Harris County v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-0531.,01-0531.
• Parties: HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner, v. Lynn SMITH, Erica Smith, Individually and as next friend of Hasasha Smith and Lynn Smith, Jr., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

96 S.W.3d 230

HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner, v. Lynn SMITH, Erica Smith, Individually and as next friend of Hasasha Smith and Lynn Smith, Jr., Respondents.

No. 01-0531.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued September 11, 2002.

Decided December 19, 2002.

Rehearing Denied February 27, 2003.

Michael A. Stafford, Harris County Attorney, Cedric K. Loeb, Harris County Attorney's Office, Sandra D. Hachem, Harris County Assistant Attorney, Houston, for Petitioner.

Willie High Coleman, Bates & Coleman, P.C., Houston, for Respondents.

Chief Justice PHILLIPS delivered the Opinion of the Court joined by Justice HECHT, Justice OWEN, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice SMITH.

In this case we must decide whether the trial court committed harmful error by submitting a broad-form question on damages that included an element without any evidentiary support. The court of appeals found no harm because the jury's award could have reasonably been based on other elements of damage for which there was evidentiary support. 66 S.W.3d 326, 336-38. We conclude that the error was harmful because the trial court's charge error "probably prevented the petitioner from properly presenting its case to the appellate courts." TEX.R.APP. P. 61.1(b). We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

I

Lynn Smith and Erica Smith, individually and as next friend for the Smith's two minor children, sued for injuries they sustained when their automobile collided with a patrol car driven by Harris County Deputy Sheriff Robert Spurgeon. At trial, the court submitted two broad-form damage questions predicated on a finding that the deputy sheriff was negligent. Each damage question instructed the jury that it could consider various elements of damage in awarding a single amount to a party. Question 3 stated that when determining Lynn Smith's damages, if any, the jury could consider:

a. Physical pain and mental anguish.

b. Loss of earning capacity.

c. Physical impairment.

d. Medical care.

Harris County objected to this issue, asking the trial court to submit each damage element separately. After the court denied this request, Harris County specifically objected that there was no evidence of "loss of earning capacity" as an element of Mr. Smith's damages. The court overruled the objection, and the jury awarded Mr. Smith $90,000.00.

Jury Question 4 instructed the jury that when determining Erica Smith's damages, if any, it could consider the following elements:

a. Physical pain and mental anguish.

b. Physical impairment.

c. Medical care.

Harris County also objected to this question, claiming that there was no evidence that Mrs. Smith had sustained any physical impairment. The trial court overruled the objection, and the jury awarded Mrs. Smith $3100 in damages.

The trial court rendered judgment against both Harris County and the deputy sheriff on the jury's verdict, which also included a $1000 award for each of the children. Harris County appealed as to Mr. and Mrs. Smith only, its sole complaint being that the trial court erred in submitting damages in Questions 3 and 4. The deputy sheriff did not appeal. The court of appeals agreed that the trial court erred in submitting loss of earning capacity as to Mr. Smith and physical impairment as to Mrs. Smith, but it concluded that the error was harmless because there was ample evidence on properly submitted elements of damage to support the jury's awards to both plaintiffs. 66 S.W.3d at 335. In reaching its judgment, the court of appeals relied on our decision in Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.1995), and distinguished our holding in Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000). 66 S.W.3d at 333-34. Because we believe the present case is closer to Casteel than to Thomas, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to the trial court for the reasons stated below.

II

In Thomas, a broad-form damage question asked the jury to consider five separate elements in arriving at a single damage amount. The defendant did not object to the broad-form submission. In reaching its verdict, the jury made notations in the margin next to each of the five elements of damage. These notations totaled $500,000, which was the amount of the verdict. On appeal, the defendant challenged the verdict, arguing that there was no evidence to support the amounts noted by the jury on two of the five elements. We rejected the argument, observing that the jury's margin notations were not in legal effect "separate damage awards for purposes of evidentiary review." Thomas, 895 S.W.2d at 359. We further said that because the defendant had not asked for separate damage findings, it could only challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the whole verdict. Id. at 360. Because the defendant did not make this argument, we rejected its evidentiary challenge. Id.

In this case, on the other hand, Harris County did object to the charge. Harris County pointed out to the trial court that particular elements of damage had no support in the evidence and should not be included in the broad-form question. The objection was timely and specific. It was also correct, and the trial court clearly erred when it did not sustain the objection and correct the charge.

The court of appeals did not believe that Harris County's objection to the charge should make any difference in the disposition, but we disagree. We further disagree with the court of appeals' application of Casteel.

III

In Casteel, we ruled that when a single broad-form liability question commingles valid and invalid liability grounds and the appellant's objection is timely and specific, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an invalid theory. The court of appeals had concluded in the case that the trial court's submission, although error, was harmless because one or more of the valid liability theories were supported by sufficient evidence. Casteel v. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. 3 S.W.3d 582, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997), ref'd and remanded, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000). We disagreed, concluding that the error was harmful because the erroneous submission, over timely objection, affirmatively prevented the appellant from isolating the error and presenting its case on appeal. We held that:

[W]hen a trial court submits a single broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted invalid theory. See TEX.R.APP. P. 61.1 ("No judgment may be reversed on ap, peal ... unless the Supreme Court concludes that the error complained of ... probably prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case to the appellate courts."); see also TEX.R.APP. P. 44.1(a).

Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388.

The court of appeals in this case concluded that Casteel applied only to "key issues" such as the submission of an invalid liability theory. 66 S.W.3d at 334. It did not extend to damages because, according to the court of appeals, a jury was less likely to include an invalid element of damage in its verdict than it was to rely on an invalid theory of liability. Id. at 334-35; see also Dorsaneo, Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the Standard of Review, 46 SMU L.REV. 601, 630 (1992) (suggesting that it is reasonable to presume that the jury will notice when there is no evidence to support an element of damage, but will not know that a liability theory is invalid). The court then concluded that the erroneous inclusion of an invalid element of damage was harmless, even when identified by timely objection, so long as there was sufficient evidence of other elements in the broad-form question on which the jury could have reached its verdict. 66 S.W.3d at 336-38.

Harris County argues, however, that Casteel's harmful error analysis is not confined to questions of liability. A trial court's error in instructing a jury to consider erroneous matters, whether an invalid liability theory or an unsupported element of damage, prevents the appellant from demonstrating the consequences of the error on appeal. Harris County directs our attention to two courts of appeals' decisions that, contrary to the court below, apply Casteel's reasoning to broad-form damage questions. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (harmful error to submit over timely objection a broad-form damages question that mixes valid and invalid measures of damages); Iron Mountain Bison Ranch, Inc. v. Easley Trailer Mfg., Inc., 42 S.W.3d 149, 157 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (same); see also In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d 232, 248 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (not reaching the issue of whether Casteel applies to broad-form damages but recognizing conflict in courts of appeals).

In Casteel, we reaffirmed our reasoning in Lancaster v. Fitch, 112 Tex. 293, 246 S.W. 1015 (1923), where this Court recognized the inherent harm to the administration of justice caused by mixing valid and invalid liability theories in a single broadform liability question. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 389. The same year we decided Lancaster, we applied its reasoning to a similar situation involving a broad-form damages question. See Eastern Tex. Elec. Co. v. Baker, 254 S.W. 933, 934-35 (Tex.1923). In Eastern Texas Electric, the trial court submitted a single broad damage issue and instructed the jury to consider past and future mental and physical pain in awarding damages even though there was no evidence of future physical pain. The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury to consider future pain but concluded that the error was harmless because evidence of past mental and physical pain was...