Harris v. the Honorable Edsonya Charles

• Decision Date: 12 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 83867–4.,83867–4.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Joshua HARRIS, Petitioner,v.The Honorable Edsonya CHARLES, Judge, Seattle Municipal Court, Director of King County Adult Detention, and The City of Seattle, Respondents.

171 Wash.2d 455

256 P.3d 328

Joshua HARRIS, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Edsonya CHARLES, Judge, Seattle Municipal Court, Director of King County Adult Detention, and The City of Seattle, Respondents.

No. 83867–4.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Feb. 17, 2011.Decided May 12, 2011.

Christine Anne Jackson, Kristen V. Murray, The Public Defender, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.Richard Edward Greene, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.Travis Stearns, Washington Defender Association, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Defender Association.WIGGINS, J.

[171 Wash.2d 458] ¶ 1 Washington's Criminal Rules authorize a trial judge to release a person before trial subject to electronic home monitoring (EHM). If convicted of a felony, the defendant is entitled to have the days spent on pretrial EHM credited against any sentence of confinement. Petitioner Joshua Harris pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors and seeks credit for time spent on EHM, arguing that allowing EHM credit for felons but not misdemeanants violates his right to equal protection of the law.

¶ 2 We hold that there are rational bases for treating felons and misdemeanants differently when crediting EHM: granting EHM credit would hamper the ability of misdemeanor sentencing judges to order jail time, given the typically shorter sentences for misdemeanors compared to felonies; misdemeanor sentencing courts have much greater discretion than felony sentencing courts to issue sentences and impose conditions designed to promote rehabilitation, a goal of misdemeanor, but not felony, sentencing. Finally, some misdemeanor sentencing statutes and ordinances (including the ordinance at issue here) provide for a combination of time spent in jail and time spent on EHM; allowing pretrial EHM credit would undermine the distinction between the two types of confinement. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the superior court's order awarding credit against jail time for pretrial EHM time.

FACTS

¶ 3 On October 19, 2007, Harris was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with driving with license suspended in the third degree (DWLS 3rd) and driving without a required ignition interlock device (IID).¹ The court set bail at $5,000, which Harris posted, and additionally required Harris to comply with EHM conditions. Harris's EHM began October 22, 2007. On January 7, 2008, Harris pleaded guilty to DWLS 3rd and IID misdemeanors. Also on January 7, Harris moved for his sentencing to be delayed 60 days; the city of Seattle (the City) did not object. The court granted the motion for delayed sentencing, and Harris remained on presentencing release subject to EHM.

¶ 4 Harris's EHM requirements ended on the date of his sentencing, March 7, 2008, when Seattle Municipal Court Judge Edsonya Charles sentenced him to 90 days in jail and a $1,000 suspended fine for DWLS 3rd. On the IID charge, the court sentenced Harris to 90 days in jail, with 90 days suspended, and a $1,000 fine, with $800 suspended. The court declined to give Harris credit against his 90–day jail sentence for the 140 days he spent on EHM prior to sentencing. The court ordered Harris to report to jail on April 9, 2008.

¶ 5 On March 31, 2008, Harris petitioned the King County Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging unlawful restraint because the sentencing court did not give him credit for his time on EHM. Harris, a misdemeanant, claimed the failure to credit his EHM time violated his equal protection rights because the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, requires courts to give such credit to felons. On April 7, 2008, the King County Superior Court granted the writ and ordered the Seattle Municipal Court to credit Harris for 90 days he was on EHM. The order stated:

RCW 9.94A.120(16), RCW 9.94A.030(8)[,] (26) and (42) states [sic] that a criminal defendant is entitled to credit against sentence for pretrial time spent on electronic home detention. I find that the rule albeit for felonies shall apply here.

Clerk's Papers at 38. The Seattle Municipal Court complied with the order on April 8, 2008, and credited Harris with 90 days against his 90–day jail sentence for DWLS 3rd. The City filed a timely notice of appeal on May 8, 2008.

