Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 16 February 1967
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 373
• Citation: 195 So.2d 521,280 Ala. 468
• Parties: Ardell HARRIS v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 521

195 So.2d 521

280 Ala. 468

Ardell HARRIS v. STATE of Alabama.

1 Div. 373.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 16, 1967.

Irving Silver, Mobile, for appellant.

Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., and Walter S. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MERRILL, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, where the defendant was convicted by a jury on April 6, 1966 of robbery and sentenced by the court to twenty-five years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.

The defendant, an eighteen year old Negro, was arrested in Prichard, Alabama, at approximately 2:30 A.M. on August 12, 1965, while in the suspected commission of a burglary. He was immediately taken to the Prichard Jail where he readily admitted complicity in the burglary. Thereafter he was held incommunicado at the jail for three days during which time he was questioned relative to the unsolved robbery of one Ida Hannon which had occurred on April 6, 1965. The interrogation of the prisoner was conducted intermittently by Detectives Gilbert and Rigsby of the Prichard Police. Force. On the third day of his detention, the defendant signed a statement confessing that he and another had committed the robbery of Ida Hannon. The instant appeal is from his conviction of that robbery.

Upon the trial of the accused, the State sought to introduce his written confession into evidence. At the proper time, the trial judge had the jury retire to the jury room and a voir dire examination of Detective Gilbert was commenced by the prosecution. Gilbert testified that he apprized the prisoner of his right to remain silent and of his right to be represented by an attorney. He further testified that Detective Rigsby was the only other person present during the interrogation and that neither of them threatened or physically abused the defendant; that neither or them offered him any promise of reward or hope of immunity; that the accused freely admitted to the robbery and signed an inclupatory paper in question and answer form.

After the cross-examination of Gilbert, the State rested its voir dire, and the defendant took the stand. He testified that he was beaten by the two detectives during his detention; that a telephone book was placed on his head and a scotch tape dispenser, some 8 inches long, was used to strike the telephone book as it rested on his head; that while this was taking place, the other detective was hitting him on the kneecap with a rather large padlock.

While this examination was proceeding to the extent that it occupies approximately 7 pages of the record, the trial judge interrupted and said:

'THE COURT: Now, I will tell y'all about this thing right now. I think the confession would make out a prima facie case, the admissibility of the confession. I think the examination here in the matter, if you are going to pursue it, pursue it before the jury, because I don't believe it. I might as well say that I don't believe it. I don't believe in harboring it; the jury may believe it. What I am trying to say is this: I have to pass on the credibility and the truth of what this witness says and I am saying right now, again, that I don't believe it. Now the jury may believe it. And in order that this matter not go on and take all the afternoon before me, because I am going to let the confession in. I don't believe this man out here would have treated any human being in such a fashion. I have a right to express that, because I am sitting as a jury and passing on it. Call the jury in and go ahead with the trial of this case and then if the confession is tendered and if he lays the predicate for it--I just wanted to know the prima facie case about it--and then if the confession is admitted into evidence, then this the Court will not express any comment on. It is a matter for the jury to believe and attach such credibility and such weight as they want to to it in the light of the testimony that is said. Now that is the way I feel about the law in the case and I grant you an exception to the Court's ruling on the admissibility of the confession. Call in the jury.'

Counsel for the accused objected to his not being allowed to complete the examination. The jurors returned to take their seats in the jury box, and the trial proceeded.

The question presented for our decision is whether it is reversible error for a trial judge to cut off an accused and refuse to hear his testimony on voir dire examination when the accused is attempting to show that a confession was illegally obtained from him.

We hold that prejudicial error was committed when the defendant's testimony was halted by the trial court before it had been completed. We quote from the old case of Bonner v. State, 55 Ala. 242, wherein the law pertaining to the procedure to be followed in determining the admissibility of a confession is accurately set forth:

'In that jealous care which the law exercises at all times in protection of life and liberty; in the tender regard it pays to human weakness and frailty, it is laid down as one of the cardinal rules of evidence, that confessions of guilt shall not...