficient evidence to establish probable cause mainly by not identifying me with certainty and the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacking every element of the offense to support the statue [sic], doing so with malicious intent.” Id. at 10. In a supplement, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bagley “bypass[ed] policies and customs” in arresting Plaintiff and “harassed [him] on numerous occasions by unlawfully detaining [Plaintiff] to inquire about other police actively that [he] had no knowledge of or involvement.” ECF No 6 at 1. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Bagley committed perjury in his police report. ECF No. 7 at 3.
Plaintiff also seeks to bring claims against several Cumberland County prosecutors, his criminal defense attorneys, and the judge overseeing his criminal case. ECF No. 12.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A party has the right to amend his or her “pleading once as a matter of course” 21 days after service of the pleading or 21 days after a motion under Rule 12 is filed, whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Plaintiff filed a request to amend his complaint before the Court screened the original complaint or ordered service; therefore, Plaintiff may amend his complaint a matter of course. Plaintiff incorporates the original complaint, so the Court will consider both documents to be the “amended complaint” for purposes of its § 1915 review.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bagley maliciously filed a complaint warrant against him by submitting “an insufficient statement of probable cause . . . without being certain I was the accused.” ECF No. 1 at 8. He vaguely states that Defendant Bagley failed “to make an arrest, failed to inform me of the offense charged and of the fact that a warrant had been issued he failed to do arrest identification procedures, he failed, to execute the warrant and make promt [sic] return to the court and failed to identify me with reasonable certainty.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff further states Defendant Bagley never provided Plaintiff with a copy of the complaint despite Defendant Bagley stating in his police report that he had done so. Id.; ECF No. 7 at 3. He also alleges a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures based on an encounter with Defendant Bagley and another officer on the street. ECF No. 7 at 3.
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for false arrest. He acknowledges his arrest was done pursuant to a warrant, and “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.'” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)). An exception exists when “the warrant was ‘based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'” Id. at 547 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). “[T]he threshold for establishing this exception is a high one[.]” Id.
Plaintiff has not met the high standard required to overcome the presumption of reasonableness because he has not provided any information about the affidavit other than his claim that it contained “insufficient evidence, ” failed to “identify[] [him] with certainty” and “lack[ed] every element of the offense . . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court cannot reasonably infer Defendant Bagley submitted an obviously deficient affidavit of probable cause without more facts.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Bagley's failed to provide him with the complaint “[h]owever, under neither federal statutory law, nor under Constitutional law, is [defendant] provided the right to be shown an arrest warrant at the time of arrest.” Lewis v. Nelson, 113 F.3d 1246 (Table), 1997 WL 291177, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Cox, 553 Fed.Appx. 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2014)(declining to decide whether failure to show warrant during arrest justifies dismissal of criminal complaint, but stating standard would require a minimum showing of “prejudice” or “intentional and deliberate disregard”); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1977) (“We find no merit to appellant's contention that his arrest was unlawful due to the failure of the arresting officer to serve him with a copy of the arrest warrant.”); Richardson v. Kimbrough, No. 16-5931, 2017 WL 6311511, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2017) (“The Court's research revealed no support for Ms. Richardson's theory that an improper arrest claim under § 1983 may be based on the mere failure to show the arrest warrant at the time of execution.”).
Plaintiff also has not stated a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Bagley. The Supreme Court recently defined “the elements of the malicious prosecution tort as follows: (i) the suit or proceeding was ‘instituted without any probable cause'; (ii) the ‘motive in instituting' the suit ‘was malicious,' which was often defined in this context as without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; and (iii) the prosecution ‘terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused.'” Thompson v. Clark, __ S.Ct.__, 2022 WL 994329, at *4 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2022) (quoting T. Cooley, Law of Torts 181 (1880)). For the final element, “[a] plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.” Id. at *7. Plaintiff has not stated any facts indicating that the criminal proceedings against him ended without a conviction; therefore, he has failed to state a malicious prosecution claim.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts Defendant Bagley perjured himself when he claimed to have sent a copy of the complaint to Plaintiff, there is no standalone § 1983 claim for perjury. See Rosado v. Dugan, No. 19-5068, 2022 WL 103192, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2022) (citing Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1467, n.16 (3d Cir. 1992)). Alleged perjury may be relevant in a probable cause or malicious intent analysis, but the Court will dismiss the separate perjury claim.
Finally Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bagley and Defendant Officer John Doe stopped him on the street “without probable cause or an arrest warrant” and “detained [him] for [approximately] 45 minutes” and “interrogated me without reading me my rights and trying to forcefully make me get inside their police vehicle . . . .” ECF No. 6 at 4. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible unreasonable seizure claim based on these “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court assumes for screening purposes only that the stop qualifies as a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but there are not enough facts for the Court to...
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