Harris v. Mississippi Valley State Univ.

• Citation: 873 So.2d 970
• Decision Date: 13 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-01184-SCT.,2002-CA-01184-SCT.
• Parties: Rosetta HARRIS v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY; The Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Dr. William Sutton; Dr. Lester C. Newman; Dr. W.E. Thomas; Dr. Saliba Mukoro; Dr. Mohammad R. Hoque; Vince Venturini; and Dr. Roy Hudson.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

873 So.2d 970

Rosetta HARRIS v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY; The Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Dr. William Sutton; Dr. Lester C. Newman; Dr. W.E. Thomas; Dr. Saliba Mukoro; Dr. Mohammad R. Hoque; Vince Venturini; and Dr. Roy Hudson.

No. 2002-CA-01184-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 13, 2004.

John M. Mooney, Jr., Jackson, attorney for appellant.

James T. Metz, Grenada, attorney for appellee.

WALLER, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Rosetta Harris sued her former employer, Mississippi Valley State University (MVSU), claiming breach of contract, wrongful termination, negligence, malicious prosecution, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. She later amended her complaint to add individual defendants and allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court dismissed all of Harris' state law claims except her breach of contract claim for failure to give notice pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claim Act (MTCA). See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1 et seq. The trial court then granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remainder of her claims. Harris appeals.

FACTS

¶ 2. In order to address Harris' appeal, it is necessary to develop the extensive history of proceedings between Harris and MVSU that culminated in her termination.¹

¶ 3. Rosetta Harris began her employment at MVSU in 1977 as an instructor in the Social Work Department. In 1994, she was granted tenure by the Tenure Committee at MVSU. She served as the program coordinator within the Criminal Justice/ Social Work department from August, 1994, to May, 1995.

¶ 4. Following Harris' appointment as program coordinator, a dispute arose regarding the accreditation of the MVSU social work program. The program was accredited by the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE), which sets standards for the hiring of faculty members. Harris became concerned with the hiring by MVSU of Dr. Mohammad R. Hoque, who lacked a masters of social work degree and who had never practiced social work. Harris notified CSWE of Hoque's lack of credentials, and CSWE responded with an inquiry into MVSU's accreditation in late August and September of 1994. On October 28, 1994, Dr. William W. Sutton, then President of MVSU, notified Harris that "it is my decision to terminate your appointment as Coordinator of Social Work. This change is effective immediately. Your salary will be unchanged for this academic year."

¶ 5. Following her removal from the coordinator position, Harris filed her federal court suit against MVSU, et al. in federal court alleging that her removal was in retaliation for her contacting CSWE. The federal district court, by summary judgment dismissed all of Harris' claims, the federal law claims with prejudice and the pendent state law claims without prejudice. Harris I, 899 F.Supp. at 1577. Harris then brought suit in state court for her state law claims arising out of her removal as program director. The trial court dismissed the case, finding that Harris' claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's decision finding that it erred in dismissing Harris' claim because the federal district court did not address the merits of Harris' state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Harris v. IHL, 731 So.2d 588 (Miss.1999).

¶ 6. On January 21, 1999, Harris requested two years of leave from MVSU in order to take the position as Project Director with the Delta Health Partners Healthy Start Initiative Program of Tougaloo College. Harris' leave request had to be approved through an extensive leave procedure within the chain of command at MVSU, beginning with her immediate supervisor and ultimately requiring the approval of MVSU President, Dr. Newman.² If anyone within the chain of command denied the request, the inquiry ended. Hoque, Harris' immediate supervisor, did not recommend granting her request because of personnel problems. On February 1, 1999, Harris was informed by Dr. Saliba Mukoro, the Chair of the Criminal Justice Department, via letter that her request for two years of leave could not be granted because classes were in session and her request would be disruptive to the students and that she was needed at MVSU for an upcoming accreditation review. Mukoro informed Harris that he would approve one year of leave for the following year if properly requested. Harris had already accepted the position with Delta Health before she was notified that her leave request had been denied. She did not return to MVSU for the remainder of the spring semester.

¶ 7. On February 8, 1999 Harris requested medical leave. Harris continued to request medical leave for the remainder of the semester. Her medical leave request were approved by Hoque and Mukoro and sent for further review. On February 16, 1999, Harris wrote to President Newman requesting leave of absence without pay for the 1999-2000 academic year. On March 4, 1999, Harris requested to be placed on unpaid medical leave for March 1, 1999, until May 17, 1999. ¶ 8. On April 1, 1999, MVSU requested further documentation to support Harris' medical leave request. Harris was then notified via letter on April 22, 1999 that Newman had denied her February 16, 1999 request for leave of absence, and that additional information regarding her leave request would soon be requested. Harris' physician, Dr. Cassada, wrote to MVSU explaining that she had been treating Harris for symptoms of stress and anxiety. Dr. Cassada did not state that Harris was unable to work. Dr. Cassada referred other medical inquiries to Dr. Wheeler, who explained that Harris had a severe medical illness, namely stress, that was exacerbated by her employment at MVSU.

¶ 9. Harris was then given notice of the University's intention to terminate her due to her absence without approval and for taking the position with Delta Health Partners. Within the notice, Harris was informed that she was entitled to a hearing. Newman stated in his affidavit that Harris was afforded a pre-termination meeting and that only afterwards did he decide to recommend her termination to the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning.

¶ 10. After making his decision to terminate Harris, Newman met with the Legal Committee of the IHL Board and discussed the Harris personnel matter. The Committee recommended to the Full IHL Board to approve Newman's recommendation of termination of Harris. Her termination was discussed and approved by the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning.

¶ 11. After the Board approved Harris' termination, she filed a grievance and also sought review of the Board's decision. The Board declined Harris' request. Harris then filed her second amended complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims.

¶ 12. After Harris filed her second amended complaint, the State Auditor was notified that Harris had continued to receive compensation from MVSU after she abandoned her position with MVSU by accepting the position with Delta Health Partners and not returning to work at MVSU during the Spring semester. The State Auditor notified Harris that she owed approximately $28,000 and that the Attorney General would be notified if the amount was not paid. Harris sought to amend her complaint to add the notification of the State Auditor as furtherance of the conspiracy and retaliatory acts against her. Harris also filed a Motion to Compel MVSU to produce a representative to be deposed regarding the notification of the State Auditor.

¶ 13. The trial court never ruled on Harris' motions, instead it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to Harris' state law claims for lack of jurisdiction because of her failure to file a "notice of claim" pursuant to the MTCA. The trial court then granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Harris' §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims and her state law breach of contract claims. Harris appeals, asserting that summary judgment was inappropriate because (1) the defendants conspired to cause her to lose her position as a tenured faculty member; (2) there was a causal connection between Harris' lawsuit and her request for leave; (3) Harris established due process and first amendment violations; (4) her removal as program coordinator constituted a breach of contract; and (5) MVSU breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She also asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her state law claims for failure to comply with the notice provision of the MTCA, and that the trial court erred by not allowing her to amend her pleadings and by not ruling on her motion to compel MVSU to present a representative for depositions.

DISCUSSION

I. Did the Trial Court err in granting summary judgment to the Appellees?

¶ 14. This Court employs a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a summary judgment and examines all the evidentiary matters before it, admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered for the movant. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Issues of material fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says to the opposite. In addition, the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact...