Harris v. Adkins
Decision Date | 28 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 21537,21537 |
Citation | 432 S.E.2d 549,189 W.Va. 465 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | Dean M. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. Harold ADKINS, Defendant. |
Syllabus by the Court
The right to petition the government found in Section 16 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution is comparable to that found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. It does not provide an absolute privilege for intentional and reckless falsehoods, but the right is protected by the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). To the extent that Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981), states to the contrary, it is overruled.
Michael Edward Nogay, Sellitti & Nogay, Weirton, for plaintiff.
Jeffrey A. Holmstrand, Rhonda L. Wade, Bachman, Hess, Bachmann & Garden, Wheeling, W. Dean DeLaMater, DeLaMater, Hague & Bohach, Weirton, for defendant.
This case comes before us through a certified question from the Circuit Court of Hancock County, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 58-5-2 (1967). 1 We are asked to decide whether the Petition Clause of Section 16 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution 2 provides absolute immunity to a defendant charged with expressing libelous falsehoods about a city councilman at a public city council meeting. 3 We note initially that in Webb v. Fury, 167 W.Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28 (1981), our Petition Clause was held to afford protection similar to that provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 In Syllabus Point 1 of Webb, we stated: "The right to petition the government embodied in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is also protected by article III, section 16 of the Constitution of West Virginia."
On January 31, 1992, the defendant, Harold Adkins, read aloud the following statement during a public meeting for the Weirton City Council:
Shortly thereafter, the city councilman, Dean Harris, sued Mr. Adkins in the Circuit Court of Hancock County for defamation, alleging that his personal and political reputations were damaged. Mr. Adkins filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that he was petitioning the government for redress when he read the statement during the city council meeting and that this activity was absolutely privileged under our holding in Webb v. Fury, supra. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion and certified the question of whether an absolute immunity existed in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). 5
In Webb v. Fury, supra, which was decided before the United States Supreme Court had occasion to determine the scope of the Petition Clause in McDonald v. Smith, supra, we did not attempt a direct analysis of the Petition Clause. Rather, we focused on what was termed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Webb involved an environmental group and one of its members, Rick Webb, who had written a complaint under the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e)(2), regarding certain violations by a coal company. Similar charges were made in a newsletter. The coal company sued in the circuit court for defamation. After an adverse ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Mr. Webb sought a prohibition to foreclose the action.
Because there was not a case on point in this jurisdiction or a United States Supreme Court decision, the parties argued the law contained in the United States Supreme Court's decisions of Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). 6 These cases developed what is known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which we discussed at some length in Webb and concluded:
167 W.Va. at 445, 282 S.E.2d at 35.
We also concluded in Webb that "the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its application to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the petitioners' activities involve the exercise of the right to petition" and were, therefore, absolutely protected. 167 W.Va. at 459, 282 S.E.2d at 43.
Some four years after Webb, in McDonald v. Smith, supra, the United States Supreme Court was asked to reach a similar result based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The United States Supreme Court refused this invitation, explaining that "[t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First Amendment], and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." 472 U.S. at 482, 105 S.Ct. at 2789, 86 L.Ed.2d at 388. As a consequence, it went on to conclude that there was nothing in the First Amendment law that elevated the right to petition to a special higher status than the rights of freedom of speech and press:
472 U.S. at 486, 105 S.Ct. at 2791, 86 L.Ed.2d at 390. (Citations omitted).
Thus, the McDonald Court established an essential equality between the First Amendment rights and, therefore, the right to petition was given the same protection against defamation suits as other First Amendment rights. 7 Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, elaborated on this protection when he stated that petitioning the government is protected by the actual malice standard:
472 U.S. at 490, 105 S.Ct. at 2794, 86 L.Ed.2d at 393.
We agree with the reasoning in McDonald, which contained no dissent, and we can find no persuasive reason why our Constitution should provide greater protection than the First Amendment as to the right to petition. Accordingly, we hold that the right to petition the government found in Section 16 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution is comparable to that found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. It does not provide an absolute privilege for intentional and reckless falsehoods, but the right is protected by the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). To the extent that Webb v. Fury, supra, states to the contrary, it is overruled. 8
For this reason, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold...
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