Harris v. Hornbaker

• Decision Date: 03 February 1983
• Docket Number: No. 48030-3,48030-3
• Citation: 98 Wn.2d 650,658 P.2d 1219
• Parties: Wallace HARRIS, Alvin Harris, Wayne Wilson, Bruce LePage, William Saling, Charles Harrington, and George Sanderson, on their behalf and others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Merle R. HORNBAKER, Bruce D. Whitemarsh, and James W. Rogers, as the Board of Franklin County Commissioners, and Franklin County, Washington, Respondents, and Tom Powers and Nancy Powers, husband and wife; Robert Arambel and Geraldine Arambel, husband and wife; Robert Mauseth and Shirley Mauseth, husband and wife; Jack Eickmeyer and Faye Eickmeyer, husband and wife; Ray Burden and Vada Burden, husband and wife, Intervenors.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 650

98 Wn.2d 650

658 P.2d 1219

Wallace HARRIS, Alvin Harris, Wayne Wilson, Bruce LePage William Saling, Charles Harrington, and George Sanderson, on their behalf and others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Merle R. HORNBAKER, Bruce D. Whitemarsh, and James W Rogers, as the Board of Franklin County Commissioners, and Franklin County Washington, Respondents and Tom Powers and Nancy Powers, husband and wife; Robert Arambel and Geraldine Arambel, husband and wife; Robert Mauseth and Shirley Mauseth, husband and wife; Jack Eickmeyer and Faye Eickmeyer, husband and wife; Ray Burden and Vada Burden, husband and wife, Intervenors.

No. 48030-3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Feb. 3, 1983.

Evans & Kerr, Leland B. Kerr, Kennewick, for appellants.

C.J. Rabideau, Franklin County Prosecutor, Robert Backstein, George E. Heidlebaugh, Deputy Pros. Attys., Leavy & Tabor, John G. Schultz, Pasco, for respondents.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

Appellants Harris, et al., appeal from a trial court's rejection of their challenge to the Franklin County Board of Commissioners' determination of where a freeway interchange should be located. We affirm.

The facts relevant to this case developed over a 10-year period. In 1970 the State Department of Transportation planned to construct a new Interstate 182 freeway through the Tri-Cities area in eastern Washington. To connect Pasco and Franklin County to this freeway system, an I-182 spur route was planned from South Richland through the "North Riverview" area of Franklin County to Pasco. See Figure 1. Two interchanges with the I-182 spur were planned in the Riverview area as part of the project: one at Road 68 and one in the vicinity of Road 100. See Figure 1. While the final decision concerning the location of the interchange rested with the State Department of Transportation (then the Department of Highways), the State agreed to give serious consideration to the recommendations of the Franklin County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter the Board). The location of the second interchange is the focus of this controversy.

The first location, proposed by appellants and others, was close to the river and described as "an extension of Road 100 ... angling westerly connecting with Road 116 in the Road 100/116 corridor" (hereinafter referred to as the Road 116 interchange). See Figure 2. Appellants are residents and landowners in the Riverview area and areas to Further action on the I-182 project occurred only sporadically over a period of years because of funding problems which ultimately caused the I-182 project to be tabled. The project was resurrected after the passage of the In early February 1978, intervenors Powers, et al., proposed another location for the interchange, an extension due north from I-182 along Road 100 (hereinafter the Road 100 interchange). See Figure 2. Intervenors are residents and landowners in the area adjacent to, or in the area of, an extension of Road 100 north. They favor the Road 100 interchange because, in part: it is a more central location for the potential development of the area both east and west of Road 100; the existing grid system for roads would be maintained and a diagonal bisection would be avoided; and the Road 100 interchange would be most direct for the overall area.

                the north, northwest, and northeast of the Road 116 interchange.   They prefer the Road 116 interchange because it is close to the Columbia River, the focus of present and anticipated development.   Exhibit A-32.   Pursuant to appellants' proposal, the Franklin County Board of Commissioners sent a letter on May 18, 1971, to the Washington Department of Transportation requesting the Road 116 interchange
                gasoline tax bill by the State Legislature in 1977.   Laws of 1977, 1st Ex.Sess., Ch. 317.
                

Appellants responded in favor of the previously designated Road 116 interchange because, in part: it was closer to the river and areas most likely to be developed first; it did not bisect the sand dune area; and it had been adopted by a previous board of commissioners and accepted and relied upon by many residents. Exhibit A-30.

