Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1863
• Parties: Byron D. HARRIS, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

148 N.E.3d 1107

Byron D. HARRIS, Jr., Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-1863

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED May 13, 2020

Case Summary

[1] Byron Harris, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for attempted murder, a Level 1 felony. We reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] Harris raises one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether Harris' due process rights were violated when his mother was excluded from his trial as part of a witness separation order.¹

Facts

[3] Harris was born in January 2003. On June 10, 2018, Trestepfone Pryor was visiting friends at the River Run Apartments in Elkhart. Fifteen-year-old Harris and another man approached Pryor. Harris thought Pryor was a man named "Hershey," and Harris told his friend, "Yeah, I'm gonna shoot him and all that because he robbed me." Tr. Vol. II pp. 180-81. Pryor denied being Hershey and denied robbing Harris. Pryor saw that Harris had a gun "tucked" into his pants. Id. at 182.

[4] The next evening, on June 11, 2018, Pryor was standing in the playground of River Run Apartments talking to some people when Harris and several of his friends walked past. Harris was "mugging" Pryor, which means Harris was staring at Pryor or "[l]ooking hard" at Pryor. Id. at 185. One of the women Pryor was talking with said to Harris, "Why are you mugging? What's going on?" Id. at 214. Harris responded, "Shut the f*** up. This has nothing to do with you." Id. Harris then "fell on [a] car," drew his gun, and "fired shots" at Pryor. Id. at 178, 186. According to Pryor, Harris was wearing a "red hat." Id. at 187.

[5] Surveillance video in the apartment complex's parking lot shows four men entering the parking lot from the direction of the playground. One of the men, later identified as Harris, wore what appears to be a black sweatshirt with a red hood. He walked backwards, facing the playground. The man pulled a handgun from his waistband, hid behind a parked vehicle, and fired toward the playground. One of the other men, who was wearing black, also drew a weapon and fired toward the playground. The four men then ran away. Pryor suffered two gunshot wounds

to his lower right leg.

[6] The State filed a petition alleging that Harris, a juvenile, committed acts that would be attempted murder if committed by an adult, a Level 1 Felony, and aggravated battery if committed by an adult, a Level 3 felony. In August 2018, after a hearing, the juvenile court waived juvenile jurisdiction over the case to the Elkhart Circuit Court. In its order, the juvenile court noted that: (1) Harris was fifteen years old at the time of the offense; (2) Harris had been involved in the juvenile justice system for six years; (3) Harris had several juvenile delinquency adjudications, including acts that would be armed robbery, dangerous possession of a firearm, theft, pointing a firearm, and possession of marijuana if committed by an adult; (4) Harris had pending charges for acts that would be possession of methamphetamine, resisting law enforcement, and escape if committed by an adult; (5) Harris was "beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system"; and (6) Harris had received "a plethora of services" from the juvenile justice system, but he had not been placed at the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"). Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 20.

[7] The juvenile court noted that Harris' offenses had escalated in violence; he committed the instant offense after running from residential placement; and it was "in the best interest of the safety and welfare of the community" that Harris "stand trial as an adult." Id. The State then charged Harris with attempted murder, a Level 1 felony.

[8] At the June 2019 jury trial, Harris was sixteen years old. Before voir dire, the State requested a separation of witnesses order. Harris' mother, Twanna Warren, was listed as a witness in the State's fourth amended witness list. Harris objected and noted that Warren would like to be present at the trial as much as possible because Harris is a juvenile.² The trial court overruled Harris' objection. The State, however, never called Warren to testify during the trial. The jury found Harris guilty of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony.

[9] Harris filed a motion for alternative sentencing under Indiana Code Chapter 31-30-4, which the trial court denied. The trial court then sentenced Harris to thirty-seven years in the DOC with five years suspended to probation. Harris now appeals.

