Harris v. Tunica Cnty.
| Decision Date | 29 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 3:14-cv-00218-MPM-SAA |
| Parties | RICO F. HARRIS PLAINTIFF v. TUNICA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and CALVIN K. ("K.C.") HAMP, SR., In his Individual Capacity DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Calvin K. Hamp, Sr.'s ("Sheriff Hamp") Motion to Dismiss ("the Motion") [51][54]. Plaintiff Rico F. Harris ("Harris") filed a Response in Opposition ("the Response") [63][64]. Thereafter, Sheriff Hamp filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Response ("the Reply") [68]. The Court has considered the Motion, Response, and Reply, as well as relevant case law and evidence, and is now prepared to rule.
Harris asserts claims against Tunica County, Mississippi, ("Tunica County") and Sheriff Hamp, in his individual capacity, based upon events giving rise to Harris's termination from the Tunica County Sheriff's Department ("TCSD"). The Court previously considered Harris's claims against Tunica County in its Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment [75]. The Court now turns to Harris's claims against Sheriff Hamp. In its present posture, this case consists of the following claims by Harris against Sheriff Hamp: (1) violation of free speech rights protected by the First Amendment and (2) malicious interference with employment under state law. Having considered the arguments made by the parties and the authorities cited therein, the Court finds that the Motion should be partially granted.
In 2005, the plaintiff, Rico F. Harris, was hired as a patrolman by TCSD. In August 2013, after a series of promotions, Harris became Captain of Investigations, the position he held for the remainder of his employment with TCSD.
In 2011, Bernadette Logan ("Detective Logan") was hired by TCSD as a patrol officer and was thereafter assigned to the detective division. Harris contends Sheriff Hamp developed a practice of providing Detective Logan and other female employees preferential treatment.
On May 11, 2013, TCSD was alerted to suspicious activity at an apartment occupied by Rosemary Jones Brown. Harris and Detective Logan were both dispatched to the apartment complex to investigate. The investigation quickly revealed that Brown was deceased and had apparently been murdered. Physical evidence at the scene connected Gloria Logan, Detective Logan's mother, to the crime. Thus, Gloria Logan became the primary suspect in the case. Upon becoming aware of her mother's potential involvement, Detective Logan recused herself from the case.
Thereafter, Harris voiced his concern to Sheriff Hamp, Commander Cedric Davis, and Chief Deputy Randy Stewart that TCSD should not investigate the murder because there was a clear conflict of interest, recommending that Sheriff Hamp refer the case to the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation ("MBI"). Harris contends Sheriff Hamp informed him that TCSD would not recuse itself because he did not believe a conflict of interest existed. In contrast, in his deposition, Sheriff Hamp testified that he contacted MBI but was informed that MBI did not have anyone available to investigate the case. However, Peter Clinton, the Lieutenant in charge of the MBI Batesville District during May 2013, stated in an affidavit that MBI was nevercontacted concerning the case. Nevertheless, TCSD did not recuse, and Harris served as the lead investigator on the case.
On the day of the murder, Harris called the District Attorney's office and spoke with Assistant District Attorney Rosharwin Williams to explain the situation. The District Attorney's office later recused itself from the case on April 11, 2014, citing a conflict of interest due to its close working relationship with TCSD. However, Harris remained in contact with Williams even after the District Attorney's office recused itself, voicing his frustration that TCSD would not refer the case to MBI.
Although Harris continued to handle the case, both he and Lieutenant William Mullen ("Mullen"), who assisted with the investigation, believed Sheriff Hamp improperly hindered the investigation. Harris claims that Sheriff Hamp prevented him from conducting necessary interviews and did not allow him to visit the crime scene before it was cleaned. Harris and Mullen both testified that they reported their concerns about Sheriff Hamp's conduct to Commander Davis on multiple occasions, but no responsive action was taken. Commander Davis, however, denied that Harris or Mullen reported any concerns to him.
On or about April 14, 2014, Harris communicated with a member of the Attorney General's office, which had taken over the case after the District Attorney's office recused. On April 15, 2014, Harris personally met with a representative from the Attorney General's office to provide a briefing of the case and a copy of his case report. Later that day, Harris contacted Tunica County Justice Court Judge Louise Linzy, who was scheduled to preside over Gloria Logan's initial appearance in the murder case, to express his concerns about the manner in which the case had been handled. Judge Linzy thereafter contacted TCSD to report Harris's call andwas instructed to complete a written report. In her deposition, Judge Linzy testified that she did not call TCSD to file a complaint but simply desired to obtain more details about the situation.
Also on April 15, 2014, Harris received notice from Commander Davis that he was being transferred to the patrol division due to his failure to timely prepare the Brown murder case for presentation to the grand jury in February. Harris contends his failure to complete the case preparation was due to Sheriff Hamp's interference with the investigation. On the following day, April 16, 2014, Harris was placed on administrative leave pending an internal affairs investigation pertaining to his conversation with Judge Linzy. On April 23, 2014, while on administrative leave, Harris failed to honor a subpoena to appear in court regarding another matter. Thereafter, on April 25, 2014, Harris received an Employment Dismissal, terminating his employment with TCSD. The Employment Dismissal provided that Harris was terminated for failure to timely prepare the murder case for presentation to the grand jury, inappropriate contact with Judge Linzy, and failure to appear in court to honor a subpoena. Upon Harris's termination, Persundra Jones, a female, was promoted to Harris's position. Shortly thereafter, Harris filed this suit against Tunica County and Sheriff Hamp.
Sheriff Hamp has raised qualified immunity as a defense to Harris's Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and, alternatively, argues that summary judgment is appropriate as to that claim. Sheriff Hamp also argues that summary judgment is proper as to Harris's state law malicious interference with employment claim.
First Amendment retaliation claim:
The qualified immunity defense shields public officials from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights ofwhich a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Thus, "[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2071, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). The defense is broad, "provid[ing] ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
"Once a defendant properly invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant is not entitled to the doctrine's protection." Howell v. Town of Ball, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 3595722, at *5 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2005)). "To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, which if true, would defeat qualified immunity." Howard v. Tunica Cty., Miss., 2000 WL 33907689, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2000) (citing Wicks v. Miss. State Emp. Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994-97 (5th Cir. 1995)). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff establishes that "(1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation." Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007)).
In the present case, once Sheriff Hamp raised the qualified immunity defense, the burden then shifted to Harris to show (1) that Sheriff Hamp violated his constitutional rights and (2) that Sheriff Hamp's conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The Court discussed in detail the potential violation of Harris's First Amendment rights in its opinion denying defendant Tunica County's motion for summary judgment. Taking Harris's allegationsas true, a constitutional violation may very well have occurred. Nevertheless, the Court finds the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis dispositive, as Sheriff Hamp's conduct did not violate law that was clearly established at the time.1
Under the second prong, "[a] defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (citing Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741). "To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial