Harris v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp.
| Docket Number | Civil Action ELH-23-701 |
| Decision Date | 23 May 2023 |
| Parties | TINA HARRIS Plaintiff, v. JOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Tina Harris filed suit in State court against defendant “Johns Hopkins Health System School of Medicine.” See ECF 3 (the “Complaint”).[1] She appears to allege that defendant deprived her of her vested pension. Harris also alleges that defendant violated the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), which is found at Md. Code , §§ 3-501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”). And, she possibly alleges hostile work environment and wrongful termination. Plaintiff seeks to be “paid her fully vested pension” as well as statutory damages and attorney's fees. ECF 3.
Suit was initially filed in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County. ECF 1-2. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation (“JHHS” or “Hopkins”) timely removed the case to federal court, based on federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1001, et seq. ECF 1 (“Notice of Removal”); see also ECF 7. Plaintiff does not seek a remand, except to achieve service of the suit. ECF 8 at 3.
JHHS has- moved to dismiss the suit, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). ECF 5. The motion is supported by a memorandum (ECF 5-1) (collectively, the “Motion”), as well as an exhibit. ECF 5-2 (the “Duke Affidavit”). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. ECF 8 (the “Opposition”). JHHS replied. ECF 9 (the “Reply”).
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall construe the Rule 12(b)(5) portion of the Motion as a motion to quash and grant it. I shall also grant plaintiff leave to amend her suit. Therefore, I shall deny, as moot, the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Motion.
The suit was filed on a form complaint. ECF 3. The entirety of the factual allegations are as follows, id.:
Ms. Harris was employed for nearly two decades by Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. When Johns Hopkins School of Medicine moved to Johns Hopkins Health Services (“JHHS”) Ms. Harris was offered and declined a paltry severance offer because it would deprive her of the right to collect her fully vested pension. Ms. Harris made the transition to JHHS. After a long history of excellent performance with the Medical School, Ms. Harris began her duties with JHHS and was provided little or no training. She was not given a handbook or training materials. Instead, she was faced with immediate pretextual, undue and constant criticism from her new supervisor. The constant harassment appears to have been a thinly disguised effort to force her to leave because she declined the severance and to deprive her of her pension. Harris should be paid her fully vested pension as well as statutory damages under the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Law and attorneys' fees.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for insufficient service of process, claiming that, as a result, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. ECF 5; ECF 51 at 2, 6. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), before submitting a responsive pleading, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint, inter alia, for “(4) insufficient process” or “(5) insufficient service of process.” Generally, “[a]n objection under Rule 12(b)(4) concerns the form of the process rather than the manner or method of its service,” and a “Rule 12(b)(5) motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery or the lack of delivery[ ] of the summons and complaint.” 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1353 (3d ed. 2004, Supp. 2021). “Once service has been contested,” as here, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the validity of service pursuant to Rule 4.” O'Meara v. Waters, 464 F.Supp.2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006); accord, e.g., Baylor v. Wegman's Food Market, Inc., WDQ-14-3330, 2015 WL 4396609, at *1 (D. Md. July 16, 2015).
Service of process, which is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4, is a prerequisite to litigating in federal court. In its absence, a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Hawkins v. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211, 228 (4th Cir. 2019). Although the court can “construe Rule 4 liberally” when the service of process, even if technically deficient, provided actual notice to the defendant, the “plain requirements” for effecting service cannot be ignored. O'Meara, 464 F.Supp.2d at 476 (quotations omitted); see also Scott v. Md. State Dep't of Labor, 673 Fed.Appx. 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) ().
Rule 4(a) specifies the contents of a summons. Among other things, it “must . . . (F) be signed by the clerk; and (G) bear the court's seal.” Of relevance here, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1) mandates that a “summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” See Danik v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 396 Fed.Appx. 15, 16 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The federal rules require that a defendant be served with the complete pleading and a copy of the summons.”). And, “[t]he plaintiff is responsible” for service within the time provided by Rule 4(m). Id.
Under Rule 4(e), a plaintiff must effectuate service through one of the expressly authorized methods. Pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1), service may be made by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located ....” Process may also be served by delivering a copy of the “summons and complaint” to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2).
Under Rule 4(1)(1), a plaintiff must submit proof of service “by the server's affidavit.” But, “[f]ailure to prove service does not affect the validity of service,” and “[t]he court may permit proof of service to be amended.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(1)(3).
Of relevance here, Maryland Rule 2-121(a) permits service by mailing the summons and complaint to the person to be served by certified mail, requesting Restricted Delivery, so as to show who was served, the date, and the address of delivery. Baylor, WDQ-14-3330, 2015 WL 4396609, at *2 (emphasis added).
Under Maryland law, “the purpose of service of process is to give the defendant fair notice of the action against him and the resulting fair opportunity to be heard.” Conwell Law LLC v. Tung, 221 Md.App. 481, 500, 109 A.3d 1227, 1238 (2015) (quoting Mooring v. Kaufman, 297 Md. 342, 350, 466 A.2d 872, 876 (1983)). And, “failure to comply with [the Maryland Rules governing service of process] constitutes a jurisdictional defect that prevents a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Flanagan v. Department of Human Resources, 412 Md. 616, 624, 989 A.2d 1139, 1143 (2010) (citing Lohman v. Lohman, 331 Md. 113, 130, 626 A.2d 384, 392 (1993).
Defendant asserts that it was never served with the Complaint. Therefore, the defendant contends that the suit should be dismissed for insufficient service of process. ECF 5-1 at 6-7.
JHHS has submitted the affidavit of Neil Duke, Esquire. ECF 5-2. He is the “Practice Group Leader and Chief Legal Counsel for employee affairs and accessibility coordination of the legal department” at JHHS. Id. ¶ 2. I may consider the Duke Affidavit, for the purpose of addressing the claim of insufficient service of process. See Goldfarb v. Mayor of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 2015) ().[3]
Notably, Duke avers: “On February 27, 2023, JHHS received a copy of the summons via certified mail, but this mailing did not contain a copy of Plaintiff's Complaint.” ECF 5-2, ¶ 4. Duke explained that he “personally retrieved a copy of the Civil Complaint from the District Court for Baltimore County, Maryland.” Id. ¶ 5. Of significance, plaintiff does NOT contest any aspect of the Duke Affidavit. See ECF 8. Indeed, plaintiff appears to concede that “plaintiff inadvertently omitted” the Complaint from “the package sent to Hopkins.” Id. at 2.
Plaintiff has not carried her burden to establish timely or proper service of process. See O'Meara, 464 F.Supp.2d at 478 (); see also Lehner v. CVS Pharmacy, RTW-8-1170, 2010 WL 610755, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 17, 2010); Hoffman v. Baltimore Police Dept., 379 F.Supp.2d 778, 786 (D. Md. 2005).
However insufficient service of process does not always necessitate dismissal of a case. See, e.g., Pugh v. E.E.O.C., DKC-13-02862, 2014 WL 2964415, at *3 (D. Md. June 30, 2014). Rather, “‘when service of process gives the defendant actual notice of the pending action, the court may construe Rule 4 liberally.'” Miller v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 833 F.Supp.2d 513, 516 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting O'Meara, 464 F.Supp.2d at 476). Generally, “[w]here ‘the first service of process is ineffective, a motion to dismiss should not be granted, but rather the Court should treat the motion in the alternative, as one to quash the service of process and the case should be retained on the docket pending effective...
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