Tedder v. FLORIDA PAROLE COM'N, 1D02-1612.
| Decision Date | 22 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D02-1612.,1D02-1612. |
| Citation | 842 So.2d 1022 |
| Parties | Robert D. TEDDER, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Petitioner pro se.
William L. Camper, General Counsel; Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
By a petition for writ of certiorari, Robert Tedder, an inmate of the state correctional system, seeks review of a final order entered by the trial court. That order denied Tedder's petition for writ of mandamus by which he challenged the Florida Parole Commission's order revoking his conditional release. Because we conclude that the trial court's order constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law, we grant the petition, quash the trial court's order, and remand for further proceedings applying the correct law.
The documents attached to the Parole Commission's response to our order to show cause reflect the following. On March 26, 1997, Tedder was placed on conditional release for a term of four years and 11 months. One of the conditions of his release was that he not change his residence without securing the permission of his conditional release supervisor.
On August 9, 2001, Tedder's conditional release supervisor signed a violation report alleging that Tedder had moved without first obtaining her permission. According to the report, the supervisor had visited Tedder's residence on August 3, 2001. She observed that the curtains were drawn in all but one room, which "was empty." In addition, there was a note on the door "written to the landlord that stated that all the belongings would be out by Friday." A warrant was issued, and Tedder was arrested.
On September 28, 2001, Tedder had a hearing on the alleged violation. Following the hearing, the parole examiner found that the evidence failed to prove to her satisfaction that Tedder had, in fact, moved on August 3. Based on that finding, the examiner recommended that Tedder be reinstated to conditional release supervision. Notwithstanding the examiner's recommendation, the Parole Commission revoked Tedder's conditional release. It did so after reweighing the same evidence considered by the examiner, and finding that evidence sufficient to establish guilt as to the violation alleged.
Tedder then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court. In his petition, he argued that the Parole Commission was not permitted to disregard the finding of the examiner because the finding was based on competent, substantial evidence. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that sufficient evidence had been presented at the revocation hearing to support the Parole Commission's decision to revoke Tedder's conditional release.
"Although the Florida Parole Commission is an administrative agency, a special provision of the Administrative Procedure Act [§ 120.81(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002)] exempts inmate orders from review by appeal." Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 703 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (criminal division en banc), approved 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998). In cases such as this, a petition filed in the circuit court, seeking a writ of mandamus, has become the accepted method by which one may obtain review of the Parole Commission's decision. Id. (citing cases). In such a case, "a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court takes the place of an appeal." Id.
Review of a circuit court's ruling in such a case may be sought by a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 1206. However, "[t]he scope of our review on such a petition for certiorari is limited to determining whether the trial court (1) afforded due process and (2) observed the essential requirements of law." Randall v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 791 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (citing Sheley), review granted, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla.2002). A ruling constitutes a departure from "the essential requirements of law" when it amounts to "a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983). When considering such a petition for writ of certiorari, the court has only two options—it may either deny the petition or grant it, and quash the order at which the petition is directed. It may not enter judgment on the merits, or direct the lower tribunal to enter any particular order. See Broward County v. G.B.V. Int'l, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838, 843-44 (Fla.2001)
(citing cases). Assessing the trial court's order according to these rules, we conclude that it constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law, and that we are, therefore, obliged to quash it.
In his petition seeking a writ of mandamus in the trial court, Tedder argued that the Parole Commission was not permitted to disregard the finding of the parole examiner that he had not moved on August 3, as alleged in the violation report, because that finding was based on competent, substantial evidence. The trial court failed to address that argument. Instead, it denied the petition based on its conclusion that sufficient evidence had been presented at the revocation hearing to support the Parole Commission's decision to revoke Tedder's conditional release. In doing so, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law.
It is a basic tenet of administrative law (subject to limited exceptions not pertinent here) that an agency may not reject a hearing officer's finding of fact that is supported by competent, substantial evidence. In what is perhaps the leading case on the topic, we said:
Factual issues susceptible of ordinary methods of proof that are not infused with policy considerations are the prerogative of the hearing officer as the finder of fact.... It is the hearing officer's function to consider all the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent, substantial evidence.... If, as is often the case, the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the hearing officer's role to decide the issue one way or the other. The agency may not reject the hearing officer's finding unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from...
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