Maldovan v. Cnty. of Erie

• Docket Number: 90
• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Citation: 39 N.Y.3d 166,205 N.E.3d 393,184 N.Y.S.3d 673
• Parties: William D. MALDOVAN, Public Administrator, as Administrator of the Estate of Laura Cummings, Deceased, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ERIE et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

39 N.Y.3d 166

205 N.E.3d 393

184 N.Y.S.3d 673

William D. MALDOVAN, Public Administrator, as Administrator of the Estate of Laura Cummings, Deceased, Appellant,

v.COUNTY OF ERIE et al., Respondents.

No. 90

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided November 22, 2022

Connors LLP, Buffalo (John T. Loss, Terrence M. Connors and Andrew M. Debbins of counsel), for appellant.

Walsh Roberts & Grace, LLP, Buffalo (Robert P. Goodwin of counsel), and Michael A. Siragusa, County Attorney, Buffalo (Jeremy C. Toth of counsel), for respondents.

Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York City (Kate Fletcher, Richard Dearing and Elina Druker of counsel), for City of New York, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TROUTMAN, J.

Plaintiff alleges that failures on the part of various government agencies, including two providing social services, caused grievous harm in this tragic case.

Despite the heartbreaking events involved, in which the victim's mother and brother, now serving lengthy prison terms for their actions, sexually assaulted, abused, and murdered her in her home, we decline to expand this Court's special duty doctrine. "A well settled rule of law denies recovery in cases like this" ( McLean v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.3d 194, 204, 878 N.Y.S.2d 238, 905 N.E.2d 1167 [2009] ). "The rationale for this rule is that the cost to municipalities of allowing recovery would be excessive [and] the threat of liability might deter or paralyze useful activity," endangering the ability of government agencies to provide crucial services to the public ( Laratro v. City of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 79, 82, 828 N.Y.S.2d 280, 861 N.E.2d 95 [2006] ).

I.

Laura Cummings was a 23–year–old woman with developmental disabilities who lived with her mother, Eva Cummings. In 2009, Laura's brother, Richard, who lived out of state, contacted a family friend with concerns about Laura's well-being after another family member informed Richard that Laura had sustained suspicious injuries. Mistakenly believing that Laura was under 18 years old, the family friend contacted Child Protective Services (CPS) about these concerns. A CPS caseworker visited the home, and both Eva and Laura, when interviewed alone, provided the same benign explanation for Laura's injuries. CPS thereafter closed the case and informed the family friend that the report was unfounded.

Months later, Richard heard again that Laura was injured, with facial bruising, and contacted the same family friend, who in turn contacted Adult Protective Services (APS). APS caseworkers visited the home, but Eva refused to allow them to speak with Laura alone. In Eva's presence, Laura gave the caseworkers the same explanation for her injuries, and the caseworkers did not observe any facial bruising. After speaking with another family member, APS closed the case and told the family friend that the report was unfounded. Richard subsequently called APS but was told that the report was investigated, that caseworkers did not find anything of concern, and that he should call with any new developments.

In November 2009, Laura ran away from home and was found at an abandoned Girl Scout camp by two Erie County Sheriff's deputies. Believing that Laura and Eva had a verbal altercation, and learning nothing to suggest that Laura should not be brought home, the deputies returned Laura to Eva's care.

In January 2010, Eva and Laura's brother, Luke Wright, tortured and murdered Laura in her home. Eva and Wright were convicted of various crimes and sentenced to lengthy prison terms (see People v. Wright, 107 A.D.3d 1398, 967 N.Y.S.2d 296 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1026, 992 N.Y.S.2d 809, 16 N.E.3d 1289 [2014] ). The public administrator of Laura's estate commenced these actions against the County of Erie and the Erie County Sheriff (defendants), alleging, among other things, that the CPS and APS caseworkers, as well as the Sheriff's deputies, were negligent in the performance of their duties, leading to Laura's death.

The parties moved for summary judgment, and Supreme Court denied both motions. The Appellate Division affirmed the order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment but reversed the order denying defendants’ motion and granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissing the complaints against them (see Maldovan v. County of Erie, 188 A.D.3d 1597, 134 N.Y.S.3d 594 [4th Dept. 2020] ; Maldovan v. County of Erie, 188 A.D.3d 1601, 132 N.Y.S.3d 349 [4th Dept. 2020] ). The Appellate Division concluded, as relevant here, that no special duty existed as a matter of law because "the fourth element [necessary to show a special relationship with the municipality], justifiable reliance, cannot be met in this case" ( Maldovan, 188 A.D.3d at 1598–1599, 134 N.Y.S.3d 594, 134 N.Y.S.3d ).

