Harris v. Charles

• Decision Date: 31 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 61629-3-I.,61629-3-I.
• Citation: 214 P.3d 962,151 Wn. App. 929
• Parties: Joshua HARRIS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Edsonya CHARLES, Director of King County Adult Detention and City of Seattle, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

214 P.3d 962

151 Wn. App. 929

Joshua HARRIS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Edsonya CHARLES, Director of King County Adult Detention and City of Seattle, Respondents.

No. 61629-3-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

August 31, 2009.

Richard E. Greene, Seattle City Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Christine A. Jackson, The Public Defender, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.

BECKER, J.

¶ 1 A statute entitles felons detained before trial on electronic home monitoring to be credited for the time served. No statute entitles misdemeanants to the same credit. In view of the differences between felony and misdemeanor sentencing, we hold this distinction is rational and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

FACTS

¶ 2 Respondent Joshua Harris was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with one count of Driving While License Suspended in the third degree (DWLS Third) and one count of operating a vehicle without an ignition interlock device. He posted bail of $5,000 and began electronic home monitoring on October 22, 2007, as a condition of pretrial release. On January 7, 2008, Harris pleaded guilty to both charges.

¶ 3 On March 7, 2008, the court sentenced Harris to 90 days in jail on the first count, consecutive to a 90-day suspended sentence on the second count. He had served 140 days on electronic home monitoring and asked to be credited for that time. The municipal court denied his request.

¶ 4 Harris was to report to jail on April 9. On March 31, he filed a petition in superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, asking on equal protection grounds that the municipal court be ordered to give him credit for his time on electronic home monitoring, as is required by a statute when sentencing felons. Over the City's objection that felons and misdemeanants are not similarly situated, the superior court granted the writ: "I find that the rule albeit for felonies shall apply here." The municipal court complied with the writ by giving Harris 90 days of credit against his 90-day sentence on the charge of DWLS Third.

¶ 5 The City appeals the superior court's order granting the writ.

HABEAS CORPUS—WHAT CONSTITUTES RESTRAINT

¶ 6 The City initially argues that the superior court should not have granted Harris relief in a habeas corpus proceeding because he was not physically restrained when he petitioned for a writ. He had been sentenced, but he had not yet reported to the jail. The City contends that a person may not employ the habeas corpus statute to challenge a sentence he has not yet begun to serve.

¶ 7 RCW 7.36.010 provides: "Every person restrained of his liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when illegal." The petition must specify by "whom the petitioner is restrained of his liberty, and the place where." RCW 7.36.030(1). If the petitioner shows that his restraint is illegal, the court must discharge him. RCW 7.36.120.

¶ 8 In support of the proposition that restraint must be physical, the City relies on an old case, In Re Powell, 191 Wash. 152, 153, 70 P.2d 778 (1937). Modern cases demonstrate that, contrary to the City's argument, being under physical restraint is not a prerequisite for obtaining habeas relief, nor is it necessary that the authority to whom the writ is issued be in a position to physically deliver the petitioner from a place of confinement to the court. Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 925, 530 P.2d 334 (1975); Born v. Thompson, 154 Wash.2d 749, 766, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005). In Born, the court considered older cases holding that a writ should not issue if it will not have an effect on the petitioner's custodial status, but found that such cases "do not state the present function of the writ of habeas corpus." Born, 154 Wash.2d at 766, 117 P.3d 1098. Release from confinement is no longer the sole function of the writ.

¶ 9 A petitioner is under restraint when he is subject to significant adverse consequences. Born, 154 Wash.2d at 763, 117 P.3d 1098. Born challenged a trial court's finding that he was charged with a violent act. As a consequence of the trial court's finding, if Born were to be charged with a misdemeanor in the future and then found to be incompetent, a statute would require that he be committed for competency restoration. The Supreme Court concluded that the potential adverse consequences of the finding were sufficiently significant to conclude that Born was under present restraint. Born, 154 Wash.2d at 764, 117 P.3d 1098. Harris' sentence of 90 days in jail for DWLS Third was a certainty, not a mere possibility. He was sufficiently restrained to seek relief under the habeas statute.

