State v. Stidham

• Decision Date: 17 November 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 20S-PC-634
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Respondent), v. Matthew STIDHAM, Appellee (Petitioner).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

157 N.E.3d 1185

STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Respondent),

v.Matthew STIDHAM, Appellee (Petitioner).

Supreme Court Case No. 20S-PC-634

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: February 27, 2020

Filed November 17, 2020

Rehearing denied January 12, 2021

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 18A02-1701-PC-68

Goff, Justice.

Seventeen-year-old Matthew Stidham and two others committed a brutal murder and several other crimes in 1991. For these crimes committed as a juvenile, Stidham received a total sentence of 138 years—the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. In 1994, a narrow majority of this Court affirmed the appropriateness of the sentence on appeal and declined to exercise the Court's constitutional authority to review and revise sentences.

In this post-conviction proceeding, we find the extraordinary circumstances required to revisit our prior decision on the appropriateness of Stidham's sentence. Two major shifts in the law—one easing the standard by which we exercise our power to review and revise sentences and another limiting the applicability of the most severe sentences to children—render suspect Stidham's maximum sentence for crimes he committed as a juvenile. So, we reconsider the appropriateness of Stidham's sentence in light of the nature of the offenses and Stidham's character. In doing so, we note the brutal nature of these crimes. However, we also recognize Stidham's steps toward rehabilitation and the impact of the abuse and neglect he suffered earlier in his childhood. Most importantly, we reinforce the basic notion that juveniles are different from adults when it comes to sentencing and are generally less deserving of the harshest punishments. We ultimately conclude that the maximum 138-year sentence imposed on Stidham for crimes he committed as a juvenile is inappropriate, and we revise it to an aggregate sentence of 88 years.

Factual and Procedural History

Stidham had a difficult childhood. As the probation officer put it in his pre-sentence investigation report, Stidham "was raised in a dysfunctional family" and "was shuffled from pillar to post like a hot potato." Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1, p. 243.

Stidham's first twelve years of life consisted of relatively frequent movement between family members, neglect, and abuse. From about age five to age nine, Stidham lived with his father and first stepmother, and during that time welfare authorities were involved with the family on neglect referrals. Later, from about age eleven through age twelve, he lived with his father and second stepmother and suffered severe abuse at the hands of his second stepmother. She would regularly punish Stidham and his brothers by locking them in and out of the house, hitting them with pans and paddles, punching them, kicking them, and choking them. On one occasion she punished Stidham for having scissors in his room by stabbing him in the chest with the scissors.¹ And on multiple occasions, she punished pre-teen Stidham for failing to clean up after the family dogs by alternatively smearing the dogs' feces in his face or making him eat the dogs' feces. This abuse eventually resulted in the boys' removal from the home. A later child-in-need-of-services report would conclude that Stidham "suffered no permanent physical damage from the injuries he received, however, he carries deep emotional scars which come out as anger, hatred, and defiance toward authority figures." Id. at 241 (citation omitted).

After experiencing this neglect and abuse, Stidham ping-ponged between placements with family members and stints in juvenile facilities from age thirteen through age seventeen. In these five years, his placements changed at least nine times, and he attended several different schools. During this time, he also began collecting juvenile adjudications, most of which involved running away or escaping from his residential placement. The State ultimately terminated wardship of Stidham when he was seventeen. All this culminated in the horrific events underlying this case.

One night in February of 1991, seventeen-year-old Stidham and several friends went to Daniel Barker's apartment to drink whiskey and play guitar. At some point, Stidham and Barker got into a fight, and the others at the apartment joined Stidham in beating Barker. They then gagged Barker and forced him toward his van, which they had loaded with some of his possessions. Barker tried to flee, but Stidham hit him with a wooden club and put him in the van. The group then drove the loaded van to a remote bank of the Mississinewa River. There, they stabbed Barker forty-seven times and threw his body in the river. The group left the scene in Barker's van, told friends of their brutal murder, and drove to Illinois where police arrested them.

