Harrison v. County of Del Norte

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Citation: 213 Cal.Rptr. 658,168 Cal.App.3d 1
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Richard D. HARRISON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DEL NORTE et al., Defendants and Respondents. A018319.

Page 658

213 Cal.Rptr. 658

168 Cal.App.3d 1

Richard D. HARRISON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DEL NORTE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A018319.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

April 30, 1985.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 30, 1985.

Review Denied Aug. 19, 1985.

Allan I. Shatkin, Law Offices of Gordon & Ropers, P.C., San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.

Paul A. Brisso, Mitchell, Dedekam & Angell, Eureka, Robert F. Carlson, Chief Counsel, Robert J. DeFea, Francis A. McEnaney, John F. Donovan, Robert R. Buell, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

CHANNELL, Associate Justice.

Richard D. Harrison appeals from an order of the Superior Court of Del Norte County denying him relief from the claim presentation requirement of Government Code section 945.4. ¹

Appellant was injured while working on a county road project managed by a state-supplied engineer. Appellant failed to file claims with either respondent State of California or respondent County of Del Norte within 100 days, as required by section 911.2. Both public entities denied appellant's applications for leave to file late claims. The trial court denied appellant's petition, pursuant to section 946.6, for relief from the claims filing requirement. Timely notice of appeal was filed.

Appellant raises several issues relating to the propriety of the trial court's denial of his petition for relief: 1) whether the trial court improperly found that appellant's failure to file claims within 100 days was not due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 2) whether the trial court improperly found that appellant was not precluded from filing timely claims by physical incapacity; 3) whether respondents failed to follow the requisite procedure in denying the request for relief from the claims presentation requirements, thereby prejudicing appellant; and 4) whether sections 911.2 and 911.6 are unconstitutional.

For the reasons set forth below, we find the denial of appellant's petition for relief from the claims presentation requirement was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. In addition, we find sections 911.2 and 911.6 constitutional.

Facts

Appellant's petition and supporting documents show the following: He was injured on August 6, 1981, when a water pump he was repairing while working on a county road project exploded. No claim was filed with either respondent within the 100-day period prescribed by section 911.2. A claim was eventually filed on February 2, 1982, 90 days late.

Appellant contends that he failed to file timely claims because he was an unsophisticated layman unschooled in legal matters who was unaware that he had causes of action against public entities. He thought his only remedy was Workers' Compensation. Appellant was hospitalized three times following the accident and spent the remainder of his recuperation period at home, unable to attend to his business affairs. Appellant's physician forbid his return to work during that period.

Appellant's attorney's declaration reveals that appellant did not contact him until after he was fired from his job, more than 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action.

Respondents introduced evidence that during the 100-day period following the accident, appellant was able to begin walking, exercising and driving. Appellant visited his workplace several times and worked on a house he was remodeling. About two and one-half months after the accident, appellant met some friends in Idaho for a week-long deer hunting expedition, and did some road hunting.

Respondents also presented evidence tending to show appellant has some business and legal experience. Appellant supervised nine to ten men, and reported any injuries to the office. He was responsible for the heavy equipment and had authority to make purchases. In addition, appellant formed a partnership, later converted to a corporation, which developed and sold a mobile home park and a recreational vehicle park. He and his brother also owned and operated two dump trucks.

Excusable Neglect

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to relieve him from the provisions of section 945.4, ² because his failure to file claims against the public entities was through "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect". We find this contention without merit.

Sections 911.6 ³ and 946.6, subdivision (c) ⁴ provide relief for late claimants who file their claims against a public entity beyond the 100-day period, if filed within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action, where the claimants established by a preponderance of the evidence that failure to present their claim on time was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. (Segal v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 509, 511-512, 90 Cal.Rptr. 720.) The showing required of a petitioner seeking relief in filing a late claim on these grounds is the same as that required by Code of Civil Procedure section 473 for relieving a party from default judgment. (Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 29, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818.)

"The granting or denial of a petition for relief under section 946.6 rests within the discretion of the trial court and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] It is true that an appellate court more carefully scans the denial than the allowance of such relief to the end that wherever possible cases may be heard on their merits. [Citation.] Nevertheless, we cannot arbitrarily substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. [Citation.] 'Unless, ultimately, each case of this nature is to be decided by the Court of Appeal as if no trial court had ever acted on the petition, we must be careful to preserve the area of the superior court's discretion, and we must do this in fact, as well as in words.' " [Citation.] (Shank v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 152, 156, 188 Cal.Rptr. 644.)

Excusable neglect is neglect which might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271.) Not every mistake of law is excusable. (Viles v. State of California, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 29, 56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818.) To determine whether a person is entitled to relief for a mistake of law, the controlling factor is the reasonableness of the misconception of the law under the circumstances of the particular case. (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 479, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753.)

Generally, the mere ignorance of the time limitation for filing against a public entity is not a sufficient ground for allowing a late claim. (Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79, 70 Cal.Rptr. 908.) Moreover, ignorance of the possible cause of action against the public entity is insufficient to constitute excusable neglect. "Failure to discover the alleged basis of the cause of action in time is also not a compelling showing in the absence of reasonable diligence exercised for the purpose of discovering the facts." (Tsingaris v. State of California (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 312, 314, 154 Cal.Rptr. 135; see also El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 57, 159 Cal.Rptr. 267.) ⁵

The dissent, relying on a footnote in Ebersol v. Cowan, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 438, fn. 14, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271, states that where a petitioner is legally unrepresented during the 100 days' presentation period, the unavailability of an alternative rememdy (i.e., an action for malpractice) requires the reviewing court to "examine with even greater scrutiny" a denial of relief from the claims presentation requirement. (Dissent, at p. 664.) But the Supreme Court went on to emphasize that "to obtain relief under section 946.6 on the basis of excusable neglect, the claimant must at a minimum make a diligent effort to obtain legal counsel within 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action." (Ebersol v. Cowan, supra, at p. 439, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601.) (Emphasis added.) In Ebersol, the petitioner sought legal advice on the day of her injury and contacted nine attorneys in all before finding one who would represent her. (See Id., at pp. 432-433, 197 Cal.Rptr. 601.) In this case, appellant took no steps whatsoever to obtain counsel until after the 100-day period had expired.

Even if appellant was unaware of potential causes of action and of the claim presentation requirements, as stated in Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 478, 58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753, "[I]t stretches one's credulity to believe that this information could not have been ascertained through the exercise of reasonable diligence...." We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant's neglect in failing to timely file claims with the public entities was inexcusable.

Physical Incapacity

Appellant contends that the trial court's denial of his petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements was based on the erroneous finding that appellant was not physically incapacitated. We reject this contention.

Section 946.6, subdivision (c)(3) permits a petitioner relief from the claim filing requirements upon a finding by the court that he was "physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of such disability failed to present a claim during such time; ..." (Emphasis added.) Subdivision (e) provides that the court "shall make an independent determination upon the petition" and that the determination "shall be made upon the basis of the petition, [and] any affidavits in support of or in opposition to the petition, and any additional evidence received at the...