This Court granted plaintiff leave to appeal (37 N.Y.3d 911, 2020 WL 6688604 [2021]). We now affirm.

II.

When a negligence claim is asserted against a municipality acting in a governmental capacity, as here, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a special duty (see Ferreira v. City of Binghamton, 38 N.Y.3d 298, 308–310, 173 N.Y.S.3d 484, 194 N.E.3d 239 [2022] ; Turturro v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 477–478, 45 N.Y.S.3d 874, 68 N.E.3d 693 [2016] ). We have recognized that a special duty may arise in three situations: where "(1) the plaintiff belonged to a class for whose benefit a statute was enacted; (2) the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally; or (3) the municipality took positive control of a known and dangerous safety condition" ( Tara N.P. v. Western Suffolk Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 28 N.Y.3d 709, 714, 49 N.Y.S.3d 362, 71 N.E.3d 950 [2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Although plaintiff raises an argument before this Court based on the first method (statutory duty), that argument is unpreserved for appellate review. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendants voluntarily assumed a duty to Laura beyond that owed to the public generally. It is true, as the dissent notes, that in the bill of particulars plaintiff alleged a violation of Social Services Law § 473. Plaintiff does not assert, however, that he raised the issue of statutory duty either in support of plaintiff's own motion for summary judgment or in opposition to defendants’ motion, and the Appellate Division did not address the issue. We note that if, as the dissent concludes, this Court's decision in ( Mark G. v. Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d 710, 721–722, 695 N.Y.S.2d 730, 717 N.E.2d 1067 [1999] ) is distinguishable and the legislature had intended to create a private right of action in Social Services Law § 473(3), the legislature is of course free to make that intent clear (see dissenting op. at 191–195, –––– N.Y.S.3d at –––– – ––––, –––– N.E.3d at –––– – ––––).

Plaintiff also relies on the second method, which we have sometimes referred to as a "special relationship" (see Tara N.P., 28 N.Y.3d at 714, 49 N.Y.S.3d 362, 71 N.E.3d 950, 49 N.Y.S.3d ; Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 80, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587, 960 N.E.2d 356 [2011] ). We conclude, however, that defendants met their prima facie burden to demonstrate that they did not voluntarily assume a duty to Laura, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact in opposition.

As we have often stated, to establish that the government voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what it generally owes to the public, the plaintiff must establish:

" ‘(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking’ " ( Tara N.P., 28 N.Y.3d at 714–715, 49 N.Y.S.3d 362, 71 N.E.3d 950, 49 N.Y.S.3d, quoting Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 [1987] [emphasis omitted]).

"[A]ll four elements must be present for a special duty to attach" ( Tara N.P., 28 N.Y.3d at 715, 49 N.Y.S.3d 362, 71 N.E.3d 950, 49 N.Y.S.3d ).

We agree with the Appellate Division that under the circumstances presented here, defendants established as a matter of law that the government employees took no action that could have induced justifiable reliance, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. As we explained in Cuffy , the justifiable reliance element

"provides the essential causative link between the ‘special duty’ assumed by the municipality and the alleged injury. Indeed, at the heart of most of these ‘special duty’ cases is the unfairness that the courts have perceived in precluding recovery when a municipality's voluntary undertaking has lulled the injured party into a false sense of security and has thereby induced [the injured party] either to relax [their] own vigilance or to forego other available avenues of protection" ( Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 261, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 ).

Months before her death, both CPS and APS investigated the reports that Laura was being abused, concluded that those reports were unfounded, closed their investigations, and advised Richard that the investigations were closed and would not be reopened without new information. As the Appellate Division noted, Richard "did not in fact relax his own vigilance inasmuch as he made two follow-up calls to the APS caseworker asking her to reopen the investigation, and he was not induced to forego other avenues of relief" ( Maldovan, 188 A.D.3d at 1599, 134 N.Y.S.3d 594, 134 N.Y.S.3d ). Similarly, the Sheriff's deputies took no action that could have induced reliance.

Plaintiff asserts that the Cuffy factors for establishing a special duty assume that the injured person is a competent adult who is reasonably capable of pursuing other avenues...