Harris v. Victoria Independent School Dist.

• Citation: 168 F.3d 216
• Decision Date: 04 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-41015,97-41015
• Parties: 132 Ed. Law Rep. 662, 14 IER Cases 1550 Dwight HARRIS; Gene Martin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VICTORIA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Paul Kornfuehrer, in his official and individual capacities; Clay Cain, in his official and individual capacities; Ivan Green, in his official and individual capacities; Randy Pollard, in his official and individual capacities; Margaret Easley, in her official capacity only; Reuban Murray, in his official capacity only; Theresa Guitierrez, in her official capacity only; Robert P Brezina, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 216

168 F.3d 216

132 Ed. Law Rep. 662, 14 IER Cases 1550

Dwight HARRIS; Gene Martin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VICTORIA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Paul Kornfuehrer, in his official and individual capacities; Clay Cain, in his

official and individual capacities; Ivan Green, in his

official and individual capacities; Randy Pollard, in his

official and individual capacities; Margaret Easley, in her

official capacity only; Reuban Murray, in his official

capacity only; Theresa Guitierrez, in her official capacity

only; Robert P Brezina, in his official and individual

capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-41015.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 4, 1999.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 6, 1999.

Martha Powell Owen, Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Arturo Gabriel Michel, Philip D. Fraissinet, Bracewell & Patterson, Houston, TX, for Victoria Independent School Dist., Easley, Murray and Guitierrez.

Roger D. Hepworth, Virgil Jay Youngblood, Henslee, Fowler & Hepworth, Austin, TX, for Kornfuehrer, Cain, Green, Pollard and Brezina.

Mark Craig Rains, Victoria, TX, for Brezina.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before SMITH, DUHE and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

DUHE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the reprimand and transfer of two teachers at Victoria High School ("VHS"), Dwight Harris and Gene Martin (collectively "Plaintiffs"), as a result of their speech at a December 8, 1995 committee meeting. Robert Brezina, Superintendent of the Victoria Independent School District ("VISD"), reprimanded the Plaintiffs and transferred them to different campuses during the 1994-95 school year because of their speech. After the VISD Board of Trustees affirmed Superintendent Brezina's decision, the Plaintiffs sued Brezina, members of the Board ¹, and VISD (collectively "Defendants"), alleging that they were transferred and reprimanded in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court granted the Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment on the ground that the Plaintiffs did not speak on a matter of public concern, and the Plaintiffs appealed. Because we hold that the Plaintiffs engaged in protected speech, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified or absolute immunity, and the Board of Trustees' actions were pursuant to official policy, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

In the beginning of the 1995-96 school year, there was an escalating conflict at VHS concerning the performance rating of the school and its principal, Melissa Porche. At the same time, Harris and Martin's colleagues elected them faculty representatives of VHS's site based decision-making committee ("SBDM"). The SBDM is part of a program created by the Texas Legislature to improve the quality of public schools through increased input from multiple sources. ² Each SBDM includes faculty representatives, parents, community members and business representatives.

In the fall semester, Harris and Martin met with Brezina and expressed the faculty's concerns about Principal Porche and gave Brezina a memorandum outlining them. As a result of this meeting, Superintendent Brezina hired a consultant to work with the SBDM, the faculty and Porche to improve the situation. After Brezina received the consultant's report, he formed a sub-committee of the SBDM to create an improvement plan for VHS. Brezina appointed all of the faculty members who were SBDM members, including Harris and Martin, to serve on this newly formed Internal Component Committee ("ICC").

The ICC distributed its improvement plan in Mid-October, but by the December 8, 1995 meeting of the ICC the situation at VHS had not improved. Part of the December 8th meeting was set aside to discuss the implementation of the improvement plan and its progress. Harris reported that many of the faculty members felt Porche was not following the plan, and that VHS needed a new principal to improve the situation. Martin agreed and added if Brezina did not do something, the faculty would revolt. Martin and Harris also called individual VISD Trustees relaying the same message.

After the December 8th meeting, Brezina reprimanded both Plaintiffs and transferred Harris to another high school to teach the same subjects and Martin to a guidance center to teach new subjects to middle school students. The VISD Board of Trustees affirmed Brezina's decision in a grievance hearing.

After the Board's affirmance, the Plaintiffs sued, alleging the transfers were in retaliation

for their exercise of protected speech. The district court granted the Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment ruling that while the Plaintiffs' transfer was an adverse employment decision, they had not spoken on a matter of public concern. The Plaintiffs appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. First Amendment Claim

The Plaintiffs contend their speech was on a matter of public concern. The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs' speech was not on a matter of public concern, and alternatively, that the Plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse employment decision.

This court reviews the district court's determination de novo. See La. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Pension & Welfare Fund v. Alfred Miller General Masonry Contracting Co., 157 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir.1998); see also Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1995). We must determine whether the pleadings and other summary judgment evidence demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 315. The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)).

The government may not constitutionally compel persons to relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). The Plaintiffs must satisfy four elements to recover for a First Amendment retaliation claim. First, the Plaintiffs must suffer an adverse employment decision. See Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir.1997). Second, the Plaintiffs' speech must involve a matter of public concern. See Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). Third, the Plaintiffs' interest in commenting on matters of public concern must outweigh the Defendants' interest in promoting efficiency. Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). Fourth, the Plaintiffs' speech must have motivated the Defendants' action. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). Because it is undisputed that Plaintiffs' transfers and reprimands were motivated by the Plaintiffs' speech at the December 8th meeting, we address only the first three requirements specifically. ³

A. Did the Plaintiffs suffer an adverse employment action?

Superintendent Brezina, in mid-term, transferred Harris to another high school to teach the same subjects and Martin to an alternative learning center for disruptive students to teach subjects and grade levels he had not taught before. Additionally, Brezina reprimanded the Plaintiffs in their transfer letters, and included the letters in the Plaintiffs' personnel files. ⁴ Subsequently, the Board of Trustees affirmed Brezina's actions in a grievance hearing.

The district court held that these facts constituted an adverse employment decision, and we agree. We recognize that federal courts should be extremely hesitant "to invade and take over" in the area of education; a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to seek redress over We also recognize that "a plaintiff's subjective perception that a demotion has occurred is not enough" to constitute an adverse employment decision. Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir.1996). However, the record reflects that the Plaintiffs' transfers, viewed objectively, constitute a demotion. ⁵ Superintendent Brezina testified that he intended the transfers to be disciplinary in nature, and that he merely reprimanded another faculty member because her actions were not as serious as the Plaintiffs. ⁶ Additionally, both Brezina and Board of Trustees member Gutierrez testified that they could not recall a mid-term involuntary transfer of a teacher at VHS, except in one instance which resulted from a reduction in force order. ⁷ Gutierrez further testified that the transfers branded the Plaintiffs as "troublemakers" and "not team players." Taken together, we agree with the district court that these reprimands and transfers constitute adverse employment decisions.

"faculty disputes concerning teaching assignments, room assignments, administrative duties, classroom equipment, teacher recognition, and a host of other relatively trivial matters." Dorsett v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities, 940 F.2d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138-39, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). However, we have repeatedly held that reprimands and demotions constitute adverse employment decisions. See Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that a formal reprimand constitutes an adverse employment decision); Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365 ("Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.") (citing Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir.1994)).

B. Was the Plaintiffs' speech on a matter of public concern?

"In order for speech by a...