Harris v. Riddle, 76-1540

• Decision Date: 14 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1540,76-1540
• Citation: 551 F.2d 936
• Parties: Leroy HARRIS, Appellant, v. Walter M. RIDDLE, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 936

551 F.2d 936

Leroy HARRIS, Appellant, v. Walter M. RIDDLE, Superintendent of the Virginia State

Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 76-1540.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 8, 1976.

Decided March 14, 1977.

Mark Merson, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Jim L. Chin, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va. (Andrew P. Miller, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before CRAVEN and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges, and MERHIGE, District Judge. ^*

CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal by state prisoner Leroy Harris, imprisoned for felony murder, from the denial of habeas relief in the district court. The only question presented is whether Harris knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel when he orally admitted his participation in the offense. For reasons to be stated, we hold that Harris' waiver was knowing and intelligent, and affirm the decision below.

I.

Three days after the commission of a homicide in the course of a robbery, the police of Newport News, Virginia, arrested Harris and took him to the police station at about 9:15 p. m. Captain Weaver of the Detective Bureau told Harris that he was charged with armed robbery and murder and correctly read him his Miranda rights. Harris said he understood them. Some 20 minutes later Lt. Austin repeated the Miranda warnings and again advised Harris of the charges against him, requesting that Harris sign a waiver-of-rights form. Harris refused to sign, but expressed his willingness to talk and reaffirmed that he understood the explanation to him of his Miranda rights.

Lt. Austin knew Harris' parents and telephoned the boy's mother and requested she come to the station right away. Lt. Austin also permitted Harris to telephone his girlfriend and later his sister. While all this was going on, Harris talked freely, insisting that, although present at the place of robbery and homicide, and although carrying a pistol, he did not fire it.

About an hour after beginning their conversation, Harris and Lt. Austin were joined by Harris' uncle, who had come in response to the telephone call to Harris' mother. In the uncle's presence, Harris was advised of his Miranda rights for the third time. He told his uncle he had not been mistreated in any way. Harris and his uncle were offered the opportunity to talk privately but declined. Harris was then asked by Lt. Austin to relate the facts of the robbery to his uncle, and Harris substantially repeated his earlier oral statement. It was this statement before his uncle that was later admitted into evidence against him.

During the course of making his confession, according to Lt. Austin's testimony, Harris explained to Austin that he was willing to talk about it but would not sign anything. The Lieutenant's testimony is susceptible to three interpretations, and for decisional purposes we read it (favorably to Harris) to mean that Harris talked freely but would not sign anything because (1) Harris thought that if he simply told about it, it would be Lt. Austin's word against his and, if he later decided to deny the conversation, the judge would believe him rather than Austin; (2) Harris thought an oral confession inadmissible in court; and (3) Harris misunderstood the elements of felony murder and thought that proof that he personally fired the gun was essential to convicting him of the graver offense.

Harris was 17 years old. His I.Q. was 67, which is within the "dull-normal" range of intelligence at about the sixth-grade level. His poorly developed language skills were at about the third-grade level. At trial the defense psychiatrist conceded, however, that Harris understood both his right to remain silent and that anything he said could and would be used against him, though, as to the latter, he might not understand "to what degree and to what extent it would be used or what charges (it would support)." The psychiatrist further testified that Harris' limited understanding of the consequences of talking would be shared by "many people even with a superior I.Q.," and that the primary source of Harris' confusion was his ignorance of the felony-murder doctrine.

Harris' confession was admitted over objection that it was not the product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to keep silent within the meaning of Miranda. Although no direct appeal was filed, a petition for habeas corpus to the Virginia Supreme Court was denied on the merits.

II.

Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 et seq., 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Harris was told (1) that he had the right to remain silent; (2) that anything he said could be and would be used against him in court; (3) that he had the right to have counsel present at the interrogation, and that if he could not afford counsel a lawyer would be provided him; and (4) that if at any time during questioning he decided to remain silent, further interrogation would cease.

But Harris contends, and we agree, that his statement to Lt. Austin revealed that he was ignorant of the law and misinformed and erroneously thought he was exculpating himself rather than incriminating himself. Thus the question presented is whether Miranda puts upon the police the obligation to go beyond the prescribed warnings to make sure that the person being questioned understands not only his right to remain silent but also the consequences of his failure to exercise it. Harris relies heavily upon the following quotation from Miranda :

If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.

384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).

He...