¶ 6 The Court of Appeals reversed the order. Harris v. Charles, 151 Wash.App. 929, 214 P.3d 962 (2009). The court held that Harris was sufficiently restrained to seek a writ of habeas corpus but that he had no expectation of finality in his sentence for purposes of double jeopardy because the City filed a timely appeal of the order. Id. at 934, 936, 214 P.3d 962. The court also held that denying a misdemeanant credit for EHM time did not violate equal protection or double jeopardy principles. Id. at 939–41, 214 P.3d 962. This court granted Harris's petition for review, 168 Wash.2d 1031, 230 P.3d 1061 (2010), and we now affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of the superior court's order.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 “Every person restrained of his liberty under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when illegal.” RCW 7.36.010. A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus raises a collateral attack and bears a higher burden than on direct appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wash.2d 322, 332, 166 P.3d 677 (2007). A petitioner raising a collateral attack claiming a constitutional error must show actual and substantial prejudice. Id. at 331–32, 166 P.3d 677. Our review of constitutional questions and a superior court's issuance of a writ is de novo. State v. Schaler, 169 Wash.2d 274, 282, 236 P.3d 858 (2010); Commanda v. Cary, 143 Wash.2d 651, 654, 23 P.3d 1086 (2001).

I. The City's appeal was not moot

¶ 8 Harris argues the City's appeal of the order granting the writ of habeas corpus was moot because he had an expectation of finality in his sentence and, regardless of the disposition on appeal, he could not be resentenced without violating double jeopardy principles. “What matters for purposes of double jeopardy is not the legality or illegality of the sentence ..., but the defendant's expectation of finality.” State v. Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d 303, 315, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996). A defendant's expectation of finality is influenced by factors such as completion of the sentence, passage of time, pendency of an appeal or review of the sentence, or a defendant's misconduct in obtaining the sentence. Id. at 311, 915 P.2d 1080. “Defendants are charged with knowledge of a statutory period in which review of a sentence may be sought.” Id. at 315, 915 P.2d 1080 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136–37, 101 S.Ct. 426, 437, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980)).

¶ 9 The superior court issued the order granting the writ on April 7, 2008. The Seattle Municipal Court complied with the order and on April 8 granted Harris credit against his 90–day jail sentence. The City filed a timely notice of appeal on May 8, 2008. Harris remained on probation until at least August 2010, and his 90–day jail sentence for IID remained suspended. Harris claims the City's appeal of the order was moot because it did not seek a stay of the order pending its appeal and because Harris completed his sentence as soon as the Seattle Municipal Court credited his jail sentence. This argument is unpersuasive because the City timely appealed the order. Any expectation of finality Harris had in his sentence was limited by the short passage of time between his sentencing and the City's timely appeal. Harris did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence for purposes of double jeopardy. The City's appeal of the order granting the writ of habeas corpus was not moot.

II. Denying Harris credit for time on EHM does not violate equal protection

¶ 10 Harris claims that denying him credit for time served on presentencing EHM violates his equal protection rights because felony and juvenile defendants receive such credit pursuant to statute. Equal protection requires that similarly situated individuals receive similar treatment under the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wash. Const. art. I, § 12. Equal protection provides equal application of law but does not provide complete equality among individuals or classes of individuals. State v. Simmons, 152 Wash.2d 450, 458, 98 P.3d 789 (2004).

In order to determine whether the equal protection clause has been violated, one of three tests is employed. First, strict scrutiny is applied when a classification affects a fundamental right or a suspect class. Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied when a classification affects both a liberty right and a semi-suspect class not accountable for its status. The third test is rational basis. Under this inquiry, the legislative classification is upheld unless the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of legitimate state objectives.

State v. Harner, 153 Wash.2d 228, 235–36, 103 P.3d 738 (2004).

¶ 11 Harris concedes his claim warrants rational basis review because it does not involve a suspect or semisuspect class or a fundamental right.² Pet'r's Suppl. Br. at 3. Under rational basis review, “[a] party challenging the application of a law as violating equal protection principles has the burden of showing that the law is irrelevant to maintaining a state objective or that it creates an arbitrary classification.” Simmons, 152 Wash.2d at 458, 98 P.3d 789. Rational basis review is a deferential standard of review. DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wash.2d 136, 144, 960 P.2d 919 (1998). Harris has the burden of showing the classification between felons and misdemeanants for purposes of granting credit for EHM is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

¶ 12 Harris argues the different sentencing treatment of misdemeanor defendants fails rational basis review. The SRA requires a sentencing court to...