Upon returning to Indiana, the State charged Stidham with murder, Class A felony robbery, Class B felony criminal confinement, Class C felony battery, and Class D felony auto theft. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to the maximum aggregate term of 141 years, resulting from consecutive sentences of 60 years for murder, 50 years for robbery, 20 years for criminal confinement, 8 years for battery, and 3 years for auto theft. On direct appeal, this Court ruled that certain evidence had been improperly admitted at trial, reversed the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. Stidham v. State (Stidham I ), 608 N.E.2d 699, 700–01 (Ind. 1993).

On retrial, a jury again found Stidham guilty of the five charges, and the trial court again sentenced him to the maximum 141-year term. Stidham appealed, and this Court affirmed each conviction except auto theft, finding that it should have merged with the robbery charge. Stidham v. State (Stidham II ), 637 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1994). In largely affirming the trial court, a majority of this Court rejected Stidham's argument that his sentence was "unreasonable" and "disproportionate to the crime committed." Id. However, Justices Sullivan and DeBruler dissented on this point. Relying on the fact that Stidham was a juvenile at the time of the crimes as well as the extensive child abuse he suffered, these two Justices would have revised the trial court's 141-year sentence down to 60 years by running the sentences for each crime concurrently. Id. (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting). But in the end, Stidham was left with a 138-year sentence for the crimes he committed as a juvenile.

In February of 2016, Stidham filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief. He challenged the propriety of imposing the maximum term-of-years sentence on him for crimes committed as a juvenile, relying on provisions of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, cases from the Supreme Court of the United States discussing constitutional limitations on juvenile sentences, and cases from this Court revising maximum sentences imposed on juveniles. He submitted evidence of his activities between his first trial and his retrial as well as evidence of his activities since his retrial, which he argued showed his potential for rehabilitation at sentencing and his actual rehabilitation since then.

The post-conviction court granted Stidham's petition. Although it described Stidham's crimes as "heinous," it relied on precedent from both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court that applied relatively recent scientific research on juvenile development to find that Stidham's "sentence was excessive in light of his age at the time of the offense." Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 51–52. After an intervening appeal and a subsequent hearing, the post-conviction court resentenced Stidham to the same maximum terms for each offense as before—60 years for murder, 50 years for robbery, 20 years for criminal confinement, and 8 years for battery—but it did not order each term to be served consecutively. Instead, it provided that Stidham would serve the terms for robbery and criminal confinement concurrent to the term for murder and the term for battery consecutive to the other terms. Thus, the post-conviction court imposed an aggregate 68-year sentence.

The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. State v. Stidham (Stidham III ), 110 N.E.3d 410, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). A majority of the Court of Appeals panel concluded that the doctrine of res judicata barred Stidham's challenge to his sentence because this Court had considered and resolved the same issue in Stidham II . Id. at 420. The majority went on to find that, to the extent Stidham's challenge relied on his improvements since his retrial, he sought an improper sentence modification because he had not obtained the consent of the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 420–21 (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(k) (2015) ). Judge May concurred in the result. She noted that, despite res judicata, a court can revisit a prior decision under certain circumstances. Id. at 421 (May, J., concurring in result). And, as Stidham did in his petition for post-conviction relief, she quoted at length from this Court's precedent discussing the unique factors involved when considering the propriety of a maximum sentence for a juvenile. Id. at 421–23 (quoting Brown v. State , 10 N.E.3d 1, 6–8 (Ind. 2014) ). See also Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 8 (same). However, because the Court of Appeals cannot revisit decisions of this Court, she admittedly could not reach the merits to consider the appropriateness of Stidham's sentence, so she concurred in the result of the majority's ruling. 110 N.E.3d at 423.

Stidham petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

When the State appeals from a grant of post-conviction relief, we apply the clearly-erroneous standard of review. State v. Oney , 993 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) ). Under this standard, we reverse the post-conviction court's judgment "only...