Harris v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 11 June 1925
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: J. R. HARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Page 620

142 Va. 620

J. R. HARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Wytheville.

June 11, 1925.

Argued before Judge Chichester took his seat.

1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Construction of Prohibition Act — Act Construed as a Whole — Intent of Legislature — Object of the Act. — The prohibition act (Acts of 1924, page 593), contains many provisions, and it would be remarkable if they were all perfectly clear and there were no apparent inconsistencies between them. But the statute must be construed as a whole, bearing in mind, where it is manifest, the object sought to be attained. It is not permissible to treat one section of an act which is not clear and plain as a detached statement of the law, but it should be considered in connection with other related sections bearing on the same subject, however far apart the sections may be in the act. It is the legislative intent as manifested in the act as a whole that is sought.

2. STATUTES — Construction — Punctuation. — Punctuation is said to be the most fallible of all standards by which to interpret a statute.

3. STATUTES — Construction — Grammatical Effect. — Generally, proper grammatical effect will be given to the arrangement of words in a sentence of a statute, but if, in so doing, a single sentence or section is left ambiguous, or subject to more than one construction, the application of rules of grammar will not be permitted to defeat the purpose of the act, if that can be otherwise ascertained.

4. STATUTES — Construction — Object of the Statute. — When we know the object of a statute and are called upon to construe a phrase or a sentence which, standing alone, may be susceptible of different interpretations, we know of no safer rule than to take the statute by its four corners and critically examine it as a whole to ascertain the legislative intent, as manifested by its different provisions. If, upon such an examination, an interpretation can be made, consistent with the language used, which will carry into effect the object sought to be accomplished by the statute, that interpretation should be adopted, in preference to one which would be equally consistent with the language used, standing alone, but which would defeat, or tend to defeat the manifest intent of the legislature.

5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Prohibition Act — Object of the Act — Exceptions. — The prime object of the prohibition act was to break up and to prevent the use of ardent spirits as a beverage, and to attain this end stringent measures were adopted to prevent its manufacture, sale or transportation, except under the most restricted and carefully guarded regulations. These regulations were deemed essential to the vitality of the act, and those who would seek to manufacture the prohibited article and escape the penalties provided by the act must bring themselves within the exception.

6. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Manufacture of Wine or Cider "at his Home." — Section 32 of the prohibition act of 1924 (Acts of 1924, page 593), provides that "the provisions of this act shall not be construed to prevent any person from manufacturing for his domestic consumption at his home * * * wine or cider from fruit of his own raising * * *." Standing alone, the language of the section might mean that the manufacturing might be done anywhere, and, as incident thereto, there would exist the right to transport to his home, which is the only place of lawful storage. Such a construction, however, was manifestly never intended by the legislature, and is inconsistent with other provisions of the statute. If, however, the phrase "at his home" be construed to apply to the place of manufacture, the statute is harmonious and consistent as a whole.

7. INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Manufacture of Wine and Cider "at his Home" — Manufacture at a Farm of Accused and Transportation to his Home. — Section 12 of the prohibition act of 1924 (Acts 1924, page 593), provides that "the possession by any person of ardent spirits at any place other than his permanent bona fide home shall be unlawful, and the possession at such home shall be unlawful unless the ardent spirits shall have been lawfully acquired from a person or persons authorized by law to furnish the same, or wine manufactured in the home not in violation of the provisions of this act." Under section 32, wine made from fruit of the manufacturer's "own raising" may be manufactured "at his home" and under section 12 such wine may be stored "in the home." Construing sections 32 and 12 together, wine manufactured by accused, who lived in Greensville county, at a farm owned by him in Brunswick county was not manufactured by accused either at or in his bona fide home, and, hence was unlawful. His possession of it being unlawful, his transportation of it from his farm to his home was also unlawful.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Greensville county.

The opinion states the case.

Buford and Raney, for the plaintiff in error.

Attorney-General John R. Saunders, Assistants Attorney-General Leon M. Bazile and Lewis H. Machen, for the Commonwealth.

BURKS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Harris was convicted of illegally transporting two gallons of wine and was fined $300.00 and sentenced to confinement in jail for three months. He lived in Greensville county, Virginia, but owned a farm in Brunswick county which was occupied by his daughter, whom he from time to time visited, sometimes for a week at a time. He testified that "he made the wine in question from dewberries grown on his land in Brunswick county for his domestic consumption at his home and not to be sold, dispensed or given away in violation of law." The offense of which he was convicted was the transportation of this wine from the farm in Brunswick. He testified that he was on his way to his home in Greensville, with the wine, when he was prevented from carrying it there by prohibition officers, and we may assume that to be a fact.

Omitting minor details, the real question at issue is: Did Harris have the right to make the wine in Brunswick county? If he did not, then the manufacture was unlawful, and if so, the transportation of it was unlawful.

The prohibition act of 1924 (Acts 1924, page 593), contains one hundred sections and prints forty-two pages. It contains many provisions, and it would be remarkable if they were all perfectly clear and there were no apparent inconsistencies between them. But the statute must be construed as a whole, bearing in mind, where it is manifest, the object sought to be attained. It is not permissible to treat one section of an act which is not clear and plain as a detached statement of the law, but it should be considered in connection with other related sections bearing on the same subject, however far apart the sections may be in the act. It is the legislative intent as manifested in the act as a whole that is sought.

In 25 R.C.L., 1007-8, it is said: "It is an established rule in the exposition of statutes that the intention of the lawgiver is to be deduced from a view of the whole, and of every part of a statute, taken and compared together. The several provisions of the statute should be...