Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 24 March 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-546
• Citation: 165 N.E.3d 91
• Parties: Byron D. HARRIS, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

165 N.E.3d 91

Byron D. HARRIS, Jr., Appellant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee

Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-546

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: November 12, 2020

FILED March 24, 2021

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Elizabeth A. Bellin, Bellin Law Office, Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Benjamin J. Shoptaw, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A-CR-1863

Rush, Chief Justice.

Children as young as twelve can be tried as adults, exposing them to harsher sentences, such as lengthy incarceration. Today we examine whether such a child has the categorical right to have a parent present during criminal proceedings, even when the parent is a witness subject to a witness-separation order.

Here, fifteen-year-old Byron Harris, Jr., was waived into adult criminal court and ultimately convicted of attempted murder. Harris now asks us to reverse his conviction because his mother—as a witness—was not allowed to stay in the courtroom during his trial. He reasons both Evidence Rule 615 —the rule governing witness-separation orders—and due process principles require this result.

We hold that a child in adult criminal court may use Evidence Rule 615(c) to establish that a parent is "essential" to the presentation of the defense and is thus excluded from a witness-separation order. But Harris did not make the requisite showing under the rule, nor did he show he had a due process right. And because we reject his remaining sentencing arguments, we affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

In June 2018, eighth-grader Byron Harris, Jr. approached Trestepfone Pryor and accused Pryor of robbing him. Pryor denied the allegation, and Harris walked away. The next evening, Harris walked by Pryor and fired multiple shots from a handgun. Pryor was shot twice in the leg.

The State initially filed a delinquency petition against Harris but then requested the juvenile court waive jurisdiction over the case. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the request. The court noted that Harris's prior adjudications included serious and violent crimes like robbery, felony theft, possession of a firearm, pointing a firearm, and battery. It also determined that Harris's prior placements in the juvenile justice system had been ineffective. The State then charged Harris with attempted murder in adult criminal court.

Before trial, the State listed Harris's mother as a potential witness. And at trial, the State requested a separation-of-witnesses order. Harris—who had a history of learning disabilities and mental health problems—objected, requesting that "separation of witnesses should be taken up after voir dire" because his mother wanted "to be in the trial as much as possible." He added that "his parents would like to be present" since his trial was for "Attempted Murder, [a] Level 1 Felony." Harris, however, did not mention any right to have a parent present and never said he himself wanted his mother to be there. The court overruled the objection and ordered Harris's mother to leave the courtroom. The State never called her to testify.

After a three-day jury trial, Harris was found guilty of attempted murder. He was sentenced to thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction with five years suspended to probation.

Harris appealed; and a split panel reversed, holding that his due process rights were violated when his mother was excluded from the courtroom. Harris v. State , 148 N.E.3d 1107, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In so holding, the majority determined Harris's mother was "essential" to his defense and thus could not be excluded under Indiana Rule of Evidence 615(c), the rule governing witness-separation orders. Id. The dissent, on the other hand, would have concluded Harris waived any arguments related to his mother's presence, but that, waiver notwithstanding, there is no due process right of children to have a parent present in criminal court. Id. at 1115–16 (Vaidik, J., dissenting). Because the majority reversed Harris's conviction, the panel did not address Harris's additional arguments challenging his sentence. Id. at 1109 n.1 (majority opinion).

The State sought transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

The issues presented in this case implicate several different standards of review. We review de novo the legal questions of an evidentiary rule's scope and the existence of a constitutional right. R.R. v. State , 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018) ; In re D.J. , 68 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2017). But we review the trial court's application of an evidentiary rule for an abuse of discretion. Osborne v. State , 754 N.E.2d 916, 924 (Ind. 2001). Likewise, we review for abuse of discretion a trial court's decision on whether to apply an alternative sentencing scheme. Legg v. State , 22 N.E.3d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. And, finally, we determine whether a sentence is inappropriate by examining the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Knapp v. State , 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1291–92 (Ind. 2014).

Discussion and Decision

Indiana recognizes that children who commit crimes differ from offending adults in important ways: they are less culpable, more vulnerable, and have a greater capacity for rehabilitation. State v. Stidham , 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1194 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 471–72, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ). Accordingly, these offenders benefit from an informal and flexible juvenile justice system with a host of statutory protections unavailable to their adult counterparts. In re K.G. , 808 N.E.2d 631, 636–37 (Ind. 2004).

Under certain circumstances, however, a child may be tried as an adult in the criminal justice system. See, e.g. , Ind. Code § 31-30-1-4 (2020). In those cases, the proceedings are no longer governed by the juvenile code. Id. And so the child cannot invoke certain statutory protections, such as the right to meaningfully consult with a parent. See, e.g. , Philson v. State , 899 N.E.2d 14, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

As a child waived into adult court, Harris acknowledges he lost some rights that generally protect children in the juvenile system, but he argues that having a parent present is a protection that should persist for two reasons. He asserts that (1) a parent always falls under the "essential" exception to the rule governing separation-of-witness orders, Evidence Rule 615 ; and (2) as a child, he has a due process right to have his parent present for all stages of a criminal proceeding in which liberty interests are at stake. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

The State claims Harris waived these arguments by not adequately preserving them at trial. In addressing the substance of Harris's claims, however, the State concedes Rule 615(c) could be used, in some situations, to allow parents to remain in the courtroom but holds firm that a child in adult court has no due process right to have a parent present.

As explained below, we agree that Evidence Rule 615 ’s "essential" exception provides a procedural mechanism to allow a parent-witness to remain in the courtroom despite a witness-separation order. The exception, however, is not categorical. To invoke it, a child defendant must make a proper showing; and, here, the record reveals Harris did not do so. Likewise, Harris did not properly raise a due process argument, so we need not consider whether there is an absolute constitutional right to have a parent-witness present throughout a child's criminal trial. Finally, we reject Harris's remaining arguments challenging his sentence.

I. Although children in adult criminal court may use Evidence Rule 615(c) to establish that a parent is "essential" to the presentation of their defense, Harris failed to make this showing.

Separating witnesses from each other promotes the truthfulness of their testimony. See Harrington v. State , 584 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ind. 1992) ; Morell v. State , 933 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). It ensures memories aren't tainted by hearing others testify and denies witnesses the opportunity to shape their testimony to match or contradict what others have said. Harrington , 584 N.E.2d at 562.

Indiana Rule of Evidence 615 guarantees these truth-seeking benefits to parties.

A. Rule 615 ’s essential-witness exception may allow a juvenile defendant's parent to remain in the courtroom despite a separation order.

Rule 615 provides that a court must exclude witnesses at a party's request or may do so on its own so that witnesses "cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony." Id. But to ensure parties can effectively prove or defend their cases, judges also have the discretion to find that an exception to Rule 615 applies. Osborne , 754 N.E.2d at 924. There are three: (1) for a party who is a natural person; (2) for a party's officer or employee if the party is not a natural person; and (3) for "a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party's claim or defense." Evid. R. 615 (a)–(c).

Of the three exceptions, only the last was potentially available to Harris's mother. Though we are mindful that exceptions must be "narrowly construed and cautiously granted" to preserve the benefits of separation, Long v. State, 743 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ind. 2001), we find the exception may be available for the parent of a child tried in the adult criminal justice system. Specifically, it applies if the juvenile defendant can show the parent has a "unique ability" to assist in the presentation of the defense based on the parent's intimate knowledge of the child or capacity to support the child during the proceedings. We explain in detail below.

As a threshold matter, the phrase "essential to presenting the party's claim or defense" is not limited to any certain type of person. See Evid. R. 615(c). While the...