Analysis

[10] Harris argues that the trial court denied him due process when it barred Harris' mother from being present during the trial due to the separation of witnesses order.³ " ‘The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without the ‘process’ or ‘course of law’ that is due, that is, a fair proceeding.’ " Gingerich v. State , 979 N.E.2d 694, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Pigg v. State , 929 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied ), trans. denied . "Once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what process is due.’ " Id. "Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo." Hilligoss v. State , 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) ; R.R. v. State , 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018) ("Both the existence of constitutional rights and the requirements for waiving them are legal questions we review de novo.").

[11] Harris raises an issue of first impression—whether the parent of a juvenile waived to adult court is subject to a separation of witnesses order. "When determining whether a juvenile has a constitutional right that the Supreme Court of the United States has not expressly recognized, we will decide the question based on ‘our own judicial examination of the various cases, statutes, and constitutional principles pertinent thereto.’ " R.R. , 106 N.E.3d at 1040 (quoting Bible v. State , 253 Ind. 373, 378, 254 N.E.2d 319, 320 (1970) ).

[12] In general, a separation of witnesses order is governed by Indiana Evidence Rule 615. "The basic premise of Rule 615 is that, upon request of any party, witnesses should be insulated from the testimony of other witnesses." Long v. State , 743 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ind. 2001). Evidence Rule 615 provides:

At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony. Or the court may do so on its own. But this rule does not authorize excluding:

(a) a party who is a natural person;

(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after being designated as the party's representative by its attorney; or

(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense.

[13] Under Evidence Rule 615, a trial court is required to grant a motion for separation of witnesses. Hernandez v. State , 716 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis added). The determination of whether a witness qualifies for a Rule 615 exemption, however, is "within the trial court's discretion and is subject to review for an abuse of that discretion." Osborne v. State , 754 N.E.2d 916, 924 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Long , 743 N.E.2d at 256 ). " Rule 615's exemptions should be ‘narrowly construed and cautiously granted.’ " Id.

[14] Under the juvenile code, however, a juvenile's parent is a "part[y] to the proceedings described in the juvenile law and ha[s] all rights of parties provided under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure." Ind. Code § 31-37-10-7 ; see K.S. v. State , 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006). As such, the juvenile's parent falls under the Evidence Rule 615(a) exception for a party and cannot be excluded from juvenile proceedings. Accordingly, a juvenile's parent is "a party not covered by the order for a separation of witnesses." K.S. , 849 N.E.2d at 542-43. Here, however, because Harris was waived to adult criminal court, the juvenile code granting his parents party status in the juvenile proceeding no longer applied.

[15] Harris' parent did not fall under the exception in Rule 615 for a "party who is a natural person" or the exception for "an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, after being designated as the party's representative by its attorney." Evid. R. 615(a), (b). The only remaining exception is for "a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense." Evid. R. 615(c).

[16] In general, "[a] party seeking to exempt a witness from exclusion as ‘essential to the presentation of the party's cause’ under clause (3) must convince the trial court that the ‘witness has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge of the facts of the case that a party's attorney would not effectively function without the presence and aid of the witness.’ " Long , 743 N.E.2d at 256 (quoting Hernandez , 716 N.E.2d at 950 ). See Long , 743 N.E.2d at 257 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing an FBI agent to remain in the courtroom as an "essential" person in a complex investigation); Hernandez , 716 N.E.2d at 951 (holding that a prison guard, who was the only person that could assist in the cross-examination of inmates, was an "essential witness" under Rule 615 ); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. N. Texas Steel Co. , 752 N.E.2d 112, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("This exemption most frequently is employed for expert witnesses, who are believed to be less susceptible to the temptation to shape their testimony."), trans. denied . We must determine here whether the parent of a juvenile defendant waived to adult court is "essential" to the juvenile defendant's presentation of his defense.

[17] Harris argues that a juvenile lacks "maturity to adequately assess the gravity of the proceedings" despite the waiver to adult court. Appellant's Br. p. 14. According to Harris, the waiver to adult...