After a number of informal meetings, the Franklin County Board of Commissioners requested the Department of Transportation to change the location from the Road 116 interchange to the Road 100 interchange. A 6-year plan was adopted by the Board in October 1978, incorporating the Road 100 interchange. See RCW 36.81.121.

Appellants challenged the Board's action in superior court. They alleged that the Board had failed to comply with the provisions of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) by failing to submit an environmental evaluation or an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to changing the location of the interchange, and prior to the approval of the 6-year road plan. Exhibit A-32. Appellants also alleged the Board's decision to move the interchange was arbitrary and capricious, clearly erroneous, and without sufficient evidence to support the determination. Exhibit A-32.

In June 1979, a superior court judge held the Board's Thereafter, the Board held two public hearings on August 6 and 21, 1979, to adopt a 6-year plan. The second hearing was for the sole purpose of discussing the interchange issue. Statutory notice and procedural requirements were followed for both hearings. All citizens desiring to speak at the August 21 interchange hearing were asked to sign in and state how much time they needed to speak. Additional written evidence was accepted until August 23, 1979. On August 30, 1979, the Board voted unanimously to adopt a 6-year plan including its recommendation to the Department of Transportation to locate the I-182 interchange at Road 100.

                action was "null and void" because there was no verbatim record or written findings to justify the Board's decision;  hence the action was unreviewable.   The court ruled, however, that the Board was not required to prepare an EIS of the Road 100 interchange, because its action was only in the nature of a recommendation, but stated the State might be required to do so.
                

Appellants Harris, et al., appealed that decision. A superior court rejected appellants' writ of certiorari and upheld the Board's decision. The court excluded evidence on the question of prejudgment bias and held: (1) the "appearance of fairness" doctrine was inapplicable, (2) its prior holding regarding conformance with SEPA procedures was res judicata, and (3) the evidence supported the Board's recommendation of the Road 100 interchange. This appeal followed.

I

Appellants first make numerous claims about the unfairness of the public hearing on August 21, 1979. Before determining the merits of those claims we must appropriately characterize the Board's function in rendering its recommendation to the Department of Transportation.

While fairness is fundamental to any proceeding, the scope of a fairness inquiry is framed by the type of decision being made. In an adjudicatory setting, impartiality and Unlike a judicial hearing where issues of fact should be resolved from the evidence only without regard to the private views of the judges, a legislative hearing may reach a decision in part from the legislator's personal predilections or preconceptions. Indeed, the election of legislators is often based on their announced views and attitudes on public questions.

                lack of bias are required of decision makers.   Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).   This is not true in the legislative process, however
                

Smith v. Skagit Cy., 75 Wash.2d 715, 740-41, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). This concept limits, to an extent, the role of the courts in reviewing legislative decisions.

The rule that courts generally will not inquire into the motives of legislative officers acting in a legislative capacity is not new. See 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.15 (1982); 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.90 (3d rev. ed. 1981); Cornelius v. Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 P. 17 (1923); Goebel v. Elliott, 178 Wash. 444, 35 P.2d 44 (1934).

[Municipal l]egislation is not to be nullified by the judicial branch of government unless the enactment contravenes the constitution or is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.

Fleming v. Tacoma, supra at 301, 502 P.2d 327 (Neill, J., concurring).

Whether a decision is legislative or adjudicatory does not necessarily depend on the type of decisionmaking body, however. Members of the judiciary may be entrusted with functions that are legislative in character, see Concerned Citizens of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 657-58, 97 S.Ct. 828, 831-32, 51 L.Ed.2d 116 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (judges serving to create conservancy districts act in legislative capacity), while legislative bodies may be entrusted with essentially adjudicatory tasks, see Fleming v. Tacoma, supra (county board's rezoning decisions deemed quasi adjudicatory). See generally In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). We must look, instead, to the kind of decision being Appellants would have us review this case under the appearance of fairness doctrine. This doctrine has been applied when legislators are involved in adjudicatory decisions. Fleming v. Tacoma, supra. Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, this court has required that the decisionmaking process "not only [be] fair in substance, but fair in appearance as well." Smith v. Skagit Cy., supra at 739, 453 P.2d 832. The purpose and scope of the doctrine was explained in Chrobuck v. Snohomish Cy., 78 Wash.2d 858, 868, 480 P.2d 489 (1971):

made to determine the breadth of the fairness inquiry.

[T]he evil sought to be remedied lies not only in the elimination of actual bias, prejudice, improper influence or favoritism, but also in the curbing of conditions which, by their very existence, tend to create suspicion, generate misinterpretation, and cast a pall of partiality,...