Harris v. Mississippi Valley State University, Civ. A. No. 4:94-CV-305SO

• Decision Date: 22 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 4:94-cv-78 BN.,Civ. A. No. 4:94-CV-305SO,4:94-cv-78 BN.
• Citation: 899 F. Supp. 1561
• Parties: Rosetta HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY; Dr. William W. Sutton, Individually and in His Official Capacity as President; Dr. W.E. Thomas, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Dr. Saliba Mukoro, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Department Head of Criminal Justice and Social Work Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

899 F. Supp. 1561

Rosetta HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY; Dr. William W. Sutton, Individually and in His Official Capacity as President; Dr. W.E. Thomas, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Dr. Saliba Mukoro, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Department Head of Criminal Justice and Social Work Department, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4:94-CV-305SO, No. 4:94-cv-78 BN.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division.

September 22, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ellis Turnage, Cleveland, MS, for plaintiff.

Robert G. Jenkins, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BARBOUR, Chief Judge.

In this case, Plaintiff, a tenured professor, who previously had additional administrative duties, alleges that the Defendants violated her rights under the United States Constitution and state law when they removed her administrative duties. The Court has before it the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Procedural Due Process Claim. Having considered the motions, responses, supporting and opposing memoranda and the attached exhibits, the Court rules that Defendants' Motion is well taken and should be granted in part and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion is not well taken and should be denied. In addition, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims, and therefore, dismisses those claims without prejudice.

I. Facts

The Plaintiff, Rosetta Harris ("Harris"), began employment with Defendant Mississippi Valley State University ("MVSU") in 1977, as an instructor in the Social Work Department. In 1991, she was promoted to the position of Coordinator of the social work program. That program is accredited by the Council on Social Work Education ("CSWE") and, to maintain accreditation, must meet certain prescribed standards, including those related to the hiring of social work faculty.

During the spring of 1994, the Board of Trustees of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning ("the Board") approved a departmental reorganization at MVSU authorizing the merger of the criminal justice and social work programs to form the new Criminal Justice/Social Work Department. The Defendant, Dr. Saliba Mukoro ("Mukoro"), was appointed to be the new department head, while Harris maintained her position as Coordinator of the social work program.

In June, 1994, Harris was granted tenure, and a week later, she executed an employment contract for the position of "Assist. Professor/Program Coordinator—Dept. of Criminal Justice/Social Work" for the period beginning August, 1994, and ending May, 1995. The contract contained the following language:

This employment contract is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The laws of the State of Mississippi and the policies and by-laws of the Board.

* * * * * *

3. The Board shall have the authority to terminate this contract at any time for the following:

a. Financial exigencies ...;

b. Termination or reduction of programs, academic or administrative units ...;

c. Malfeasance, inefficiency or contumacious conduct;

d. For cause.

At some point in August 1994, Dr. Mohammad R. Hoque ("Hoque") was hired as an assistant professor in the social work program. By letter dated August 29, 1994, as Coordinator of the social work program, Harris notified Dr. Nancy Randolph ("Randolph"), Director of the Standardization and Accreditation Division of the CSWE, of Hoque's hiring and enclosed a copy of his resume. Harris also advised Randolph of the new mailing address and telephone number of the social work program.

Harris's letter prompted the following response from Randolph:

I am responding to your correspondence ... in which you indicate you have "learned" that a new faculty member ... has been hired to teach in the baccalaureate social work program which you coordinate.

Your letter raises two different concerns. First, it is apparent that you, as Program Coordinator, had no knowledge of the hiring of a faculty member to teach in your program. Such a hiring process is in noncompliance with two accreditation standards....

* * * * * *

The second issue regards Dr. Hoque's credentials. His curriculum vitae does not indicate that his academic work ... has been certified as comparable to degree programs accredited by the CSWE. Therefore, Dr. Hoque lacks the master's of social work degree required to allow him to teach required practice courses or to coordinate the field practicum.

Randolph set September 15, 1994, as the deadline for a response "so that the program's continued compliance with accreditation standards may be reviewed by the Commission on Accreditation at its meeting at the end of September."

By letter dated September 22, 1994, the Defendant, Dr. W.E. Thomas ("Thomas"), Vice-President for Academic Affairs, responded to Randolph's concerns, although he was "unclear as to the issue raised." He continued:

Dr. Hoque's credentials certainly must have been reviewed by the Program faculty as they are in the hands of the Program Coordinator. The process for hiring faculty at our institution is similar to that commonly used by other universities and involves two steps: 1. faculty review of applications and screening for appropriate candidates, and 2. a subsequent administrative process to hire an appropriate candidate. To my knowledge, this is exactly what happened in the case of Dr. Hoque.

Harris denies having reviewed or discussed Dr. Hoque's credentials with anyone and maintains she first learned of Dr. Hoque's employment when he was introduced at an August, 1994, faculty meeting.

Over the course of the next month, Harris, Mukoro and Thomas met several times to discuss the escalating problems associated with Hoque's hiring. Harris voiced her concerns about perceived inaccuracies in Thomas's letter to Randolph. Mukoro and Thomas became increasingly disturbed about Haris's disloyal and uncooperative attitude and directed her to write a letter to the CSWE supporting the hiring of Hoque. Harris refused, and on October 27, 1994, she met with the Defendant, Dr. William W. Sutton ("Sutton"), President of MVSU, who promptly removed Harris from her position as Coordinator of the social work program, though he did not relieve her of her tenured faculty position. That action was confirmed by letter the following day. Since that time, Harris has been under medical and psychiatric care and is presently on a medical leave of absence from MVSU on the advice of her medical doctor and psychiatrist.

Approximately one month after she was relieved of her administrative duties, Harris initiated the instant suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. She sued MVSU and Drs. Sutton, Thomas and Mukoro, individually and in their official capacities. She also moved for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which this Court denied.

The gravamen of Harris's Complaint centers on her August 29, 1994, letter. She also alleges that Defendants removed her administrative duties and responsibilities without due process. Defendants answer with broad allegations concerning Harris's uncooperative and insubordinate attitude toward the combining of the criminal justice and social work departments into one.

II. Applicable Legal Standard for Consideration of Defendants' Motion

Defendants' motion is styled as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Although motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are interrelated and are often asserted in the alternative, there are differences in the legal standards applied under the two motions. The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to test the statement of the claim for relief as set out in the complaint. See Murray v. Amoco Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1385, 1387 (5th Cir.1976). The motion may be granted "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegation." Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 804 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court's inquiry is limited to the contents of the pleadings, Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 309 n. 4 (5th Cir.1986), and all material allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983).

In contrast, a motion for summary judgment goes beyond the pleadings and tests the sufficiency of the evidence a party can produce in support of those issues on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Because the parties have submitted and the Court has considered materials outside of the pleadings, the Court will treat Defendant's Motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir.1980); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir.1991).

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary...