Harris v. Mangum
| Decision Date | 18 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-15054,15-15054 |
| Citation | 863 F.3d 1133 |
| Parties | Jason Lee HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. Kenneth MANGUM ; J. Scott Dutcher, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Seth W. Lloyd (argued), Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.; Yuka Teraguchi and James E. Hough, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Tokyo, Japan; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joseph I. Vigil (argued) and Joseph J. Branco, Deputy County Attorneys; William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney; Civil Services Division, Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Ronald M. Gould, Richard R. Clifton, and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jason Harris, an Arizona state prisoner, filed pro se a lawsuit in state court that was subsequently removed by Defendants-Appellees J. Kenneth Mangum and J. Scott Dutcher to federal court. Harris filed a motion asking the court to appoint a representative or guardian ad litem to protect his interests, contending that he had previously been found incompetent to stand trial in a criminal case. Without separately considering that motion, the district court dismissed his lawsuit as frivolous and denied pending motions, including the guardian motion, as moot.
This court agreed that the lawsuit was frivolous but ordered a limited remand to the district court for the purpose of considering whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) required the court to evaluate Harris's competence and consider the appointment of a guardian ad litem or issuance of another appropriate order. On remand, the district court concluded that it was not required to evaluate Harris's competence because he had no interest in this case that could have been protected by appointment of a guardian ad litem or issuance of another order under Rule 17(c)(2). We agree.
Harris argues that a guardian could have voluntarily dismissed this lawsuit so that its dismissal by the court as frivolous would not have charged him with a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) that could affect his ability to file a future lawsuit in forma pauperis. Like the district court, however, we conclude that Harris could not be charged with a strike based on the dismissal of this lawsuit because he filed it in state court. Though it was later removed to federal court by another party, § 1915(g) imposes a strike only when a prisoner has brought a meritless action or appeal in a federal court, and Harris did not do so. Moreover, we also agree with the district court that, because Harris had incurred at least three strikes from prior cases, he was already subject to the limitations imposed under § 1915(g) and could not be adversely impacted by whatever happened in this case. Though some of those prior cases were dismissed for failure to state a claim with leave to amend, and judgment was entered against Harris after he failed to file amended complaints, we conclude that those dismissals still count as strikes under § 1915(g).
Because Harris had no interest in this case that could have been protected by appointment of a guardian ad litem or issuance of another appropriate order pursuant to Rule 17(c)(2), the district court was not required to evaluate his competence prior to dismissing the action. We affirm.
Harris, an Arizona state prisoner, filed pro se a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court against an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Sandra Ybarra, alleging violations of Harris's rights under the U.S. Constitution and various federal statutes. Attorneys Mangum and Dutcher, who were employees of the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, represented Ybarra in that action, and they removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Harris then filed another lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court, again pro se, this time against Ybarra's attorneys, Mangum and Dutcher. This second lawsuit is the action currently before us in this appeal. In this lawsuit Harris alleged that Mangum and Dutcher's removal of the first lawsuit was an action that itself violated Harris's rights under the U.S. Constitution and two federal statutes. Defendants removed this second case to the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
The district court is required, under provisions enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, to screen a complaint filed by a prisoner seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court is required to dismiss such a complaint or any portion thereof in which a prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
Before that review was accomplished in this case, Harris filed a number of motions. One was a motion for appointment of a representative or guardian ad litem. That motion cited Harris's understanding that he had previously been "found incompetent for trial" in a criminal case pending against him in state court.
The district court dismissed the case as frivolous pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, observing that removal of the first case by Ybarra's attorneys was not a basis upon which the attorneys could be held liable to Harris under federal law. The order entered by the court also denied all pending motions, including the motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, and directed the court clerk to enter judgment.
Harris appealed the dismissal of his case, and his motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis came before a Ninth Circuit motions panel. The motions panel concluded that Harris's claims were legally frivolous. Order, Harris v. Mangum , No. 14-16290 at 2 n.1 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2014). Even so, it vacated the district court judgment and remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of considering whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) required appointment of a guardian ad litem or another order to protect Harris's interests. Id. at 3.
On remand, the district court concluded that Harris had no interest in the case that could be protected by appointment of a guardian ad litem or issuance of another appropriate order. The district court determined in addition that Harris did not provide documentation regarding his mental health sufficient to merit further inquiry into his competence. Accordingly, the district court declined to appoint a guardian ad litem. The district court directed the court clerk to forward a copy of its order to this court, which we construe as a statement of the district court's intent to reinstate its judgment and its intent that the order be appealable. See Resh v. China Agritech, Inc. , 857 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) ().
Harris then filed this appeal, challenging the district court's decision not to appoint a guardian ad litem.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court's decision not to appoint a guardian ad litem for abuse of discretion. Davis v. Walker , 745 F.3d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 2014). "[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation, such as the applicability of the strike provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), are reviewed de novo." Belanus v. Clark , 796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2) provides that a "court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action." Ordinarily, "when a substantial question exists regarding the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se, the proper procedure is for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine competence, so a guardian ad litem can be appointed, if necessary." Allen v. Calderon , 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court did not conduct a competency hearing for Harris. Thus, the first question we address is whether a district court may forego an otherwise-required Rule 17(c)(2) assessment when, as here, it concludes that the litigant's competence is irrelevant because the litigant has no interest that could be protected by one of the safeguards provided by Rule 17(c)(2), namely "appoint[ing] a guardian ad litem" or "issu[ing] another appropriate order." We conclude that the district court may dispense with that assessment of competence in circumstances such as those involved in this case.
"The purpose of Rule 17(c) is to protect an incompetent person's interests in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit." Davis , 745 F.3d at 1310. Accordingly, we have held that a district court has broad discretion to fashion an appropriate safeguard that will protect an incompetent person's interests. See id. at 1311 (); Krain v. Smallwood , 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land , 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986) ().
The requirement that the district court implement safeguards sufficient to protect an incompetent person's interests presupposes the existence of interests. The parties do not identify and we have not found any precedent that discusses what a district court must do when a litigant has no interest to protect. The absence of such cases is not surprising. Ordinarily it would be difficult for a district court to be certain at the outset of a...
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