Harris v. S.C. Dep't of Emp't & Workforce

• Decision Date: 02 March 2022
• Docket Number: 21-ALJ-22-0381-AP
• Parties: Jeana R. Harris, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Administrative Law Court Decisions

Jeana R. Harris, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce, Respondent.

No. 21-ALJ-22-0381-AP

South Carolina Administrative Law Court Decisions

March 2, 2022

FINAL ORDER AFFIRMING

SHIRLEY G. ROBINSON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (Court) pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed by Jeana R. Harris (Appellant). Appellant is seeking review of a final decision issued by the Appellate Panel (Panel) of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Department). The Panel modified the decision of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) and held Appellant indefinitely ineligible for benefits effective March 21, 2021, upon finding she does not meet the availability requirements of the law. The ALC has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to section 41-35-750 of the South Carolina Code. See S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-750 (2021). After careful consideration of the Record on Appeal (record), parties' briefs, and the applicable law, the Panel's decision is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed a claim for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on April 23, 2021. Appellant indicated in the claim application that she was not currently able to look for, accept, or perform full-time work. The Department conducted a fact-finding review, and in responses to the fact-finding inquiries, Appellant stated that she suffers from an acute kidney injury and the condition prevents her from accepting a job. On April 27, 2021. a Department claims adjudicator issued a determination finding Appellant ineligible for benefits beginning April 18, 2021. based on her inability to work. Also, on May 3, 2021, a second determination was issue by a Department claims adjudicator finding Appellant ineligible for benefits beginning April 25, 2021 again based on her inability to work. On June 9, 2021, Appellant appealed the Claim adjudicator's determinations to the Department's Appeal Tribunal, and on June 3, 2021 an evident any hearing was held before a Tribunal administrative hearing official. Appellant was the sole witness.

Appellant testified that she was employed with CGC Recreation Bowling Alley (CGC) from October 30, 2015, until March 20, 2021, and performed multiple job duties including cashier, food prep and stocking. Appellant was hospitalized on March 20, 2021 after passing out while she was on the job. She was discharged from the hospital on April 8, 2021, however as of the date of the hearing. Appellant was still under her doctor's care and testified that it could be six months to a year before the doctor releases her to return to work. Appellant submitted documentation evidencing her medical issues. Appellant additionally testified that she was honest when answering questions related to her claim for UI benefits, and currently is unable to seek full-time employment due to weakness caused by her ongoing medical issues. She further testified that while she wants to work and could possibly learn a different type of work, she cannot currently do the work in which she has training and experience.

On June 4, 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the claims adjudicator's determination and found Appellant ineligible for benefits effective April 18, 2021, and April 25, 2021, because she does not meet the availability requirements of the law. Appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Panel. On July 20, 2021, the Panel issued its decision modifying the Tribunal*s decision and found Appellant disqualified from benefits effective March 21, 2021, upon finding she does not meet the availability requirements of the law. Appellant filed a timely appeal with this court.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's decision holding Appellant ineligible for benefits effective March 21, 2021, upon finding she does not meet the availability requirements of the law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Department is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding that the Employment Security Commission, a predecessor of the Department, was an agency within the meaning of the APA). Accordingly, the APA's appellate standard governs appeals from Department decisions. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380 and -600(D) (2005 & Supp. 2021); Gibson, 282 S.C. at 386, 318 S.E.2d at 367. Section 1-23-380(5) provides the standard of review to be utilized the ALC when reviewing Department decisions:

(5) The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (2005 & Supp. 2021).

A decision is supported by substantial evidence when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C, 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm 'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996).

When applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 466 S.E.2d 357 (1996). Thus, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency "unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Proi. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res,, 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc.. 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)). Furthermore, the reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995). Finally, the fart) challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

DISCUSSION

Section 41-35-110 of the South Carolina Code sets forth the conditions of eligibility for UI benefits. Specifically subsection 41-35-110(3) states, in pertinent part, that Appellant is eligible for benefits with respect to a week only if the department finds she "is able to work and is available for work at [her] usual trade, occupation, or business for which [she] is qualified based on [her] prior training or experience..." The South Carolina Supreme Court has determined that availability for work means Appellant has an unrestricted exposure "to the normal labor market to which [she] has been customarily attached." Hyman v. S.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 234 S.C. 369. 379, 108 S.E.2d 554, 559 (1959); See also Murphy v. S.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 328 S.C. 542, 544. 492 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wellington v. South Carolina Employment Security Commission, 281 S.C. 115, 314 S.E.2d 37, (Ct.App.1984) and reiterating that "available for work" to mean an" 'unrestricted...