Harris v. Director of Revenue, State of Mo.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 25631.,25631.
• Citation: 132 S.W.3d 897
• Parties: Donald David HARRIS, Jr., Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

132 S.W.3d 897

Donald David HARRIS, Jr., Petitioner-Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 25631.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

April 28, 2004.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Rebecca J. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for appellant.

No brief filed by Respondent.

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Chief Judge.

The Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue ("Director") appeals a judgment granting Donald David Harris Jr. ("Driver") hardship driving privileges pursuant to Section 302.309.¹ We reverse.

On February 4, 2003, Driver filed a petition for hardship driving privileges in circuit court. In his petition and in the accompanying sworn affidavit, Driver averred that more than three years had passed since his driving privileges were revoked and that he was not ineligible to receive a hardship driving privilege pursuant to Section 302.309.3(5)(c) or any other provision of Section 302.309.3(5). See Section 302.309.3(6)(a).² Driver, however, failed to attach a certified copy of his driving record to his petition as required by Section 302.309.3(3).³

In its answer to Driver's petition, Director asserted that Driver was "otherwise ineligible" to receive hardship driving privileges "in that [Driver] has a conviction for a felony the commission of which involved a motor vehicle." Additionally, Director pled that granting Driver the requested privileges would be improper because a review of his driving record "demonstrated that he is a habitual drunkard pursuant to [Section] 302.060.4." Director attached to its Answer a certified copy of Driver's Missouri Driver Record, copies of uniform traffic tickets issued to Driver, and records of convictions for those offenses.

On April 7, 2003, the case was submitted to the trial court "upon the pleadings and records in the file." Finding that Director "[did] not prove any felony convictions to the satisfaction of the Court," the trial court ruled Driver was statutorily eligible for a hardship license and granted his petition. Director now appeals to this Court.

The record reveals that between 1989 and 2000, Driver was convicted four times for Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") and twice for driving with a suspended or revoked driver's license.⁴ In October of 1991, due to Driver's earlier alcohol-related convictions, the Director imposed a ten-year minimum denial of his driving privileges, making Driver eligible for reinstatement on August 29, 2001.⁵ Thereafter, in July of 1997, Director suspended Driver's privileges for another ten years due to Driver's additional DWI convictions. According to the record, Driver would then be eligible to have his driving privileges reinstated on May 25, 2004.⁶

In his sole point on appeal, Director contends the trial court erred in granting Driver hardship driving privileges in that: (1) Driver was statutorily ineligible to receive such privileges due to his commission of a felony involving the use of a motor vehicle and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) Driver has a history as a habitual drunkard,⁷ and, (3) Driver has failed to present evidence that he is no longer a threat to public safety.⁸

On appeal, the trial court's decision will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or misstates or misapplies the law. Chapman v. Lavy, 20 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Mo.App. E.D.2000)(citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment entered by the trial court. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 18 S.W.3d 538, 539 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). A circuit court acts in excess of its jurisdiction when it grants limited driving privileges to one who is statutorily ineligible to receive them. State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Mobley, 49 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Mo. banc 2001); see also Section 302.309.3(6).

The Director initially argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant Driver's petition. It has often been noted that "jurisdiction" is a term which is used imprecisely in judicial opinions and other legal writings, depending for its meaning on the context of the matter at issue. Schneider v. Union Elec. Co., 805 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. W.D.1991). In the context of this matter, although Director argues that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, Director is actually arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction to render the order given. "Jurisdiction has many meanings depending upon the context used. `Jurisdiction' is a loosely employed term but generally it includes three kinds of authority, over the subject matter, over a person, and to render the order given." Scott County Reorganized Sch. Dist. v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 872 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Mo. App. S.D.1994)(citing Farrar v. Moore, 416 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo.App.1967)). Thus, in the stricter sense, it means judicial authority over the subject matter and the parties, but in its broader sense, it includes the power to grant specific relief in cases within such authority. Id. If the pleadings state a matter belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends, then the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Claxton v. Buzbee, 975 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo.App. S.D.1998).

Section 302.309.3.1 specifically states: "All circuit courts or the director of revenue shall have jurisdiction to hear applications and make eligibility determinations granting limited driving privileges." Therefore, the trial court in this matter clearly had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to evaluate Driver's petition and determine whether or not he was statutorily eligible for a hardship license. When the trial court heard the application of Driver for the license and reviewed the records, it ruled on his petition with the subject matter jurisdiction.

We, therefore, review Director's next contention that Driver was statutorily ineligible to receive driving privileges or, in other words, whether the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the hardship driver's license. As stated in Section 302.309.3(6)(a), as long as an applicant "is not otherwise ineligible for a limited driving privilege," a circuit court may grant limited driving privileges to that applicant. The Supreme Court of Missouri interpreted this subsection as follows in Hagan v. Director of Revenue:

Giving the language of sec. 302.309.3(6)(a) its plain and ordinary meaning, an applicant is only eligible [to petition] for a hardship license if: (1) he was ineligible to obtain an operator's license for ten years pursuant to section 302.060(9); (2) he had served three years of the ineligibility; and, (3) he was not "otherwise ineligible for a limited hardship driving privilege" under "this section" which includes subsection .3(5).

968 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. banc 1998).

Referring to acts that make an applicant "otherwise ineligible", Section 302.309.3(5) states in pertinent part:

Except as provided in subdivision (6) of this subsection, no person is eligible to receive a limited driving privilege ... whose license has been suspended or revoked for the following reasons:....

(b) A conviction of any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used.

Director asserts that, based on the above provision, Driver was statutorily ineligible to petition the trial court for limited driving privileges because he received a felony DWI conviction involving the use of a motor vehicle. In support of this contention, Director points out that Driver's Record of Conviction for his 1994 DWI indicates the case number was CR592-929FX. According to Director, this "FX" designation means the violation was considered to be a felony and, therefore, under Section 302.309.3(5)(b) Driver was ineligible to petition for a hardship license and his petition should have been dismissed instead of considered on its merits.

On their face, the records submitted in this case were insufficient to determine that any of Driver's previous DWI convictions were, in fact, felony convictions. Driver was convicted of four separate DWI offenses; however, there is no indication as to the sentences received or to the classification of any of the offenses.⁹ In fact, part of the records are illegible. We are left with Director's assertion that "it is reasonable to assume that the May 24, 1994 DWI matter was treated as a felony." We have no evidence before us under which this determination can logically be made; thus, the trial court did not err in finding that the State "[did] not prove any felony convictions." Our analysis, however, does not end with that finding.

We agree with Director that Driver's application for limited driving privileges under Section 302.309 should not have been granted because he was "otherwise ineligible" under Section 302.309.3(6)(a). Although the trial court found that "[Director] [did] not prove any felony convictions to the satisfaction of the Court," we note the burden of proof was upon Driver to prove he was worthy of hardship driving privileges. See Kinzenbaw v. Director of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 49 (Mo. banc 2001)(holding that the Driver retains the burden of persuasion at all times). In Conrad v. Director of Revenue, the court stated, "Conrad [the licensee] had the burden at trial to prove that he was eligible for a limited driving privilege. Conrad offered no evidence to show he was eligible statutorily based on Director's answer." 20 S.W.3d at 609 (internal citation omitted). Similarly, in this case, Director's Answer called into question facts pled by Driver in his petition, yet Driver agreed to submit the matter on the record instead of attempting to rebut Director's claims that he had a felony conviction and was a habitual drunkard.

Section 302.309.3(6)(a) imposes the specific burden on Driver to present evidence to support a finding that: (1) he has not...