Harris v. Florida Parole Com'n, 1D04-5695.
| Decision Date | 15 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D04-5695.,1D04-5695. |
| Parties | Leetroy HARRIS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Leetroy Harris, petitioner, pro se.
Kim M. Fluharty, General Counsel, and Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for respondent.
Petitioner seeks certiorari review of a final order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. The pertinent facts of this case are substantively identical to those in Merritt v. Crosby, 893 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Accordingly, we are bound by the holding in Merritt and, as in Merritt, we grant the petition, quash the order denying the petition for a writ of mandamus, and remand to the trial court for expedited proceedings consistent with that decision.
PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; and REMANDED, with directions.
This court's holding in Merritt v. Crosby, 893 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), does not control our decision in this case because there we stated that "the sole evidence to support the Commission's finding of guilt consisted of the deputy's recitation of Pauldon's hearsay statement, but hearsay alone is not sufficient to sustain the revocation of parole." Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the Parole Commission specifically relied on the deputy sheriff's observation of the victim's injuries, and this evidence is not hearsay. The deputy's observations are circumstantial evidence which corroborate the victim's hearsay testimony that Petitioner battered her. Furthermore, identity is not at issue here. Petitioner himself admitted that he and the victim argued, but Petitioner denied striking the victim. This evidence could be rejected in part by the hearing examiner, who could find Petitioner's attempted exculpatory testimony unworthy of belief. Thus, although the recited facts of Merritt appear to also contain similar evidence, apparently the Commission did not rely on such evidence, and this court's holding in Merritt did not rely on such evidence. Thus, Merritt is distinguishable, as it relies on a legal principle that is not applicable here.
I would distinguish Merritt and address the question which we declined to answer in Merritt: Whether a parole examiner's conclusion of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law? In my view, the parole examiner's conclusion is a legal conclusion. See Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(en banc) (). I would deny the petition for writ of certiorari because the Parole Commission has the authority to reject the examiner's conclusions of law.
This court should address whether an issue of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law or a question of fact. In Merritt, we briefly discussed this issue, but determined that we "need not address this distinction, because however it is characterized, the examiner's conclusion was correct." 893 So.2d at 599. In Merritt, this court stated that the Parole Commission relied solely on the assertion that the domestic violence victim's testimony qualified as an excited utterance, and was sufficient substantive evidence to sustain Merritt's revocation. Id. Such is not the case here. As noted above, the Commission here relied on substantive evidence which corroborated the victim's hearsay testimony.
In Jones, this court held that in criminal cases the issue of evidentiary sufficiency presents a question of law on appeal reviewable de novo. 790 So.2d at 1197. Evidentiary sufficiency questions in criminal cases and in cases involving Commission decisions revoking parole or conditional release are similar questions of law, although a different legal standard applies. The existence of different legal standards does not transform the issue from one of law to one of fact. As this court noted in Jones, although a different standard applies on review of criminal convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence, the "sufficiency of the evidence is no less an issue of law...." Id. at 1196, n. 2. The question of evidentiary sufficiency to sustain a Commission's action revoking parole or conditional release is an issue of law, not a determination of fact.
The Commission need only find by a preponderance of the evidence that the releasee committed the behavior which constitutes a crime. Even an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude a Commission's determination that a revocation should occur based on the same conduct. Cavalcante v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm'n, 414 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Rock v. State, 584 So.2d 1110 (Fla 1st DCA 1991). The reasonable doubt standard does not apply, and a releasee's freedom is dependent on strict compliance with supervisory conditions. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual [parolee] to prison without the burden of a new ... criminal trial." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
I would deny the writ of certiorari because the trial court's ruling did not depart from the essential requirements of law. The trial court found that the evidence of the deputy's observation of the victim's injuries was "consistent with her account of the attack [and the] Deputy's direct observation of the injuries corroborated her account of the attack." The Commission's order recited this evidence. I cannot find that the trial court's decision was a departure from law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 703 So.2d 1202, 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (criminal division, en banc), approved, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998). Therefore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate entitlement to relief by writ of certiorari.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by determining that the Commission had the authority to reject the hearing examiner's legal conclusion that Petitioner was not guilty of violating his conditional release. I agree with the trial court that where a hearing examiner concludes that evidence is insufficient to sustain a revocation, without making any specific factual findings, the Commission possesses the legal authority to reject the examiner's conclusion. Although the better course would be for the Commission to remand the case back to the examiner for proper factual findings, that issue is not presented here in light of the majority opinion granting the writ, which effectively requires the Petitioner's release under the Commission's supervision.
In section 947.141, Florida Statutes, the Legislature authorized the Commission, not a hearing examiner, to determine whether evidence exists to sustain a revocation of conditional release. I distinguish Tedder v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 842 So.2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), where this court found that the Commission lacked lawful authority to reject an examiner's specific factual determination that a conditional releasee had not moved from a residence without permission and had not violated his conditional release. Here, the Commission relied on testimony by a law enforcement officer who observed facial injuries to the woman who reported that Petitioner battered her. The hearing examiner did not in any way discredit or reject the officer's testimony, and did not make any factual determinations regarding whether the injuries were caused by Petitioner or other causes.
The hearing examiner simply found the evidence in toto insufficient. This was a legal conclusion which the Commission was entitled to reject. See Jones, 790 So.2d at 1197. As this court reviews a trial court's ruling on a judgment of acquittal de novo, the Parole Commission is authorized by section 947.141, Florida Statutes, to review a hearing examiner's conclusion regarding sufficiency determinations de novo.
Because this case presents an important question, I address the underlying facts here and my legal analysis. Petitioner was sentenced in 1989 to a 20-year habitual felony offender sentence for delivery of cocaine and other felony convictions. In 2002, after accumulating incentive gain time, Petitioner was released early from his sentence under the Conditional Release Program. By operation of law, Petitioner remained under the supervision of the Florida Parole Commission until 2009, the termination date of the 20-year prison sentence. After his early release, Petitioner was arrested for an alleged act of domestic violence, a battery.
In 2003, the Commission charged Petitioner with a violation of his conditional release based on the alleged battery. Under section 947.141, Florida Statutes, the Commission is to conduct a hearing with a hearing examiner, who makes factual findings on the alleged violation. Section 947.141 provides that a "panel of no fewer than two Commissioners shall enter an order determining whether the charge of violation of conditional release . . . has been sustained based upon the findings of fact[.]" (emphasis added). Unlike duties related to fact finding or other matters, the Legislature only authorized the Commission to make the ultimate decision of whether a person has violated conditional release, subject to judicial review by habeas corpus petition in the circuit court and extraordinary review by certiorari in the appellate courts. Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 703 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (Criminal Division, en banc), approved, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998). Under Tedder, our scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court afforded due process and observed...
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