Harper v. State, 2777

• Decision Date: 25 May 1962
• Docket Number: No. 2777,2777
• Citation: 141 So.2d 606
• Parties: Dell H. HARPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 606

141 So.2d 606

Dell H. HARPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2777.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 25, 1962.

Steadman S. Stahl, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David U. Tumin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.

SHANNON, Chief Judge.

In this appeal the defendant below seeks review of an adjudication of guilty of grand larceny following a non-jury trial in the court of record.

The record-on-appeal reflects that in March, 1960, the appellant was hired by Atlantic Surgical Supply Company, in Fort Lauderdale, as a bookkeeper and accountant. She was charged with handling the financial affairs of the corporation, which included making regular deposits to the company's bank account.

In October, 1960, the owners of the company became concerned about its financial condition. An investigation followed, and from the results thereof, it was concluded that there was a shortgage in the corporation's account. Appellant was called upon by the president and general manager of the corporation, Dillon, and by its vicepresident, Powell, to explain these discrepancies. Dillon and Powell both testified that the appellant admitted having taken the money and that she voluntarily made a written statement implicating herself in the theft. In the statement, appellant agreed to pay to the company the sum of $10,000.00 'to cover any monies taken by me from the firm for my own personal use. * * *'

Subsequently, the appellant was informed against for the offense of grand larceny. Upon arraignment she entered a plea of not guilty and waived trial by jury. At the conclusion of the trial, appellant was adjudicated guilty of the crime of grand larceny. Her motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed.

By her assignments of error and points-on-appeal, the appellant challenges generally the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction under Sec. 811.021, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.

In a prosecution for the crime of larceny, it is necessary that the State establish first that the property in question was lost by the owner thereof, and, secondly, that its loss was the result of a felonious taking. The question of the existence of felonious intent is one of fact. See Groover v. State, 1921, 82 Fla. 427, 90 So. 473, 26 A.L.R. 373 and 20 Fla.Jur., Larceny, Sec. 58. It is the establishment of these two elements, which constitute the corpus delicti of the offense, that is challenged first in this appeal. In essence, the appellant maintains that the only evidence adduced at trial which tended to prove that any money was actually lost by the company was the following extra-judicial statement made in writing by appellant:

'October 9, 1960

'I, Dell H. Harper do hereby give my note of $10,000.00 to Edward, A. Powell and Charles A. Dillon of Atlantic Surgical Supply Company, Inc. to cover any monies taken by me from the firm for my own personal use and to defray any expenses and damages the company has suffered due to my taking the money. The sum of $10,000.00 is over the actual monies diverted to my own use as that amount is still undetermined. The money in excess of the amount taken is for whatever damages I have caused the company.

'/s/ Dell H. Harper.'

While a statement, or an admission, such as the one set out here, is insufficient standing alone to establish the corpus delicti of the offense, it may be considered along with the other evidence. Williams v. State, Fla.App.1960, 117 So.2d 548; and Cross v. State, 1928, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380. It is likewise settled in this jurisdiction that the corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. Shuler v. State, Fla.1961, 132 So.2d 7. The evidence herein establishes the corpus delicti of the offense of grand larceny.

As alluded to above, upon being hired by Atlantic, appellant was charged with the responsibility of making all deposits of cash receipts, taken in through the company's cash register, to its account in the bank, as well as with the company's bookkeeping and accounting.

From the record it appears that each day, at the close of business, either Dillon or Powell would check the cash registers, remove the money from them and place it in an envelope in the safe. The next morning, the appellant would remove the...