Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 27 May 1986
• Citation: 502 N.Y.S.2d 760,117 A.D.2d 298
• Parties: Cornelius HARRIS, etc., et al., Respondents, v. The STATE of New York, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 760

502 N.Y.S.2d 760

117 A.D.2d 298

Cornelius HARRIS, etc., et al., Respondents, v. The STATE of New York, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

May 27, 1986.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (Peter J. Dooley and Vernon Stuart, of counsel), for appellant.

Barry, McTiernan & Moore, New York City (Roger P. McTiernan, Sr. and Kathryn Deborah Nealon, of counsel), for respondents.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and RUBIN, LAWRENCE and KUNZEMAN, JJ.

KUNZEMAN, Justice.

The issue presented by these appeals is whether the State may be held directly liable for injuries sustained by Adrienne D. a mentally disabled individual, while a resident of a State-certified family-care-home in which she had been placed by the State pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 31. Her injuries were sustained when she suffered an epileptic seizure in a locked bathroom in the home. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that direct liability was properly imposed upon the State and thus affirm the modified judgment of the Court of Claims.

In 1971, Adrienne, a mildly retarded individual, was admitted to the Wassaic Developmental Center, a State institution for the mentally retarded. At the time of her admission, she was 16 years of age, and had a known history of epileptic seizures which rendered her immobile for minutes at a time. Her medication, Dilantin, kept her epileptic condition under control although she did continue to experience some seizures following her admission.

In 1974, Adrienne was placed in a family-care home under the supervision of William and Mary McNair. At the time of the placement, Mrs. McNair was informed by social workers that Adrienne was an epileptic, but was never given any records regarding her condition. Mrs. McNair was told that Adrienne was to take her medication three times a day. Between the years 1974 and 1978, Adrienne suffered periodic seizures while under the McNairs' supervision.

The McNair residence had been certified by the State as a family-care home following an inspection in or about 1975. A recertification was made in 1977. During the certification inspections, as well as intermittent other inspections, no hazardous conditions were found to exist in the home. The second-floor bathroom, where the underlying incident occurred, was outfitted with a bathtub, commode, sink and closet. The bathtub, which was enclosed by sliding glass doors, was equipped with a showerhead and faucet with one control for the hot and cold water. The door to the bathroom was a solid, standard, wood type with a butterfly lock below the handle on the inside of the bathroom. There was no turning device for the lock on the outside of the door. The McNairs were never directed to remove or change the lock on the bathroom door.

On April 7, 1978, at approximately 7:00 P.M., Adrienne went to take a bath in the upstairs bathroom. Although she had not been told to do so, she locked the bathroom door. She stepped into the bathtub, turned on the hot water, and then suffered an epileptic seizure which rendered her immobile. At approximately 7:15 P.M., Mrs. McNair became aware of the problem when another mentally retarded client residing in the home summoned her. Upon arriving at the bathroom, Mrs. McNair discovered the door locked. By looking underneath the door, Mrs. McNair was able to observe Adrienne standing in the corner of the tub, with her back against the wall, and away from the shower spout. The bathroom door was eventually forced open and the claimant was transported to the hospital. Adrienne was diagnosed as having suffered first, second and third degree burns on her lower legs and ankles.

The instant claim against the State was commenced in 1980, seeking to recover $5,000,000 for personal injuries, $750,000 on a derivative claim and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Following a trial, the Court of Claims found, in the first instance, that the State had the primary responsibility for Adrienne's care and safety and as such was required to insure that any potentially unsafe condition which might exist in the subject family-care home be remedied. The court also determined that the McNairs were agents of the State and, therefore, negligence on their part was imputable to it. Based on the facts as adduced at the trial, particularly Adrienne's known history of epileptic seizures, the court concluded that the State was negligent in permitting the McNairs to have a bathroom door in their family-care home equipped with a lock which could not be opened from the outside. Such negligence was further found to have been a proximate cause of the injuries suffered since, as a result thereof, Adrienne was exposed for several minutes to water of such a temperature that it resulted in severe burns. Adrienne was awarded $125,000 as full compensation for her injuries. The derivative claim and the demand for punitive damages were dismissed.

