Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. E2005-00566-SC-R11-PC.,E2005-00566-SC-R11-PC.
• Citation: 301 S.W.3d 141
• Parties: Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

301 S.W.3d 141 Ricky HARRIS
v.
STATE of Tennessee. No. E2005-00566-SC-R11-PC. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. January 6, 2009 Session. January 14, 2010.

[301 S.W.3d 142]

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; Joe Crumley, District Attorney General; and Kenneth C. Baldwin, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

Sonya Slaughter Helm, Bristol, Tennessee, for the appellee, Ricky Harris.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined. WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in result, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., joined.

We granted the State's appeal to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis and remanding for a determination of whether due process requires tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. We conclude that the delay in seeking coram nobis relief is unreasonable as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case, and therefore due process considerations do not preclude application of the statute of limitations to bar the petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals

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and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

On March 1, 1988, a jury found the petitioner, Ricky Harris, guilty of first degree murder. On May 4, 1988, the trial court denied Mr. Harris's motion for a new trial and entered a judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Harris, No. 85, 1990 WL 171507 (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov.8, 1990), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 4, 1991). In 1992, Mr. Harris sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel were ineffective and that the State withheld exculpatory evidence. The trial court's denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed on appeal. Harris v. State, No. 03C01-9611-CR-00410, 1998 WL 191441 (Tenn.Crim. App. Apr.23, 1998), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 7, 1998).

On December 10, 1998, just three days after this Court denied Mr. Harris's application for permission to appeal, Mr. Harris filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleging that the State had failed to disclose the identity of a purported alibi witness named Corrine Hampton. Mr. Harris asserted that he became aware of Ms. Hampton when he received an anonymous letter in response to an August 1998 newspaper advertisement seeking information about his case. The letter stated that Ms. Hampton told an unidentified officer that a man resembling Mr. Harris helped her when she had car trouble on September 8, 1987, at approximately 8:25 a.m. She saw nothing suspicious inside his car or trunk and followed him to the car dealership where he worked. These events allegedly occurred during the time when Mr. Harris was murdering the victim and disposing of her body according to the State's theory of the crime. The trial court denied the motion to reopen, ruling that the motion did not state a cognizable ground for reopening the post-conviction petition.¹

On appeal, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals sua sponte treated the motion to reopen as a petition for writ of error coram nobis and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits. After granting the State's application for permission to appeal, this Court held that Mr. Harris did not state a cognizable ground for reopening his post-conviction petition. Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tenn. 2003). A majority of the Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in sua sponte treating the motion to reopen as a petition for writ of error coram nobis, although members of the majority disagreed on the reasoning used to reach this conclusion. Id. at 594. Two members of the Court dissented, stating that Mr. Harris's motion asserted a prima facie case for coram nobis relief and raised grounds requiring that the one-year coram nobis statute of limitations be tolled under due process principles. Id. at 596 (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

On March 11, 2004, almost eleven months after this Court's opinion, Mr. Harris filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. He based the petition on two items of purportedly newly discovered evidence. The first item related to the potential alibi witness, Ms. Hampton. Mr. Harris asserted that he did not become aware of the exculpatory nature of the evidence from Ms. Hampton until his private investigator contacted her in 1998.

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The second item related to someone named "Bill" who in June 1991, approximately three years after the trial, had sent the District Attorney General letters confessing to the murder and absolving Mr. Harris. Although the "Bill" letters had been given to Mr. Harris's trial counsel in June 1991, Mr. Harris contended that he did not obtain evidence proving the exculpatory nature of the letters until he received a handwriting expert's June 2002 report identifying their author.

The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court concluded that Mr. Harris was not entitled to coram nobis relief because his claims did not involve newly discovered evidence because he knew of Ms. Hampton at the time of his trial and the "Bill" letters were an issue as early as the original post-conviction proceeding. The trial court also ruled that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The intermediate appellate court remanded the case for a hearing to determine: (1) whether due process considerations require tolling of the statute of limitations; (2) whether the alibi evidence is credible; and (3) whether the third-party confession evidence is newly discovered.

We granted the State's application for permission to appeal.

Analysis

A proceeding in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis is available to convicted defendants in criminal cases. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-26-105(a) (2006). Whether to grant or deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis on its merits rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527-28 (Tenn.2007). Coram nobis claims may be based on newly discovered evidence:

Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b).

Coram nobis claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103 (2000) ("The writ of error coram nobis may be had within one (1) year after the judgment becomes final. . . ."). The statute of limitations is computed from the date the judgment of the trial court becomes final, either thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn.1999). Whether a claim is barred by an applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which we review de novo. Brown v. Erachem Comilog, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tenn.2007). We construe the coram nobis statute of limitations consistent with the longstanding rule that persons seeking relief under the writ must exercise due diligence in presenting the claim. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670. The State bears the burden of raising the bar of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Harris, 102 S.W.3d at 593.

In this case, the State appropriately raised the statute of limitations in the trial court. Id.; see Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn.1995). The trial court ruled that the petition was time-barred. The State has not relied on the statute of limitations in this Court, arguing instead that

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the trial court properly denied coram nobis relief on the merits. This Court is not compelled, however, to accept a concession by the State in this regard. Barron v. State Dept. of Human Serv., 184 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tenn.2006). The threshold question for determination, therefore, is whether Mr. Harris's petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

When a petitioner seeks a writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, due process considerations may require tolling of the statute of limitations. Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tenn.2001). These due process considerations refer to the principle that "before a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn.1992). Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn.2006).

To determine whether due process requires tolling, a court must weigh the petitioner's interest in obtaining a hearing to present a later-arising ground for relief against the State's interest in preventing stale and groundless claims. Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 103. In balancing these interests, a court should utilize a three-step analysis:

(1) determine when the limitations period would normally have begun to run;

(2) determine whether the grounds for relief...