Wallace v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CP-01149-COA,C/w : 2019-CT-01735-COA |
| Citation | 350 So.3d 644 |
| Parties | Adam Brent WALLACE, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ADAM BRENT WALLACE (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In May 2014, a Lamar County grand jury indicted Adam Brent Wallace on one count of child exploitation occurring "on or about 24 March 2011," in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-33(5) (Supp. 2007). On September 28, 2018, Wallace pleaded guilty to that charge. The Lamar County Circuit Court sentenced Wallace to a term of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with five years to serve and five years suspended on post-release supervision. Wallace, pro se, filed his first petition for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) in 2018, which the circuit court summarily dismissed. Wallace appealed and this Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of Wallace's first PCR petition. Wallace v. State , 312 So. 3d 1202, 1205 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), cert. denied , 312 So. 3d 729 (Miss. 2021) ( Wallace I ).
¶2. In June 2021, Wallace filed his second PCR petition, which the circuit court also summarily dismissed. Wallace now appeals the dismissal of his second PCR petition. Restated for clarity, Wallace raises the following issues: (1) his guilty plea was without a factual basis and was involuntary; (2) the indictment was defective for failure to include the essential elements of the crime charged; and (3) his plea counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the State's proffered evidence or raise a speedy-trial claim. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Wallace's second PCR petition.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶3. On May 22, 2014, Wallace was indicted by a Lamar County grand jury on one count of child exploitation pursuant to section 97-5-33(5). The record reflects that at the time he was indicted, Wallace was incarcerated in a federal prison on different charges. At Wallace's plea hearing, his attorney explained to the trial court that Wallace had been released from federal custody directly to Lamar County on April 6, 2018, and held in the Lamar County jail. Wallace's guilty plea hearing was held on September 28, 2018.
¶4. After conducting Wallace's plea hearing, the trial court accepted his guilty plea. Details of Wallace's guilty plea petition and the plea colloquy are discussed below. The court sentenced Wallace to ten years, with five years to serve and five years suspended on post-release supervision.
¶5. Wallace filed his first PCR petition in 2018, followed by supplemental filings, in which he asserted:
(1) the circuit court violated his rights by failing to rule on his pre-trial motions for a speedy trial violation, suppressing evidence and statements, and infringing his right to self-representation; (2) his guilty plea was not voluntary because he entered his plea based upon a recommendation from the State that contained an illegal sentence; and (3) the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to accept his plea.
Wallace I , 312 So. 3d at 1203 (¶1). The circuit court denied and summarily dismissed Wallace's PCR petition pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2015). Id. On appeal, Wallace challenged only the "illegal sentence recommendation." Id. "Finding no error, [this Court] affirmed the circuit court's judgment." Id.
¶6. Wallace then filed his second PCR petition, which is the subject of this appeal. Following the filing of his second PCR petition, Wallace filed two more supplemental PCR petitions and a supporting memorandum. The circuit court treated all of Wallace's filings as his second PCR petition. Wallace asserted that: (1) his sentence had expired; (2) he was denied the right to counsel in that he received "no meaningful assistance" from his attorney and his attorney did not "assert a constitutional right to [a] speedy trial claim"; (3) the trial court failed to place the State's sentence recommendation on the record in violation of Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.4(b) ; (4) there was no factual basis to support his guilty plea and it was not voluntary; and (5) the indictment was defective for failure to allege an essential element of the crime.1
¶7. On October 11, 2021, the circuit court denied and summarily dismissed Wallace's second PCR petition under section 99-39-11(2).2 Relating to the issues Wallace now raises on appeal, the circuit court found that Wallace's guilty plea was supported by a factual basis, including the facts presented by the State at Wallace's plea hearing, the wording of the indictment, and Wallace's affirmations under oath with respect to this information. Additionally, the circuit court found that Wallace entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently as shown by the plea hearing transcript.
¶8. Regarding Wallace's indictment, the circuit court found that it was not defective, but rather it "tracks with the [child exploitation] statute and satisfies the requirements of MRCrP Rule 14.l(a)," and "Wallace affirmed during his plea that he had read and understood the charge against him."
¶9. Lastly, the circuit court found that Wallace's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was barred as a successive writ and no exception applied. The circuit court also found that this claim failed on the merits because Wallace made no argument "that ‘but for’ his attorney's performance he suffered prejudice, nor that he would not have entered a plea," he attached no corroborating affidavit(s) to his PCR petition to support his claim, and he "contradict[ed] his claim by his sworn answers in his plea colloquy[.]"
¶10. Wallace appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11. "A trial court's denial of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be reversed unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous." Wallace I , 312 So. 3d at 1204 (¶4). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶12. This appeal stems from the dismissal of Wallace's second PCR petition related to the guilty plea Wallace entered on the child exploitation charge against him. The Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) prohibits the filing of a successive motion, as follows: " Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2020) (emphasis added). As the petitioner, Wallace must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that his claims are not barred as successive writs." Salter v. State , 184 So. 3d 944, 948 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(7).
¶13. The PCR petition that is the subject of this appeal is Wallace's second PCR petition and is plainly successive. Further, each of the issues that Wallace raised in this successive petition could have been raised in his first PCR petition. For this reason, these issues are also "barred by ordinary principles of res judicata[.]" Harris v. State , 313 So. 3d 500, 506 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). As this Court has explained, "since successive motions are not allowed, ‘a person who requests post[-]conviction relief is obligated to place before the court all claims known to him and/or of which he should have had knowledge.’ " Id. (quoting Nichols v. State , 265 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) ). "The failure to do so results in a loss of his claims for a second or successive petition." Id.
¶14. We acknowledge, however, that "errors affecting fundamental rights may be excepted from procedural bars," Reardon v. State , 341 So. 3d 1004, 1011 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Rowland v. State , 42 So. 3d 503, 505-06 (¶7) (Miss. 2010) ), including "the right to be free from an illegal sentence," and, "in extraordinary circumstances, the right to effective assistance of counsel[.]" Id. (quoting Creel v. State , 305 So. 3d 417, 421 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) ). Wallace asserts that his sentence is "illegal" because his guilty plea was "without a factual basis" and involuntary. Wallace also asserts that his indictment failed to charge essential elements of the child exploitation charge against him. Lastly, Wallace asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We address each of these assertions in turn.
¶15. Wallace asserts that there was no factual basis for his guilty plea and that it was involuntary. See MRCrP 15.3(c) (). We find that both assertions are without merit for the reasons addressed below.
¶16. "A factual basis for a guilty plea may be established in a number of ways, including by a statement of the prosecutor ... as well as an actual admission by the defendant[.]" Turner v. State , 864 So. 2d 288, 292 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Also, if the indictment is sufficiently specific, it can provide the sole source of the factual basis for a guilty plea. Woods v. State , 302 So. 3d 218, 220 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). This Court considers the entire record in considering whether a factual basis exists. Williams v. State , 110 So. 3d 840, 843 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
¶17. We find that a sufficient factual basis supporting Wallace's guilty plea was established in three ways: (1) the wording of the indictment; (2) the statement of the prosecutor regarding the expected evidence in this case; and (3) Wallace's own admission at his plea hearing.
¶18. Wallace was charged with...
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