EXPECTATION OF FINALITY

¶ 10 By challenging the superior court's order in this appeal, the City seeks to take away the 90 days of credit Harris received for time served on electronic home monitoring. Harris argues that the City's appeal should be dismissed as moot because re-imposing the 90-day jail term would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. An appeal is moot if the court cannot grant relief. State v. Veazie, 123 Wash.App. 392, 397, 98 P.3d 100 (2004); State v. Turner, 98 Wash.2d 731, 733, 658 P.2d 658 (1983).

¶ 11 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a second attempt by the State to increase a sentence if, despite an erroneous sentence, the defendant had a legitimate expectation of its finality. State v. Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d 303, 310-11, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). A defendant may acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in an erroneous sentence if the sentence has been substantially or fully served, unless the defendant was on notice that the sentence might be modified. Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d at 312, 915 P.2d 1080.

¶ 12 Harris argues that he had a legitimate expectation of finality because, once the municipal court complied with the writ and gave him credit for 90 days on electronic home monitoring, he had completed his sentence. He points out that 90 days is the maximum amount of jail time the court can impose for third degree driving with a suspended license.

¶ 13 While the federal cases cited in Hardesty hold that completion of a sentence ordinarily gives rise to a legitimate expectation of finality, they also indicate that there is no finality until the time for review has expired. See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir.1990), cited in Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d at 312, 915 P.2d 1080. "So long as a sentence can be increased on appeal, defendant has no expectation of its finality." Rico, 902 F.2d at 1068.

¶ 14 The City filed a timely appeal. We conclude Harris did not have a legitimate expectation of finality, and re-imposing the original sentence will not violate double jeopardy. The City's appeal is not moot.

EQUAL PROTECTION

¶ 15 The City's main contention on appeal is that Harris was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus because there was no violation of his constitutional rights. See RCW 7.36.130(1). This court reviews writ actions of the superior court de novo. Butler v. Kato, 137 Wash.App. 515, 521, 154 P.3d 259 (2007).

¶ 16 The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee that persons situated similarly with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must receive like treatment. State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652, 672, 921 P.2d 473 (1996). Equal protection is denied if a valid law is administered in a way that unjustly discriminates between similarly situated persons. State v. Handley, 115 Wash.2d 275, 289, 796 P.2d 1266 (1990). Before a court will scrutinize an equal protection claim, the defendant must establish that he is situated similarly to others in a class. Handley, 115 Wash.2d at 289-90, 796 P.2d 1266.

¶ 17 Harris contends that, as a person who served time on electronic home monitoring before being sentenced, he is in the same class with felons who under the Sentencing Reform Act must be credited for all "confinement" before sentencing if the confinement is served solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced. Former RCW 9.94A.505(6) (2009).¹ The Sentencing Reform Act defines "confinement" as including "partial confinement," and "home detention" is defined as a form of "partial confinement." Former RCW 9.94A.030(11), (30), and (35) (2008).²

¶ 18 Harris argues that he is situated similarly to felons because no statute prohibits misdemeanants from being credited for time spent on electronic home monitoring. According to Harris, the legislature must afford the same treatment to all defendants who are subjected to electronic home monitoring as a condition of pretrial release.

¶ 19 We apply the "rational basis" test for analyzing an equal protection claim when, as here, a classification does not involve a suspect or semi-suspect class and does not threaten a fundamental right. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d at 673, 921 P.2d 473. Under that test, a law will be upheld if it rests upon a legitimate state objective and is not wholly irrelevant to achieving that objective. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d at 673, 921 P.2d 473. The person challenging the classification must show that it is "purely arbitrary." Omega Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marquardt, 115 Wash.2d 416, 431, 799 P.2d 235 (1990). According to Harris, there is no rational basis for the legislature to require that credit for time served on electronic home monitoring be given to felons but not misdemeanants.

¶ 20 This argument fails. The sentencing systems for felonies and misdemeanors are significantly different. See Wahleithner v. Thompson, 134 Wash.App. 931, 941, 143 P.3d 321 (2006) (comparing misdemeanor and felony sentences was of limited utility in determining whether misdemeanor sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment). Pertinent to this case, one significant difference is that felons typically face much higher maximum penalties....