Harris v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 18 March 1889
• Citation: 97 Mo. 571,11 S.W. 236
• Parties: HARRIS et al. v. HUNT.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

11 S.W. 236

97 Mo. 571

HARRIS et al. v. HUNT.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March 18, 1889.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE — JURISDICTION.

The charter of the City of Kansas (Acts Mo. 1875, p. 252, art. 8, § 4) provided that suits on tax-bills, not exceeding $300, might be brought before the city recorder, "or any justice of the peace in said city, as in other civil cases." The City of Kansas had been, and was at the time of the suit on the tax-bill in question, a part of Kaw township, and had no justices of the peace, except the justices elected for the township, who had their offices in the city. Held, that such justices were the justices contemplated by the charter.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; J. H. SLOVER, Judge.

Adams & Field and Bingham & Adams, for appellants. C. A. Kenyon and C. O. Tichenor, for respondent.

BRACE, J.

This is an action in ejectment to recover possession of two lots in Kansas City. The petition is in the usual form, and the answer a general denial. The case was tried before the court without a jury, the finding and judgment was for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal. On the trial it was admitted that the defendant is in possession of the premises, and that the plaintiffs are the owners thereof, unless their title has been divested by a sheriff's deed made to defendant's grantor in pursuance of a sale of the premises by virtue of an execution issued by the clerk of the circuit court of Jackson county on a transcript of a judgment filed therein, rendered by JOSEPH C. RANSOM, a justice of the peace within and for Kaw township, in said county, on the 6th day of March, 1875, in a suit before said justice against said plaintiffs as owners on a special tax-bill against the lots in question. There were four judgments and executions, but, for the sake of convenience, they will be treated as one. It is provided in the charter of the City of Kansas (section 4, art. 8, Acts 1875, p. 252) that "* * * in suit on any tax-bill the judgment shall be special, and that the plaintiff recover the amount found due, including interest to be levied of the land described in the bill, and a special execution shall issue to sell the land to pay such judgment, interest, and costs, and the judgment shall bear interest at the same rate as the tax-bill. When the amount due on any tax-bill does not exceed three hundred dollars, suit may be brought thereon before the recorder of the city, or any justice of the peace in said city, as in other civil cases, and such recorder or justice of the peace may render a special judgment as aforesaid; but to enforce the same a transcript of such judgment shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jackson county, in said city, and be recorded, docketed, and indexed as a judgment of that court; whereupon an execution may be issued out of that court, the same as if the judgment had been rendered in that court," etc. The amount of the tax-bill and the judgment thereon in this case was less than $300. A transcript of the judgment was filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jackson county at Kansas City, was duly recorded and indexed as a judgment of that court in record A of the clerk's office, Transcripts of Judgments, Justice of the Peace, Kansas City. It was admitted on the trial on the part of the plaintiffs that at the time of the commencement of the proceedings on the tax-bill, and of the rendition of the judgment by the justice, his office, and his only office, as such justice, was in the City of Kansas; and it was further admitted by both parties that all of the justices of the peace for Kaw township at that time had their offices in Kansas City, and heard their cases in such offices, and that the City of Kansas did not compose more than one-half of Kaw township in the year 1875; counsel for the plaintiff stating at the time: "While we admit this to be true, we object to evidence extraneous to the record as to the fact that Joseph C. Ransom was a justice of the peace in the City of Kansas. We say that fact is jurisdictional, and must appear on the face of the record, in the proceedings before the justice." The objection was overruled, and the sheriff's deed, over the objection of the plaintiff, was read in evidence, in which, among the other necessary recitals, it was recited that the judgment was obtained "before JOSEPH C. RANSOM, a justice of the peace within and for Kaw township," Jackson county. A like recital appeared in the execution which was offered in evidence by the plaintiffs in rebuttal, and these were the only papers in evidence wherein the proceedings before the justice was recited, or by which those proceedings appeared. The sheriff's deed contains all the necessary recitals, and it sufficiently appears by those recitals that the sale was made by virtue of a valid execution upon a valid judgment rendered by "JOSEPH C. RANSOM, a justice of the peace within and for Kaw township," if such justice was the tribunal provided by law in the section quoted from the charter to hear and determine the issues in the case in which it was rendered.

The proceeding provided for in the charter is a special one, and is committed to a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held in this state that inferior tribunals, not proceeding according to the course of the common law, are confined strictly to the authority given, and the jurisdiction must appear on the face of their proceedings. State v. Metzger, 26 Mo. 65; Hansberger v. Railroad Co., 43 Mo. 196; Schell v. Leland, 45 Mo. 289; Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 61 Mo. 33; Gibson v. Vaughan, Id. 418; Rohland v. Railroad Co., 89 Mo. 180, 1 S. W. Rep. 147. Otherwise their judgments will be held to be coram non judice, when questioned in a direct, or even in a collateral, proceeding. Bersch v. Schnider, 27 Mo. 101; State v. Swope, 72 Mo. 399; Karnes v. Alexander, 92 Mo. 660, 4 S. W. Rep. 518. The same rule has also been applied to proceedings in courts of general jurisdiction, when engaged in the exercise of special and limited statutory powers. Ells v. Railroad Co., 51 Mo. 200; Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585. In Karnes v. Alexander, supra, in which the same question was raised as in this case, it was insisted "that, inasmuch as the execution only recites that the justice who...