Before discussing the issue of the State's direct negligence in this case, we note that a question arises as to whether the Court of Claims' determination that the McNairs' negligence could be imputed to the State was proper. Mental Hygiene Law article 31 and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide for the placement of mentally disabled persons in State certified family-care homes. Such facilities are defined as "the combination of a private residence and a family certified by the commissioner according to regulations stated elsewhere in this part to provide care for no more than 10 mentally disabled persons" (14 NYCRR 87.1[a] ). A family-care provider is "a person or persons to whom an operating certificate has been issued by the commissioner to operate a family care home" (14 NYCRR 87.1[b] ). Placement in a family-care home acts as a conditional release which terminates the State patient's inpatient status and sets up an arrangement of outpatient care and treatment (14 NYCRR 36.2[b] ).

In considering the issue of whether the State could be vicariously liable for the negligence of a family home-care provider, the case of Hawley v. State of New York (22 A.D.2d 357, 256 N.Y.S.2d 269, revd. 16 N.Y.2d 809, 263 N.Y.S.2d 6, 210 N.E.2d 358) is instructive. That case involved a mentally disabled individual who had been committed to a State institutional school. During the claimant's confinement, the school entered into a custodial contract with a nearby farmer, allowing the claimant to work on the farm on "convalescent status" (Hawley v. State of New York, supra, 22 A.D.2d at p. 358, 256 N.Y.S.2d 269). While working on the farm, the claimant sustained physical injuries when he fell 40 feet from the top of a scaffold erected on the outside of a silo. The trial court in Hawley found the State vicariously liable for the claimant's injuries. The Fourth Department affirmed, stating, in relevant part (Hawley v. State of New York, supra, at p. 361, 256 N.Y.S.2d 269):

"It is no new concept that liability may be imposed upon the State for a negligent act performed by a third party acting as its agent (cf. Maltby v. County of Westchester, 267 N.Y. 375 ). (See also, Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Auth., 255 App Div. 426 ). The duty imposed upon the State was one from which it could not be freed short of absolute discharge of the patient. The negligence of its selected agent (with minimal supervision on the part of the State) in placing claimant in a position of peril with resulting injury to him was imputable to appellant".

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against the State with the following memorandum (Hawley v. State of New York, 16 N.Y.2d 809, 809-810, 263 N.Y.S.2d 6, 210 N.E.2d 358, supra):

"The statutory relation between the State and the custodian of a patient on 'convalescent status' does not impose a liability on the State for an act of negligence of the custodian not foreseeable by the State in the exercise of reasonable care; and the custodian is not the agent of the State in this relationship so as to impute such a liability to the State when due care is taken in the selection of the custodian (Mental Hygiene Law, former § 132; § 34, subd. 12). It seems implied in subdivision 12 that a patient on convalescent status is not a patient at the institution. The custodian of such a patient is often his family or guardian ( § 132) and no statutory distinction as to the relationship of 'agent' to the State is made between a member of the family and another suitable person selected as custodian. Reports must in either case be made to the State as to the physical, moral and mental condition of the patient, but the control of the patient is sufficiently independent from the State in detail and management as to protect the State against liability for acts of negligence not reasonably to be anticipated".

This court in Blanca C. v. County of Nassau, (103 A.D.2d 524, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747, affd. 65 N.Y.2d 712, 492 N.Y.S.2d 5, 481 N.E.2d 545) extended the holding set forth in Hawley v. State of New York (supra ) by refusing to impose vicarious liability upon the County of Nassau, absent statutory or case law precedent, for the acts of foster parents who are essentially contract service providers (see also, Matter of Mavis M., 110 Misc.2d 297, 308, 441 N.Y.S.2d 950; cf. People ex rel. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 46 N.Y.2d 382, 389-390, 413 N.Y.S.2d 626, 386 N.Y.S.2d 235).

We are of the opinion that the rationale of Blanca C. v. County of Nassau (supra), a foster care case, and Hawley v. State of New York (supra), a mental-health-custodian case, is applicable to family home-care providers as well since, in this case, a private person directly involved in the care of the State's client is also essentially a contract-service provider. We therefore, agree with the State's argument that negligence on the part of the McNairs, as contract-service providers, is not imputable to the State so as to render it vicariously liable when due care has been taken...