Harris v. State, 33501

• Decision Date: 23 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 33501,33501,2
• Citation: 65 S.E.2d 267,84 Ga.App. 1
• Parties: HARRIS v. STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 267

65 S.E.2d 267

84 Ga.App. 1

HARRIS v. STATE.

No. 33501.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

May 23, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court

Where demand for trial was properly made at the regular July term, 1950, of the City Court of Lyons County, during an adjourned session which convened September 11, 1950, and at which term there was a competent jury impaneled to try the defendant, but the State postponed the case, and where at the next regular term, October 1950, a competent jury was impaneled, but the case was not called for trial by the State, it was error for the trial judge at the succeeding regular January Term 1951 of such court to overrule the motion of the defendant that, pursuant to said demand for trial previously allowed by the court, he be discharged and acquitted of the charges against him.

An accusation was sworn out on September 5, 1950, in the City Court of Lyons charging Melvin Harris with a misdemeanor. Thereafter, the regular July, 1950 adjourned term of said city court convened on September 11, 1950, and the defendant was present therein with his counsel and upon the call of the case announced ready for trial but the State postponed the case due to the absence of a principal witness. There was a jury impaneled at said court competent to try the defendant. Thereupon, the defendant made a demand for trial, which was approved by the Judge of said court on said date of September 11, 1950. The next regular term of said court convened on the fourth Monday in October, 1950, and thereat a competent jury was impaneled and qualified to try the defendant. Said case was not called for trial nor disposed of in any manner by the court at said October term, 1950. At the next regular term of said court, which convened on January 23, 1951, the defendant made a written motion in which he set up the facts and moved that the charge against him be dismissed and that he be discharged and acquitted and an entry to such effect be made on the minutes of the court. After argument the trial judge overruled and denied said motion and refused to discharge the defendant. To this judgment the defendant excepts to this court.

A. L. Layne, T. Ross Sharpe, Lyons, for plaintiff in error.

G. H. Williams, Sol., Lyons, for defendant in error.

GARDNER, Judge.

It is the well established and salutary policy of our system of jurisprudence to give to persons accused of crime not only a trial by an impartial jury, but that such person shall have a 'speedy trial.' The constitution of Georgia provides this.

For a similar provision in the Federal Constitution see Amend. 6, Code, § 1-806. Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 5, Code, § 2-105. Therefore, our General Assembly has provided that every person against whom a bill of indictment is found shall be tried at the term of court at which the indictment is found, unless the absence of a material witness or the principles of justice require a postponement of the trial, and then the court shall allow a postponement until the next term. See Code, § 27-2002. In keeping with this policy of our law, it has been provided by statute that an accused person may demand such trial.

Code, § 27-1901, provides as follows: 'Any person against whom a true bill of indictment is found for an offense not affecting his life may demand at either the term when the indictment is found, or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter, a trial; or, by special permission of the court, he may at any subsequent term thereafter demand a trial. In either case the demand for trial shall be placed upon the minutes of the court. If such person shall not be tried when the demand is made, or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter, provided at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment.' The term succeeding that at which the demand is granted by the judge is the next regular term as fixed by the above statute. Nix v. State, 5 Ga.App. 835, 63 S.E. 926. The language of the statute is 'imperative and admits of no exceptions.' Trial or acquittal are the only alternatives. See Durham v. State, 9 Ga. 306(2). The state is bound to try the defendant or ...