Harris v. Walker (Ex parte Walker), 1110436.
Decision Date | 25 May 2012 |
Docket Number | 1110436. |
Citation | 97 So.3d 747 |
Parties | Ex parte Marcus Lydell WALKER. (In re Miguel Harris v. Marcus Lydell Walker). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Fred L. Clements, Jr., and Mahaley P. McInnes of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner.
Ted L. Mann of Mann & Potter, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriff's Department, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901. Walker further asks this Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris.
On May 31, 2011, Harris sued the Macon County Commission, Macon County, and Walker, in both his individual and official capacities, alleging in part:
Harris's claims against Walker and Macon County and the Macon County Commission (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the county defendants”) alleged negligence, wanton and reckless conduct, and negligent and wanton entrustment.
On July 1, 2011, Walker and the county defendants separately moved the trial court to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Walker argued that he was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a Macon County Sheriff's deputy and is, therefore, absolutely immune from suit pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901. The county defendants argued that they cannot be held vicariously liable for the tortious act of the sheriff or his deputies because the Alabama Constitution denominates sheriffs and deputies as members of the State's executive department; they are not, the county defendants argued, county employees.
On November 30, 2011, the trial court entered an order granting the county defendants' motion to dismiss; however, the trial court denied Walker's motion to dismiss. The trial court made no findings of fact in its order. Harris's attorney testified in an affidavit—presented in support of Harris's response to Walker's petition for the writ of mandamus—that the trial court stated at the hearing on the motions to dismiss that it was denying Walker's motion because there existed no evidence as to whether Walker was acting in the line and scope of his duties as a sheriff's deputy at the time of the accident. The trial court reasoned:
“[A] motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., should not be granted if there is a possibility that through discovery the parties could find evidence that [Walker] was not acting within the line and scope of [his duties] at the time of the accident such that [Harris] could possibly recover from [Walker].”
“Inasmuch as the issue before us is whether the trial court correctly denied a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss, ‘[t]his Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true.’ Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala.2002). Moreover, as the defendants sought only a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal without resort to facts supplied by affidavit or other evidentiary material outside the allegations of the complaint, and as the trial court accordingly treated the motion only as what it was, a motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment with evidentiary materials outside the allegations of the complaint, those allegations themselves are the only potential source of factual support for the defendants' claims of immunity. Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Mooneyham v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 802 So.2d 200 (Ala.2001); Garris v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 584 So.2d 791 (Ala.1991); Hales v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 380 So.2d 797 (Ala.1980).
“
“Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 788, 789 (Ala.1998).
“
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So.2d 393, 397–98 (Ala.2003).
Walker states that the complaint in this case alleges that the traffic accident occurred while he was “acting within the line and scope of his employment for the Macon County Sheriff's Department” and that at the time of the accident he “was engaged in the regular course and scope of his employment for the Macon County Sheriff's Department.” Walker argues in his petition that he is an executive officer of the State of Alabama pursuant to Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const.1901. Walker contends that, as an executive officer of the State, he is immune from suit, pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901, for money damages for actions taken while he was executing his duties as a deputy sheriff.
Harris concedes that Walker is immune from suit in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff; however, he notes that the complaint contained allegations against Walker in his individual capacity, and he argues that Walker is entitled to immunity from those claims only if he was acting within the line and scope of his duties at the time of the accident. Relying upon this Court's decision in Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928 (Ala.2003), Harris contends that Walkercannot assert immunity from claims against him in his individual capacity simply because he was operating his patrol car at the time of the accident and that Walker must put forth some evidence showing that, at the time of the accident, he was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff. Harris states that the motion to dismiss was properly denied because it is entirely possible that he could prevail on his claims against Walker individually if it is shown that Walker was not acting within the line and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Harris further contends that at this early stage of the proceeding no discovery has taken place and that he should be allowed time for discovery in order to determine whether Walker was acting within the line and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff at the time of the accident.
This Court has stated:
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