Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 01 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-CP-00804-COA,2019-CP-00804-COA |
| Citation | 313 So.3d 500 |
| Parties | Marcus Herbert HARRIS a/k/a Marcus Harris a/k/a Marcus H. Harris, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARCUS HERBERT HARRIS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD, Jackson
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In 2011, Marcus Harris pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated assault. The Jackson County Circuit Court sentenced Harris to serve a life sentence for his murder conviction and a twenty-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).
¶2. More than three years later, Harris filed a petition to clarify his sentence, which the trial court treated as a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). The trial court denied Harris's motion. In 2018, Harris filed his second PCR motion, which the trial court denied as time-barred and without merit.
¶3. Harris now appeals from the trial court's order denying his PCR motion. After our review, we find that Harris's PCR motion is time-barred and successive-writ barred. We also find that Harris's claims of fundamental-rights violations are without merit. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying Harris's PCR motion.
FACTS
¶4. On December 26, 2009, Harris was involved in an altercation that resulted in the fatal shooting of Sema Hall and permanent paralysis of Willie Williams. As a result of the altercation, Harris was indicted for capital murder, with robbery as the underlying charge, and aggravated assault. Harris entered a plea of not guilty, and the matter proceeded to trial. After opening statements,1 Harris withdrew his not-guilty plea, and on March 1, 2011, he pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated assault. Harris received a life sentence for his murder conviction and a twenty-year sentence for his aggravated-assault conviction in the custody of the MDOC. The trial court also ordered Harris to pay a $5,000 fine for each conviction, as well as all court costs.
¶5. On July 31, 2014, more than three years after pleading guilty, Harris filed a petition to clarify his sentence. After reviewing Harris's petition and the State's response, the trial court entered an order denying relief, finding that Harris's sentence was unambiguous. Harris appealed from the trial court's denial of his petition. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Harris v. State , 230 So. 3d 718, 719 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). This Court held that "Harris's petition to clarify his sentence falls within the purview of postconviction relief, as Harris asserts that his sentence is ambiguous." Id . at 720 (¶5) (citing Laneri v. State , 167 So. 3d 274, 277 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ). This Court acknowledged that "Harris did not explicitly file a PCR motion in the circuit court" but explained that Id . This Court ruled that because Harris pleaded guilty in March 2011, "his PCR motion is time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), as he filed his motion more than three years after the entry of his judgment of conviction." Id .2
¶6. On May 21, 2018, Harris filed a second PCR motion. That same day, Harris also filed a motion for discovery and for an expansion of the record. In his PCR motion, Harris set forth the following claims: (1) no factual basis for his guilty plea existed; (2) his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) he did not voluntarily and intelligently enter his guilty plea; (4) his indictment was defective and deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction; and (5) the trial court violated Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 8.04 by participating in plea discussions. In his motion for discovery and expansion of the record, Harris argued that he needed additional documents to prove his PCR claims, including the transcript from the trial (in which only voir dire and opening statements were completed prior to Harris deciding to enter a plea of guilty); the surveillance video from the December 2009 shooting; the transcript of the plea hearing; and all thirty-eight letters he wrote to the trial court complaining about his public defenders and the conditions of the jail.
¶7. The trial court entered an order on January 3, 2019, denying Harris's PCR motion. The trial court held that Harris's PCR motion was time-barred and without merit. The trial court explained that it "reviewed the transcripts of both the guilty plea and the opening statements made at trial, guilty plea petition, sentencing order, the [PCR motion] and applicable law[,] and determined that no evidentiary hearing was necessary." The trial court stated that Harris's PCR motion was time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) because Harris failed to file his PCR motion within three years after his conviction. The trial court further found that Harris failed to show that his PCR claims involve one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar or an error affecting a fundamental constitutional right. However, the trial court stated that "[d]espite the absence of affidavits or other evidentiary support for the [m]otion or a showing of good cause for the absence of proof, the [c]ourt will address each of Harris’[s] assignments of error in an abundance of caution."
¶8. As to Harris's claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court explained that "Harris contends his counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to a defective indictment, failed to investigate the underlying facts of the case, including Harris’[s] claim of self-defense, and he allowed Harris to plead guilty with no factual basis to support the plea." The trial court found that "Harris’[s] attorney performed competently and Harris has failed in showing, had he completed his trial, that the outcome would have been different." The trial court also found that "Harris’[s] attorney negotiated with the State to reduce the capital murder charge to murder which included the opportunity for release and significantly reduced time in prison."
¶9. The trial court also found no merit to Harris's claim that no factual basis existed for the trial court to accept his guilty plea, explaining that The trial court also found that "[t]he State was prepared to prove the robbery element of the capital murder charge with the store surveillance video that showed Harris leaving the crime scene with the gun he used to kill one victim and permanently injure the other."
¶10. Regarding Harris's claim that his plea was involuntary, the trial court found that
¶11. As to Harris's claim that his indictment was defective because it contained only the statute for robbery, not capital murder, and thus "deprived the [trial] [c]ourt of subject matter jurisdiction[,]" the trial court found that "[t]his issue is without merit as the indictment clearly contains the correct capital murder statute."
¶12. The trial court also found no merit to Harris's final assignment of error—that the trial court had improperly participated in plea discussions. The trial court explained that "[o]ther than Harris’[s] own bare assertion, there is nothing in his pleadings or the record to support such a contention."
¶13. On May 6, 2019, Harris filed his notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying his PCR motion.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14. "When reviewing a trial court's denial or dismissal of a [PCR motion], we will only disturb the trial court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous; however, we review legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Chapman v. State , 167 So. 3d 1170, 1172 (¶3) (Miss. 2015).
DISCUSSION
¶15. On appeal, Harris argues that the trial court erred in denying his PCR motion. In support of his argument, Harris lists the same assignments of error and arguments from his PCR motion, and he additionally asserts that he was entitled to discovery and expansion of the record. The State maintains that Harris's PCR motion is time-barred and successive-writ barred.
¶16. Harris filed his PCR motion on May 21, 2018, approximately seven years after he pleaded guilty. Because Harris failed to file his PCR motion within three years after the entry of the judgment of conviction, the trial court properly found that Harris's motion is time-barred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) ().
¶17. The Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) also prohibits the filing of a successive motion: "[A] motion filed after entry of a final judgment that asserts the same issues is procedurally barred as [successive]." McComb v. State , 135 So. 3d 928, 931 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015). As stated, Harris's first PCR motion was a request to clarify his sentence based on his belief that the circuit clerk's docket summary revealed that the crime he had been indicted for, and the sentence he received, had been reduced. Harris , 230 So. 3d at 720 (¶3). Harris's second PCR motion, which is currently before this Court, sets forth various assignments of error relating to his guilty plea, ...
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