Harrington v. Harrington

• Citation: 269 A.2d 310
• Parties: Mertland G. HARRINGTON and Glenys P. Harrington v. Gertrude HARRINGTON.
• Decision Date: 25 September 1970
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 310

269 A.2d 310

Mertland G. HARRINGTON and Glenys P. Harrington v. Gertrude HARRINGTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 25, 1970.

A. Alan Grossman, and Barry M. Faber, Rockland, for plaintiffs.

Paul F. Zendzian, Bangor, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, WEATHERBEE and POMEROY, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Justice.

This is an appeal from the dismissal in the Superior Court of the defendant's notice of appeal from the action of the District Court, Division of Knox, ordering that judgment be entered for the plaintiffs in a complaint of forcible entry and detainer which prayed for judgment of possession of a four (4) room one-family house located in Friendship, Maine, and for $250 in rental damages, plus costs.

The record reveals the following procedural background prior to the Superior Court action which led to the instant appeal. Represented by counsel in the District Court the defendant, in addition to denying specifically the plaintiffs' asserted right to possession of the premises and that any rent was due in relation thereto, pleaded in defense of the forcible entry and detainer action equitable title in herself and her divorced husband by reason of a resulting or constructive trust. This affirmative defense is structured upon the fact that defendant and her husband have paid the full purchase price for the premises and had directed title to be conveyed to the plaintiffs on account of their own minority at the time.

The plaintiffs did not file on the return day or at any time thereafter for that matter, under Rule 80D(d), M.D.C.Civ.R., a written allegation that the defendant's claim of title was frivolous and intended for delay. 14 M.R.S.A. § 6007 provides as follows:

'The plaintiff may make a written allegation that the defendant's claim of title is frivolous and intended for delay and the judge shall then examine the case so far as to ascertain the truth of such allegation, and if satisfied of the truth thereof, he shall proceed to try the cause, and if it is determined in favor of the plaintiff, he may issue a writ of possession for removal of the defendant; but this shall not prevent an appeal as provided in section 6008.'

In that posture of the case, the District Court Judge had to assume, as we also must do, that the defendant had a meritorious claim in defense of the action of forcible entry and detainer, sufficient to secure a removal of the cause from the District Court to the Superior Court for trial of the title, provided other provisions of the statutory procedure were met.

The District Court, however, purported to act under the provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6006:

'Claims of title

When the defendant claims title in himself or in another person under whom he claims the premises, he shall, except as otherwise provided, recognize in a reasonable sum to the plaintiff, with sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay all intervening damages and costs and a reasonable rent for the premises. The plaintiff shall in like manner recognize to the defendant, conditioned to enter the action in the Superior Court within 30 days and to pay all costs adjudged against him. If either party neglects so to recognize, judgment shall be rendered against him.'

Notwithstanding plaintiffs' neglect to recognize as required by the statute, the District Court did not render judgment of dismissal against them, but rather entered judgment in their favor against the defendant because of defendant's neglect to furnish the statutory recognizance to the plaintiffs to secure them against all intervening damages, costs and a reasonable rent for the use and occupation of the premises. The Court's decision was not based on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim as the Judge entered of record the following notation:

'Defendant claims title and admits that provisions of Title 14, Sec. 6006 apply. Defendant claims inability to comply with terms of Sec. 6006 as to bond (see affidavit) because of poverty and consequent inability to obtain sureties. I hold that the provisions of Sec. 6006 not complied with and therefore, give judgment to the Plaintiff.'

Prior to the above notation of judgment the defendant had subscribed and filed with the Court an affidavit that her answer to the complaint was made in good faith and that due to her poverty status she was unable to comply with the requirements of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6006. The Court's action, in the absence of any contrary counter-affidavit or conflicting evidence assumed the truth of the matters stated. Thus, on this record it would appear that the District Court judgment is erroneous, 1) for granting relief to the plaintiffs without compelling them to comply with 14 M.R.S.A. § 6006 while defaulting the defendant for non-compliance and 2) for granting judgment for the rent claimed due when Rule 80D(g), M.D.C.Civ.R., provides that forcible entry and detainer actions shall not be joined with any other action.

However that may be, the appeal comes to us from the Superior Court's dismissal of defendant's appeal for non-compliance with the security provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6008, which provide as follows:

' § 6008. Appeals

Either party may appeal from a judgment to the Superior Court as in other civil actions. When the plaintiff appeals, he shall recognize in manner aforesaid to the defendant, except as otherwise provided, conditioned to enter the action and to pay all costs adjudged against him. When the defendant appeals, he shall recognize in like manner to the plaintiff, conditioned to enter the action and to pay all intervening costs and such reasonable rent of the premises, as the judge shall adjudge, if the judgment is not reversed.'

In her points on appeal the defendant claims the Superior Court erred in failing to exempt her on account of poverty from compliance with the security requirements of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6008, and the District Court in compelling obedience to the dictates of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6006, all, as asserted, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. It is argued that the reference statutes operate unconstitutionally when applied to her because of her impoverished condition.

We note initially that our Legislature has not adopted for the prosecution or defense of civil actions an 'in forma pauperis' program either at the trial level or in appellate proceedings as exists in the federal system and in more than 20 of our sister States. See note: Proceedings in Forma Pauperis, 9 U.Fla.L.Rev. 65 (1956); Boddie v. State of Connecticut, 1968, D.C., 286 F.Supp. 968, 973. With due respect to the constitutional standards imposed upon the States of the Union by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, we must in the present instance determine whether our legislative procedures surrounding forcible entry and detainer remedies invidiously violate the constitutional mandate of equal justice under the law to the poor as to the rich.

On the criminal side, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have in numerous instances articulated several of the constitutional requirements which the States must affirmatively effectuate to equalize the conditions between the poor and the rich in our adversary system of jurisprudence either at the trial level or on appeal. Roadblocks to appellate review arising from the poverty status of the accused have been held unconstitutional, such as the prerequired payment of a filing fee, however small, Smith v. Bennett, 1961, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39. Pecuniary hurdles in the path of effective access to judicial review may impair the indigent's right to equal protection under the law as much as if he were completely excluded therefrom. Gardner v. California, 1969, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601. States are not required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned discriminatory distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 1966, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577; Burns v. State of Ohio, 1959, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209.

While the great number of cases which have applied the Equal Protection Clause to all stages of the judicial process have dealt with criminal defendants, the constitutional mandate that there be no invidious discrimination between indigent and rich litigants does not differentiate between civil and criminal cases. The Constitution protects life, liberty and property.

'It is the importance of the right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.' Lee v. Habib, 1970, Dist. of Columbia Cir., 424 F.2d 891.

Court procedures, at the trial level or in appellate review, even though the result of statutory requirement, which in and of themselves invidiously discriminate between rich and poor impair guarantees of equal justice which the Constitution was designed to protect. This is equally so in civil litigation as in criminal prosecutions. An indigent litigant may have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case. Furthermore, equal access to the civil courts was among the Fourteenth Amendment's primary objectives. See, Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 334, 42 S.Ct. 124, 130, 66 L.Ed. 254; Barbier v. Connolly...