Harris v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 30 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 17078.,17078.
• Parties: Randy HARRIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

860 A.2d 715

271 Conn. 808

Randy HARRIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 17078.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 2004.

Decided November 30, 2004.

Anne E. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Jo Anne Sulik, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent).

Sandra J. Crowell, assistant public defender, with whom were Temmy Ann Pieszak, chief of habeas corpus services, and, on the brief, Judith M. Wildfeuer, assistant public defender, for the appellee (petitioner).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the petitioner, Randy Harris, was entitled by General Statutes § 18-98d¹ to have each of his two concurrent sentences, which were imposed on different dates, reduced by the same calendar days of presentence confinement credit, which he had accrued simultaneously while held in lieu of bond under two separate dockets. We conclude that he was not, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court.

The petitioner commenced this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus.² The petitioner claimed that the respondent commissioner of correction had denied him 751 days of presentence confinement credit that he had accrued while held in lieu of bond simultaneously under two separate dockets for which he thereafter was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment on June 16 and June 27, 2000, respectively. The petitioner argued that the respondent should have followed the procedure described in Payton v. Albert, 209 Conn. 23, 32, 547 A.2d 1 (1988) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds, Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214, 255 n. 44, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000), and credited both sentences with 751 days of presentence confinement for the purpose of calculating his discharge date. The habeas court, Fuger, J., rejected the respondent's argument that the 751 days of presentence confinement could be counted toward only one sentence under the plain language of § 18-98d(a)(1)(A) and granted the petition. The respondent, upon the granting of certification, appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-2.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. The petitioner was placed into the custody of the respondent on October 29, 1997, when he was charged in a criminal information assigned to Docket Nos. CR97-513469 and MV97-372359³ (Hartford I).⁴ On December 15, 1997, the petitioner was charged with additional offenses set forth in two informations in Docket Nos. CR97-159252 and CR97-159254 (Manchester II). The petitioner, unable to post bond for the Manchester II charges, was held in presentence confinement for 780 days from December 15, 1997, to February 2, 2000, when he was sentenced to a term of two years imprisonment for separate offenses not germane to this appeal⁵ (Manchester I). On January 12, 1998, the petitioner was charged in a fourth information in Docket Nos. CR98-516413 and MV98-373384 (Hartford II). He was held in lieu of bond for the Hartford II offenses for 751 days from January 12, 1998, to February 2, 2000, while he was simultaneously confined in connection with the Manchester II charges.

On June 16, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the Manchester II dockets to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment⁶ to be served concurrently with the two year sentence imposed in Manchester I. On June 27, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the Hartford II dockets to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment⁷ to be served concurrently with all other sentences that he then was serving.

The respondent calculated the petitioner's discharge date for the Manchester II sentence by adding four years to the June 16, 2000 sentencing date to arrive at a maximum discharge date of June 15, 2004. The respondent then posted 779 days of presentence confinement credit earned between December 15, 1997, and February 2, 2000, plus one day authorized by Public Acts 2001, No. 01-78 (P.A. 01-78),⁸ which yielded a discharge date of April 27, 2002, for the Manchester II sentence.

With respect to the Hartford II sentence, the respondent calculated the June 25, 2004 discharge date by adding four years to the June 27, 2000 sentencing date and deducting one day of presentence confinement credit authorized by P.A. 01-78. The respondent did not credit the Hartford II sentence with the 751 days that had accrued between January 12, 1998, and February 2, 2000, because he believed that such credit would violate General Statutes § 18-98d(a)(1)(A), which provides that "each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed...." In accordance with that interpretation, the respondent determined that the 751 days of presentence confinement traceable to both the Manchester II and Hartford II dockets already had been counted when the respondent credited the Manchester II sentence with 780 days of presentence confinement. Consequently, there were no days remaining to accelerate the June 25, 2004 discharge date established for the Hartford II sentence. Since the Hartford II sentence was ordered to run concurrently with all other sentences that the petitioner was serving, it became the controlling sentence for the purpose of establishing the petitioner's discharge date pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-38(b).⁹

The petitioner thereafter filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the respondent had erred in calculating his discharge date. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that he was entitled to receive 751 days of presentence confinement credit on his Hartford II sentence, which would have advanced the discharge date for that sentence from June 25, 2004, to June 6, 2002.¹⁰ The petitioner further contended, inter alia, that the denial of such credit constituted discrimination on the basis of indigency in contravention of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions¹¹ and violated the prohibition against double jeopardy under the federal constitution.¹²

The habeas court agreed with the petitioner, concluding that the rationale set forth in Payton v. Albert, supra, 209 Conn. at 32, 547 A.2d 1, should govern the calculation of the petitioner's sentences. The court stated: "The ... method endorsed in Payton requires the calculation of each docket's discharge date by examining each docket and adjusting it for its authorized credits. In accordance with Payton, the respondent must treat each concurrent docket's presentence confinement credit separately and cannot transfer such credit to another docket. In calculating each docket's respective discharge date, however, the same time periods or calendar days can be utilized to calculate each docket's respective discharge date. Any presentence confinement credit that is unique to a docket can only be posted or applied to that docket. Conversely, any presentence confinement credit that is not unique to a docket can be ... applied to each of the dockets where such credit was earned, with the limitation that each calendar day can only be posted or applied once. This methodology ensures both that the sentenced inmate receives proper credit on each docket's respective sentence and that each day of presentence confinement credit is only counted once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement. General Statutes § 18-98d (a)(1)(A)." (Emphasis in original.)

The habeas court explained that, under the reasoning of Payton, this method of calculation does not result in the double counting of presentence confinement credits once the sentences are merged pursuant to § 53a-38(b). The court determined that, by merging the terms of concurrent sentences, as required by the statute, "any overlapping days, either pre-sentence or post-sentence, are only credited once." The habeas court acknowledged that the petitioner in Payton had been sentenced to concurrent terms on the same date, but concluded, nevertheless, that the Payton rationale applies with equal force when prisoners are sentenced to concurrent terms on different dates. In reaching that result, the court stated: "[Sections] 18-98d, 53a-38(b) and Payton do not distinguish between concurrent sentences imposed on the same day versus those imposed on different days. The fact that the respondent in Payton was able to make the adjustments for the two dockets on the same day as a result of the sentencing occurring on the same day does not mean that double counting was prevented because the sentencing date was the same. There is simply no valid reason to apply a different rule." (Emphasis in original.)

With respect to the petitioner's equal protection claim, the habeas court concluded that the respondent's method for applying presentence confinement credit gives rise to disparate treatment when concurrent sentences are imposed on different dates, but that such disparity is not attributable to the petitioner's indigency. Rather, the court noted that the disparity is premised on the fact that "a person sentenced [to concurrent prison terms] on the same day would receive all of the pretrial credits on each docket while the person sentenced [to concurrent terms] on different days would not." The habeas court determined that the respondent's asserted interest in its calculation method was not sufficiently compelling to justify the resulting infringement on the petitioner's fundamental right to liberty. Finally, the habeas court concluded that the respondent's method of calculation violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because it did not afford the petitioner recognition for the time that he was compelled to remain in custody in...