Harris v. Crawford Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm'rs

• Decision Date: 22 September 2022
• Docket Number: CV-22-439
• Citation: 2022 Ark. 160
• Parties: JODY HARRIS APPELLANT v. CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS; BILL COLEMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN; MIKE MOXLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER; MEMORY BOUCHER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER; AND CHAD PURYEAR APPELLEES
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2022 Ark. 160

JODY HARRIS APPELLANT v. CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS; BILL COLEMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN; MIKE MOXLEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER; MEMORY BOUCHER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER; AND CHAD PURYEAR APPELLEES

No. CV-22-439

Supreme Court of Arkansas

September 22, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 24OCV-22-60] HONORABLE DENNIS CHARLES SUTTERFIELD, JUDGE

Lancaster Law Firm, PLLC, by: Clinton W. Lancaster, for appellant.

Wahlmeier Law Firm, P.A., by: Gentry C. Wahlmeier, for appellees Crawford County Board of Election Commissioners and Commissioners in their official capacities.

Brister Law Firm, PLLC, by: M. Sean Brister; and Steel Wright, Gray PLLC, by: Alec Gaines and Nate Steel, for appellee Chad Puryear.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

Appellant Jody Harris appeals from the Franklin County Circuit Court's dismissal of her complaint challenging the certification of the House District 25 ("HD 25") Republican primary race by appellee Crawford County Board of Election Commissioners ("CBEC").^[1]Harris argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by (1) dismissing her complaint based on lack of jurisdiction and improper venue and (2) denying her motion to transfer the case to Crawford County. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Harris and appellee Chad Puryear both sought the Republican Party's nomination for the HD25 seat in the May 24, 2022 preferential primary election. HD25 encompasses portions of Crawford, Franklin, and Washington Counties. On June 1, 2022, the CBEC certified that Harris received 712 votes, while Puryear received 740 votes. The certified results from all three counties in the district resulted in 2204 votes for Harris and 2211 votes for Puryear.

On June 14, 2022, Harris filed a complaint in the Franklin County Circuit Court contesting the CBEC's certification. She alleged election-law violations and irregularities with regard to the CBEC's handling of certain absentee ballots and claimed that the HD25 Republican primary election results were unreliable. Harris prayed that the circuit court void the CBEC's certification of the HD25 race or void the HD25 election.

Puryear filed a motion to dismiss the suit on July 1, 2022, asserting, among other grounds for dismissal, that the Franklin County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction and that venue was improper pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-5-801(b) (Repl. 2018). Puryear argued that the action should have been filed in Crawford County instead because that is where the alleged wrongful acts occurred. The CBEC filed an answer denying the allegations in Harris's complaint and also joined in Puryear's motion to dismiss.

Following a hearing held on July 15, 2022, the circuit court entered an order on July 18 granting the motion to dismiss. The court found that Harris's complaint was not filed in the proper county, that it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, and that venue was improper. The circuit court also denied Harris's oral motion to transfer the case to Crawford County. Harris filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court's order. On July 20, 2022, Harris filed a motion to expedite the appeal, which this court granted on July 27, 2022.^[2]

On appeal, Harris first argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing her complaint. She contends that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated section 7-5-801(b) to not allow her to bring her postelection contest in Franklin County. Section 7-5-801 provides as follows:

(a) A right of action is conferred on any candidate to contest the certification of nomination or the certificate of vote as made by the appropriate officials in any election.

(b) The action shall be brought in the circuit court of the county in which the certification of nomination or certificate of vote is made when a county or city or township office, including the office of county delegate or county committee member, is involved, and except as provided in this subchapter, within any county in the circuit or district wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred when any circuit or district office is involved, and except as provided in this subchapter, in the Pulaski County Circuit Court when the office of United States Senator or any state office is involved.

(c) If there are two (2) or more counties in the district where the action is brought and when fraud is alleged in the complaint, answer, or cross-complaint, the circuit court may hear testimony in any county in the district.

(d) The complaint shall be verified by the affidavit of the contestant to the effect that he or she believes the statements to be true and shall be filed within twenty (20) days of the certification that is the subject of the complaint.

(e) The complaint shall be answered within twenty (20) days.

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to determine what a statute means. Mississippi Cnty. v. City of Blytheville, 2018 Ark. 50, 538 S.W.3d 822. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cnty. v. Mitchell, 2017 Ark. 154, 518 S.W.3d 64. We construe the statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. Where the language is plain and unambiguous, this court determines legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. White v. Owen, 2021 Ark. 31, 617 S.W.3d 241. Statutory language is ambiguous if it is open to two or more constructions, or if it is of such obscure and doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Arkansas Dep't of Corr. v. Shults, 2017 Ark. 300, 529 S.W.3d 628. When a statute is ambiguous, this court must interpret it according to legislative intent, and our review becomes an examination of the whole act. Id. In addition, we must look at the legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved. Mississippi Cnty., supra.

The parties agree that HD25 is a district office for purposes of section 7-5-801(b). Thus, the dispute in this case centers on the proper interpretation of the language in subsection (b) stating that "[t]he action shall be brought in the circuit court . . . within any county in the circuit or district wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-801(b). Harris argues that the clause "wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred" refers to "the circuit or district," while appellees contend that it refers to "any county."

We agree that this statutory language is open to two constructions and is therefore ambiguous. Further, each interpretation is supported by a different canon of construction. According to the "last-antecedent canon," the clause "wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred" typically refers to the word or phrase that is nearest to it-"the circuit or district" in this case. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 144 (2012). However, the "surplusage canon" states that every word and provision in a statute are to be given effect if possible and that no statutory provision should be given an interpretation that causes it to be redundant or to have no consequence. Id. at 174; see also Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc., 2013 Ark. 231, at 8, 428 S.W.3d 430, 436 ("We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible."). As appellees assert, the construction of section 7-5-801(b) urged by Harris would render the clause "wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred" superfluous and insignificant. If this language was removed, subsection (b) would still have the same meaning. Specifically, if an election contest could be brought in any county in the district regardless of whether wrongful acts occurred in that county, there would be no reason for the General Assembly to insert the words "wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred." Rather, the legislature would have drafted section 7-5-801(b) to state, "The action shall be brought in the circuit court . . . within any county in the circuit or district . . . when any circuit or district office is involved . . ."

The interpretation argued by appellees and accepted by the circuit court in this case is also supported by our prior cases interpreting section 7-5-801(b). In Simes v Crumbly, 368 Ark. 5, 242 S.W.3d 600 (2006), the plaintiff filed an election contest in Pulaski County alleging that there were uncounted votes in Phillips County during the 2006 Democratic preferential primary for the office of state senator for District 16. We affirmed the circuit court's dismissal for failure to comply with the statutory requirements in section 7-5-801(b), holding that the correct forum for the election contest was in Phillips County "because that is the county of District 16 where wrongful acts were alleged to have occurred." Id. at 4, 242 S.W.3d at 612. In reaching that conclusion, we stated that pursuant to section 7-5-801(b), "an election contest concerning a district office is to be brought within 'any county . . . wherein any of the wrongful acts occurred when any. . . district office is involved . . . .'" Also, in Willis v. Crumbly, 368 Ark. 5, 242 S.W.3d 600 (2006), a companion case concerning the runoff election for state Senate District 16, the plaintiff filed a petition in St. Francis County alleging that voter fraud had occurred there. The circuit court dismissed the action, stating that the office of state senator was a "state office," which has to be filed in Pulaski County, and that ...